业绩承诺变更会影响企业研发费用操纵吗?

以 2011-2022年A股并购业绩承诺事件为研究对象,探讨了业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响。研究发现:业绩承诺变更加剧了上市公司研发费用操纵现象,且这一影响是通过激发高管机会主义、降低商业信用融资能力实现的;异质性检验发现,业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响在关联并购事件、主并方为国有企业、以及分析师关注程度较低的企业中更为显著;动机和经济后果检验发现,业绩承诺变更主要通过激发高管的政策迎合动机提高了研发费用操纵水平,而该行为使得企业获取了更多的税收优惠和政府补助。     

制造商IT资源、合同治理与分销商渠道投机

从交易成本视角入手并结合信息系统相关研究,文章分析了制造商IT资源对其合同治理手段的影响,以及对分销商渠道投机的抑制作用。经由实地收集的数据实证检验发现：第一,制造商的IT设备越先进,越有助于其与分销商制定更细致的一般合同条款与意外情况合同条款。第二,制造商IT人员提供的支持越多,则越有助于其与分销商制定更细致的一般合同条款与意外情况条款。第三,只有更细致的一般合同条款可以有效地抑制分销商投机,但更细致的意外情况条款则无助于降低分销商的投机。最后,根据上述研究结论,文章给出了企业怎样使用IT资源来提高渠道合同控制效率的相关建议。     

Imperfect Information and Opportunism

Information is a scarce resource. It is inherently available only in a limited form to decision-makers. Limited or imperfect information is caused by uncertainty — both ontologic and epistemic, limitations in cognitive capabilities or bounded rationality, hidden information, and information asymmetries. This has fundamental implications for the manner in which the self-interested behavior of agents will manifest itself. The article argues that in the context of imperfect information, self-interest can function in a manner quite different from what standard approaches assume. This has been demonstrated by the recent financial crisis. However, there has been limited consideration in mainstream models, both of the neoclassical and institutional type, as to what the exact nature of self-interestedness is, and how this affects the market behavior of agents. The nature of self-interest, therefore, needs to be modeled explicitly to improve the explanatory power of economic theories.     

Business-to-Business Negotiations: The Role of Relativism,Deceit, and Opportunism

Purpose: Studies examining the impact of relativism and deceitful tendencies on unethical negotiation tactics have yielded inconsistent results; some studies report a positive relationship, some negative, while some others report a nonexistent relationship between these constructs. These inconsistencies suggest that there may be intervening variables mediating the effects of these factors on unethical negotiation tactics. We propose that opportunism plays an important role in determining the effects of these two antecedents on business managers' perceptions of unethical negotiation tactics.

Method: An Internet-based survey was administered to a sample of managers at U.S. firms engaged in business-to-business marketing. Structural equation modeling techniques were used to evaluate the mediating role of opportunism between deceitful tendencies and relativism on questionable negotiation tactics.

Findings: The analysis supports the hypothesized role of opportunism as a mediating variable. Opportunism was found to play a significant role in mediating the relationships of both relativism and deceitful tendencies on attitudes toward unethical negotiation tactics.

Contribution: In addition to the theoretical contributions suggested here, this article includes suggestions for minimizing the likelihood that a negotiation partner's relativism and deceitful tendencies will negatively impact business negotiation.     

预算机会主义、预算治理构造和预算审计——国家审计嵌入公共预算的理论架构

各国的国家审计在公共预算中的作用呈现不同特色.沿着预算机会主义、预算治理构造到预算审计这个逻辑路径,建立一个关于国家审计在公共预算中作用的理论架构,并以美国和中国作为案例来验证这个理论构架,具有重要意义.各个国家针对预算机会主义会有一个由预算文化、预算制衡和预算问责组成的预算治理构造,预算审计属于预算问责,预算审计如何嵌入预算治理构造的决定因素是剩余预算机会主义,剩余机会主义决定预算审计体制、预算审计重点和预算审计模式.     

转型时期中国品牌崛起的制约因素研究

改革开放30多年来,中国实现了经济大国的崛起,但是,崛起过程中"中国品牌"成了短板。通过企业价值导向、政经环境、文化传承以及管理人才等角度分析后发现,机会主义的企业价值导向从目标设定上背离了品牌发展的方向,不成熟的政治经济环境是约束品牌成长的背景变量,实用主义的传统文化让中国品牌迷失了方向。此外,中国缺乏商界领袖等管理人才也是制约中国品牌崛起的重要因素。     

Rogues and Deviants: a game-theoretic perspective on opportunism in strategic alliances

ABSTRACT

This research examines how relational factors, such as monitoring, relative alliance identity (RAI), and trust, influence opportunism and, consequently, alliance performance. The authors suggest that the strategic alliances literature would benefit from recognising that opportunism does not always originate from the firm (rogue opportunism), but can also originate from individual employees (deviant opportunism). Hypotheses are tested in a multi-method approach within a business simulation and a cross-sectional sample of alliance executives. The results demonstrate a U-shaped relationship between trust and opportunism; however, monitoring moderates the relationship such that at high levels of trust, opportunism is practically non-existent. Further, results indicate that employees’ identification with the alliance impedes opportunism. Additionally, both types of opportunistic behaviours negatively impact the performance of partner firms and alliances.     

U.S.-Based Fast-Food Restaurants: Factors Influencing the International Expansion of Franchise Systems

Studies of international franchising are scant but increasing and can be divided into two streams of research: those focusing on environmental predictors of internationalization and those focusing on strategic, firm-level characteristics. Examining the latter category, this study empirically explores a set of firm-level attributes as predictors of decision making on whether firms seek international expansion. Using longitudinal data from Bond's Franchise Guide 2001–2008, we draw on a sample of U.S.-based fast-food franchise systems to test our hypotheses. Specifically, our database is composed of 1,058 observations of 158 chains, and we estimate a semi-parametric logistic model for international franchising. The model contributes to the literature by being the first to examine the nonlinearity of international franchising determinants using agency theory. The results show that (a) bonding, (b) the percentage of franchised units, (c) the number of states within which the system operates, and (d) the provision of area development agreements and sub-franchising significantly contribute to the international expansion of U.S.-based fast-food franchisors.     

Promotion and Prevention Contracts in Distributor–Supplier Relationship Using Matched Dyadic Data

ABSTRACT

Purpose: This article aims to introduce and distinguish two features of contract design – prevention and promotion contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism within the distributor–supplier relationship. It also examines the moderating role of ex post contract enforcement strategies.

Methodology/approach: The authors test the proposed theoretical model by collecting matched data from distributors and suppliers in China. Moreover, partial least squares regression is used to analyze the data and test the hypothesis model.

Findings: The results show that a prevention contract leads the distributor to vigilantly avoid mistakes and punishments, thereby deterring him from behaving opportunistically. Alternatively, a promotion contract motivates the distributor to make an effort to attain potential long-run payoffs instead of short-term profits, subsequently restraining his opportunism. Overall, the promotion contract is more effective in curbing distributor opportunism than the prevention contract. In addition, the inhibitory effect of a prevention contract on opportunism is reinforced along with a severe contract enforcement strategy. By contrast, a promotion contract effectively mitigates opportunism with a swift contract enforcement strategy.

Originality/value/contribution: This study untangles two distinctive features of contract design – prevention-framed and promotion-framed contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism management. This study also provides a profound understanding of contract effectiveness by revealing the interaction effect between ex ante contract design and ex post contract enforcement.

Research implications: Researchers are encouraged to explore contract effectiveness from a framing perspective. In particular, ex post contract enforcement strategies should be included in research frameworks related to contract governance. Suggestions for further research on the effects of prevention and promotion contracts on different forms of opportunism are also proposed.

Practical implications: This article provides several insightful implications for managers in designing and enforcing contract in business-to-business marketing. Managers can strategically achieve control and motivation effects by consciously making framing decisions in the contract design, further curbing opportunistic behaviors. Moreover, managers can select a contract enforcement strategy in accordance with the contract type to maximize the effects of the specific contract.     

Theory Choice in Economics: Philosophy and Practice

This article evaluates the factors that influence the opportunistic behavior observed in the automotive fuel distribution sector (ethanol and gasoline) and the way this behavior has affected the stability of transactions between distributors and retail gas stations in the State of São Paulo (Brazil). The methodology we adopt in this study is logistic regression. Contracts analysis showed good results in reducing opportunism through fuel adulteration (-68.6 percent), and enforcement by distributors proved effective in curbing opportunism through noncompliance with agreements. We also found that time in the market is a factor conducive to opportunistic behavior, while the application of higher prices is a factor that discourages opportunism.