Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

Agricultural trade negotiations as a strategic game

This study views multilateral trade negotiations as a strategic game among nations or regions, including taxpayer, consumer, and producer components. Payoffs are calculated from an intermediate-run international trade model initialized with 1989 data. For the public at large, the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal outcome is liberalization of trade – unilateral or multilateral. Maintenance of the status quo of market distortions costing the world billions of dollars each year is rational only if producer payoffs are sovereign so that strategies optimal for producers are considered optimal for nations. Remedial policies are discussed, including opportunities for economic education, political system reform, and less incentives for producers to scuttle multilateral trade negotiations.     

Supply Chain Innovations and Partial Ownership

Review of Industrial Organization - When knowledge sharing is non-contractible, we show that competing downstream firms may prefer to help improve an inefficient alternative supply source than help...     

Has European corporatism delivered? A survey with preliminary evidence

I ask whether European firms' investments in stakeholder welfare come at the cost of lower shareholder value. Focusing on the largest 50 public firms in four European countries, I find a valuation discount in the Tobin's Q of continental European firms relative to matched US firms. The valuation discount is correlated with presence of large block holders in European firms but not with the poorer disclosure record of US firms on the environmental (E) and social (S) dimensions. In sum, poorer governance (G) in continental Europe appears to destroy more shareholder value than better E and S disclosure can add.     

Do ESG funds make stakeholder-friendly investments?

Review of Accounting Studies - Investment funds that claim to focus on socially responsible stocks have proliferated in recent times. In this paper, we verify whether ESG mutual funds actually...