Jean Tirole,Nobel Prize Winner

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for 2014 to Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Toulouse, France ‘for his analysis of market power and regulation’. What commonly characterizes Jean Tirole's work is a combination of rigorous scientific analysis of markets and provision of useful scientific insights and policy guidance for regulation and competition policy in such markets. This paper focuses on two of Tirole's papers, both co-written with Jean-Charles Rochet, which probably best exemplify his policy-oriented research. It summarizes and then explains how the theory that these papers develop led to the implementation of a new policy regulating the payment card industry in the European Union.     

餐饮业网络团购定价研究——以某寿司餐厅为例

文章以广州某寿司餐厅为例,经过实地调研和问卷调查,获得消费者对于该类商品的消费期望,识别影响消费者选择餐饮团购的关键因素,再根据区分需求定价法对团购定价进行建模计算,以期对商家网络团购定价决策做出有益尝试。     

External balances,trade flows and financial conditions

This paper studies how changing expectations concerning future trade and financial conditions are reflected in international external positions. In the absence of Ponzi schemes and arbitrage opportunities, the net foreign asset position of any country must, as a matter of theory, equal the expected present discounted value of future trade deficits, discounted at the cumulated world stochastic discount factor (SDF) that prices all freely traded financial assets. I study the forecasting implications of this theoretical link in 12 countries (Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States and The United Kingdom) between 1970 and 2011. I find that variations in the external positions of most countries reflect changing expectations about trade conditions far into the future. I also find the changing forecasts for the future path of the world SDF are reflected in the dynamics of the U.S. external position.     

Agency costs and product market competition: The case of audit pricing in Greece

Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs are not dependent on product market competition. However, elsewhere in the economics literature, theoretical analysis and empirical research have indicated that product market competition reduces agency costs by reducing the marginal cost of eliciting effort from agents. We investigate the relationship between product market competition and audit fee, as an example of agency cost. Taking advantage of a proprietary data set for Greek audit firms, we find that the audit fee and audit hours are inversely associated with client firm product market competition. We conclude that audit effort, as an agency cost, is reduced where competitive forces reduce the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents.     

Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.     

The impact of temporary uses on property prices: the example of food trucks

Food trucks represent a temporary use of vacant or underutilised land. They have been assumed to increase the livability, vibrancy and attractiveness of a neighbourhood. However, no previous study has investigated whether this effect is reflected in property prices within the surrounding neighbourhood. We investigate the impact of a food truck pod on the values of single-family homes nearby. Using a quasi-experimental design, transaction data from Portland, Oregon and a difference-in-difference specification of a spatial regression model, we find that food trucks actually represent a negative externality, and that proximity of a home to food trucks is penalised by homebuyers. The closer a home is to the food trucks, the lower is the sales price. Explanations for this effect include increased parking shortages and trash issues in a neighbourhood due to food truck visitors.     

PRICING DERIVATIVES ON MULTISCALE DIFFUSIONS: AN EIGENFUNCTION EXPANSION APPROACH

Using tools from spectral analysis, singular and regular perturbation theory, we develop a systematic method for analytically computing the approximate price of a large class of derivative‐assets. The payoff of the derivative‐assets may be path‐dependent. In addition, the process underlying the derivatives may exhibit killing (i.e., jump to default) as well as combined local/nonlocal stochastic volatility. The nonlocal component of volatility may be multiscale, in the sense that it may be driven by one fast‐varying and one slow‐varying factor. The flexibility of our modeling framework is contrasted by the simplicity of our method. We reduce the derivative pricing problem to that of solving a single eigenvalue equation. Once the eigenvalue equation is solved, the approximate price of a derivative can be calculated formulaically. To illustrate our method, we calculate the approximate price of three derivative‐assets: a vanilla option on a defaultable stock, a path‐dependent option on a nondefaultable stock, and a bond in a short‐rate model.     

A NOTE ON PRICING OF PRODUCT QUALITY FOR STATUS CONCERNS

The paper analyses the optimal pricing of the product quality scheme when concerns for relative standing exist among consumers. We demonstrate that if the proportion of high‐value consumers is over (respectively, under) 1/2 of the total consumers, a firm has an incentive to select a large (respectively, small) quality gap among products. Therefore, there exists a cut‐off level for status concerns, which eliminates quality differences, and the firm assigns the same quality to all the consumers. These results indicate that consumers’ qualities will reflect distortions at the top and bottom. Accordingly, the firm's profit depends on which consumer category is larger.     

CONVEX RISK MEASURES FOR GOOD DEAL BOUNDS

We study convex risk measures describing the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound, which is a subinterval of a no‐arbitrage pricing bound. We call such a convex risk measure a good deal valuation and give a set of equivalent conditions for its existence in terms of market. A good deal valuation is characterized by several equivalent properties and in particular, we see that a convex risk measure is a good deal valuation only if it is given as a risk indifference price. An application to shortfall risk measure is given. In addition, we show that the no‐free‐lunch (NFL) condition is equivalent to the existence of a relevant convex risk measure, which is a good deal valuation. The relevance turns out to be a condition for a good deal valuation to be reasonable. Further, we investigate conditions under which any good deal valuation is relevant.     

基于零售商开通网络渠道的多渠道供应链定价策略

文针对拥有网络直销渠道的制造商，考虑零售商实体渠道促销努力水平及消费者的搭便车行为，在 Nash博弈和零售商主导的Stackelberg 博弈下，就零售商开通网络渠道的问题进行研究。通过理论和数值分析，得到以下结论：零售商渠道地位对其开通网络渠道影响不大；开通后，制造商利润减小，当实体渠道基本市场份额较小时，零售商利润增大；零售商应根据实体渠道基本市场份额大小来决定是否开通网络渠道。