Fund Families as Delegated Monitors of Money Managers

Because a money manager learns more about her skill from hermanagement experience than outsiders can learn from her realizedreturns, she expects inefficiency in future contracts that conditionexclusively on realized returns. A fund family that learns whatthe manager learns can reduce this inefficiency cost if thefamily is large enough. The family’s incentive is to retainany given manager regardless of her skill but, when the familyhas enough managers, it adds value by boosting the credibilityof its retentions through the firing of others. As the numberof managers grows, the efficiency loss goes to zero.     

Dairy Trade Liberalization Impacts in Canada

Supply management in Canada is facing broad trade liberalization pressures. This paper uses a spatial equilibrium trade model to simulate the impacts of various trade liberalization scenarios in the Canadian dairy industry. The results critically hinge on the relationship between increased market access and the market sharing quota (MSQ) at the farm level. Two different MSQ decision rules are simulated: (i) global output at the farm level remains unchanged following liberalization; and (ii) the MSQ is reduced to support the unit production quota rent at its preliberalization level. The results show that if the MSQ is held constant following a potential compromise in the Doha Round, retail prices of fluid milk and cheese would decrease by about 5%. These price movements can be negated by a 1.4% cut in the global MSQ at the farm level. Net welfare gains in the Canadian dairy sector following market access reforms range between $48.2 and $64.2 million when evaluated at the 2003–04 world prices. Le courant de libéralisation des échanges crée une certaine pression sur les programmes de gestion de l'offre au Canada. Ce papier présente un modèle de commerce en équilibre spatial afin de simuler les effets de différents scénarios de libéralisation des échanges sur l'industrie laitière canadienne. Les résultats dépendent fortement de la relation entre amélioration de l'accès au marché et quota de mise en marché (QMM). Deux différentes règles de décision du QMM sont simulées : i) la production globale est inchangée après la libéralisation ; et ii) le QMM est réduit afin d'assurer une rente de quota par unité de production identique à son niveau de pré‐libéralisation. Les résultats associés à un compromis potentiel dans le cadre du Cycle de Doha indiquent que les prix au détail du lait de consommation et du fromage diminueraient d'environ 5% si le QMM demeure constant. En revanche, les variations de prix seraient nulles si le QMM est réduit de 1.4%. Suivant les scénarios de libéralisation des échanges considérés, le gain net pour l'industrie laitière canadienne serait compris entre 48.2 et 64.2 millions de dollars, lorsqu'évalué aux prix mondiaux de 2003/2004.     

The Collusion-deterring Effect of Pre-attributed Supplies and the Hog Auction in Quebec

The hog/pork industry in Quebec has been going through major institutional changes since 1989, the year an electronic auction was put in place to market all of the hogs in the province. Because the auction's ability to generate high prices did not meet the expectations of hog producers, the pure auction system was replaced by a hybrid one in 1994. In this system, most of the hog supply was pre-attributed to processors at a negotiated price based on the US. price while the remainder of the provincial supply of hogs was sold through the auction. In this paper, we investigate how a seemingly inefficient marketing mechanism like pre-attributions can increase the efficiency of a usually efficient mechanism like an auction. We present theoretical arguments regarding the sustainability of collusion under the pure auction and hybrid systems in addition to analyzing auction prices with modern time series tools.     

The Nonequivalence of Import and Export Quotas in Strategic Equilibrium

The authors use a standard general‐equilibrium trade model to show that export and import policies are not symmetric in the equilibrium of a strategic game with quotas. It is assumed that N (identical) large countries, without cooperation, set their import (or export) quotas to maximize domestic welfare. It is shown that the equilibrium in which all countries use import quotas differs from, and is superior to, the equilibrium in which countries use export quotas. The difference arises because the elasticity of the residual foreign export supply schedule differs between the two equilibria. The authors also study the properties of the sequential equilibrium of the game. In a simultaneous‐move game, each country is indifferent as to whether it uses an import or export quota, given the policy of the other country. However, in a sequential‐move game, the first mover will prefer to use an import quota rather than an export quota.     

The Role of Trading Halts in Monitoring a Specialist Market

When a collection of specialists organize as an exchange, eachcan reap net private benefits at the expense of the exchangeby quoting a privately optimal pricing schedule. Coordinationmakes all specialists and customers better off, but requiresa system of monitoring and punishment that breaks down wheninformation asymmetries between the exchange and a specialistare high. The specialist may then seek a temporary trading haltto alleviate unjustified punishment, or the exchange may halttrading to prevent the quoting of damaging privately optimalpricing schedules. We test this theory on a sample of NYSE halts.As predicted, we find a significant increase in estimated informationasymmetry immediately preceding trading halts.     

Low-Price Low-Capacity Traps and Government Intervention in the Québec Hog Market

This paper investigates the marketing of a primary commodity produced by competitive producers that sell to a single downstream processor. There is a significant lag between production and marketing decisions made by producers. If a credible price commitment cannot be made before producers make their output decision, it is a dominant strategy for the processor to buy producers' output at the world price adjusted for transportation costs. Producers fully anticipate this partial holdup ex ante and adjust production accordingly. When the processor's capacity is binding ex post, the equilibrium is described as a low‐price, low‐capacity trap. Under a specific condition, the processor finds it advantageous to credibly commit to a price increment before producers make their output decision. The ensuing equilibrium is Pareto‐superior to the no‐commitment equilibrium. We argue that the Québec hog/pork industry has experienced such a situation in the past few years. Government intervention is justified even if the processor has committed to a price increment. The modeling of strategic interactions between the government and the processor reveals that their price increments are strategic substitutes. However, given that the processor's (government's) payoff is increasing with the government's (processor's) price increment, the first‐mover advantage entails committing early to a low‐price increment to force one's rival to offer a high‐price increment. Cet article analyse la mise en marché d'un produit primaire vendu par des producteurs preneurs de prix à un seul et unique transformateur. Les décisions de production et de mise en marché sont séparées dans le temps. Si le transformateur ne peut pas s'engager à payer un certain prix avant que les producteurs prennent leur décision de production, alors la stratégie dominante du transformateur est d'offrir aux producteurs le prix mondial diminué par les coûts de transport. Les producteurs anticipant ce hold‐up partiel et réduisent leur production en conséquence. Lorsque le transformateur est confrontéà une contrainte de capacité ex post, les producteurs et le transformateur sont piégés dans un équilibre de « petit prix et petit volume ». Si une condition est respectée, il peut être avantageux pour le transformateur d'offrir un supplément aux producteurs avant leur décision de production. L'équilibre qui s'en suit constitue alors une amélioration au sens de Pareto. Nous soumettons que l'industrie porcine québécoise a vécu pareille expérience durant les dernières années. L'intervention du gouvernement demeure justifiée même si le transformateur s'est commis à payer un supplément. En fait, les interventions du transformateur et du gouvernement sont des substituts stratégiques. Puisque le gain du transformateur (gouvernement) croit avec le supplément offert par le gouvernement (transformateur), il y a un avantage àêtre le premier à se commettre à payer un faible supplément, tant pour le transformateur que pour le gouvernement, pour ainsi forcer l'autre partie à offrir un supplément plus généreux.     

Trade and growth: A gravity approach

The impact of international trade, or “openness,” on economic growth is difficult to quantify because of reverse causality. In this article, I use recent advances in gravity equation estimation to generate a geography‐based instrument for openness à la Frankel and Romer (1999). In contrast with the benchmark, the new instrument is constructed using consistent and unbiased estimates of the impact of geography on bilateral trade. As a result, the instrument provides stronger identification of the impact of trade on income and increases the efficiency of the two‐stage least square estimation. An important advantage of the corrected procedure over the benchmark is that the estimated effect of trade on income remains large, positive, and statistically significant even after controlling for regional indicators and endogenous institutional quality.     

Production uncertainty and trade policy commitment

Agricultural markets are characterized by production and marketing lags. Uncertainty is also an inherent feature of agricultural markets. This paper investigates if two policy active importers will choose to commit to their import levels or keep the flexibility to revise their ex-ante import levels once production decisions are made and the uncertainty is resolved. This is the constant dilemma faced by prospective WTO members. We assume production in both importing countries is subject to an asymmetric random shock. We show that a government will not want to commit to its import level when there is a high degree of uncertainty in production. However, an importing country is likely to commit to a trade policy in equilibrium although the equilibrium may be Pareto dominated. Under certain conditions, an equilibrium in which one country commits to its ex-ante import level while the other chooses the flexibility option can emerge. In this setting, international trade agreements play an important role.     

WHY HAS HOME OWNERSHIP FALLEN AMONG THE YOUNG?*

We document that home ownership of households with “heads” aged 25–44 years fell substantially between 1980 and 2000 and recovered only partially during the 2001–5 housing boom. The 1980–2000 decline in young home ownership occurred as improvements in mortgage opportunities seemingly made it easier to purchase a home. This article uses an equilibrium life‐cycle model calibrated to micro and macro evidence to understand these developments. A trend toward marrying later mechanically lowers young home ownership after 1980. We show that the large rise in earnings risk that occurred after 1980 can easily account for the remaining decline in young home ownership.