Mehr Fiskalkompetenz für die EU?

Die Schuldenkrise der Euro-L?nder hat schlaglichtartig die erheblichen finanzpolitischen Unterschiede zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten verdeutlicht. Viele der damit verbundenen Konflikte und Probleme w?ren m?glicherweise zu entsch?rfen, wenn die EU mehr Kompetenzen im fiskalischen Bereich erhielte. Dies wird von den ?konomen aus verschiedenen Gründen aber mehrheitlich abgelehnt.     

Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*

Law backed by non‐deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., self‐imposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so.     

On government centralization and fiscal referendums

Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens’ fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.     

Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons

Abstract. Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with – ceteris paribus – lower tax rates, and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, income tax rates in cantons are the lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.     

Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated

Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or “psychological” contract. Studies on tax evasion in Switzerland show that the more strongly the political participation rights are developed, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. In this paper, empirical evidence based on a survey of tax authorities of the 26 Swiss states (cantons) is presented, indicating that the differences in the treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities can be explained by differences in political participation rights as well. Received: June 2000 / accepted: November 2000     

Budget referendums and government spending: evidence from Swiss cantons

In many Swiss cantons, new government programs must be approved by a referendum of citizens before money can be spent. Referendums seem like a natural way to address citizen-legislator agency problems, yet statistical evidence on how referendums affect spending decisions is almost nonexistent. We estimate regressions for Swiss cantons using panel data from 1980 to 1998 and find that mandatory referendums reduced government spending by 19% for the median canton after controlling for demographics and other determinants of spending.     

Capital structure choice and company taxation: A meta-study

This paper provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on the tax impact on corporate debt financing. Synthesizing the evidence from 48 previous studies, we find that this impact is substantial. In particular, the tax rate proxy determines the outcome of primary analyses. Measures like the simulated marginal tax rate (Graham, 1996) avoid a downward bias in estimates for the debt response to tax. Moreover, econometric specifications and the set of control-variables affect tax effects. Accounting for misspecification biases by means of meta-regressions, we predict a marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of about 0.27.     

FDI AND TAXATION: A META‐STUDY

Abstract In this paper we extend former meta‐analyses on FDI and taxation in three ways. First, we add 16 recent publications. Second, we code additional meta‐regressor variables addressing important issues in research on FDI and taxation. Third, we refer to the sophisticated meta‐analytical methodology and present a coherent strategy to choose the meta‐regression estimator most suitable for the meta‐data at hand. As compared to prior surveys, the meta‐analysis is thus based on a much broader methodological basis and a considerably richer meta‐data set. The median tax semi‐elasticity of FDI based on 704 primary estimates is 2.49 in absolute terms. The precision weighted average of the full sample of semi‐elasticities is 2.55, again in absolute terms. Moreover, our meta‐analysis shows that there is a publication bias in the primary literature. Meta‐regressions show that studies based on aggregate data report systematically larger semi‐elasticities than firm‐level analyses, that integrating bilateral tax regulations into effective tax rates leads to more effective measurement of adverse tax incentives on foreign investment, and that tax effects are not compensated by public spending.