Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czech Firms

Using a sample of 988 newly privatized Czech firms, with part of the ownership structure exogenously determined prior to voucher privatization, we find that share values are positively related with the ownership stakes of foreigners, insiders, and restituents. While the findings for foreigners and insiders can be attributed to their superior ability to identify more profitable firms, we interpret the findings on restituents as evidence of the beneficial effect of blockholdings. On the other hand, we find that the ownership of the fund with the largest stake is not significantly related with share value, suggesting that the value of external blocks depends on the identity of the owner. However, when the fund is also the largest blockholder in the firm, it has an adverse effect on share value. The negative effect of the dominant block owned by a fund is mitigated when a bank sponsors the fund. Although funds are legally separated from their sponsoring institutions, bank‐sponsored funds may nevertheless have inherited a better access to the innards of these firms, and may be in a better position to monitor them.     

From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style

In 1995, China began a profound reform of its state-owned enterprises. We first describe and characterize this progress in two areas: privatization of small state-owned enterprises at the county level and mass lay-offs of excess state workers at the city level. Local governments have initiated these reforms, which are proceeding in economically and politically sensible ways. We then argue that privatization, Chinese style, rests on an adequate economic and political foundation - federalism, Chinese style. We suggest a range of incentives that propel local governments toward state-owned enterprise reform, including their harder budget constraints and increased competition from the non-state sector. In this sense, federalism, Chinese style, has induced privatization, Chinese style.
JEL classification: H7, L30, P3.     

发展中国家的国有经济改革

伴随发达国家国有经济改革,发展中国家针对本国国有经济存在的弊端也掀起了改革浪潮。改革的核心是产权的私有化。实践表明,私有化不是万能的,政府在经济发展中的干预作用不可削弱。国有经济改革的出路不只是私有化,更重要的是理顺产权关系,改革治理结构,提高管理水平。     

Upstream privatization and downstream licensing

This study attempts to investigate the impact of downstream foreign licensing on upstream privatization policy in a vertically related market, in which a public firm and a domestic private firm supply exclusively to downstream domestic and foreign firms, respectively. We show that downstream licensing occurs when the cost differential between downstream duopolists is small, and the optimal strategy under licensing is upstream partial privatization. In addition, downstream foreign licensing facilitates upstream privatization. We further show that downstream licensing improves (reduces) local welfare when the cost differential is large (small).     

Corruption and privatization: Evidence from a natural experiment in China

This paper investigates how government corruption shapes state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) privatization. To establish causality, we exploit a natural experiment (i.e., the investigations of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) to document that SOEs significantly deepen privatization after the crackdown on corruption. Further evidence demonstrates two plausible mechanisms driving our findings. Specifically, anti-corruption campaign: 1) accelerates privatization process by curbing the underpricing transfers to state entities and encouraging the normal transfers to private entities or individuals; and 2) by reducing managers' incentives to maintain the dominance of state ownership for expropriation through the discretion of perk consumption. Moreover, our findings are particularly pronounced for SOEs located in areas with high levels of social trust, government intervention, and less information asymmetry.     

Training,productivity and wages: An investigation of China's manufacturing enterprises in a privatization era

We estimated a structural model of production and wage determination in which labour quality can be affected by a firm's training decision using data of China's manufacturing enterprises in an era of privatization (2004–2007). Training increased both productivity and wages, but the former increased more, which explained the voluntary provision of on-the-job training. Our results also indicate that state-controlled enterprises' investment in training could be both privately and socially efficient; unions played a role in promoting training; it might be more privately and socially efficient for manufacturing firms to prioritize training resources to lower-educated, female and junior workers, if they had not done so, during privatization.     

Entry decision of a vertically integrated foreign firm with downstream subsidization and upstream privatization

This study considers a vertical structure model in which an upstream state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a downstream domestic firm compete with a vertically integrated foreign firm (VIFF). We consider the cost-inefficiency of the SOE and examine the entry decisions of a VIFF under downstream subsidization. We find that without upstream privatization, the VIFF's entry decision might not be socially desirable unless it enters both markets and the cost inefficiency is intermediate. Additionally, a policy to reduce the cost inefficiency might cause a drastic welfare increase or loss when the VIFF changes its entry decision. We then examine upstream privatization and show that a substantial improvement in cost efficiency can increase welfare with privatization. When the SOE maximizes welfare, however, lesser (greater) cost efficiency improvement is necessary to increase welfare with privatization if the ex-ante cost inefficiency is high (low).     

Has the acceleration of privatization become inevitable in Bahrain?

Bahrain remains the most vulnerable Gulf country due to its limited savings and sharp rise in debt levels, leaving it exposed to high financing risks. The financial crisis has been deepened by the economic double blow of the decline in oil prices and the effects resulting from the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Bahrain has decreased subsidies and increased taxes on many products. Those measures seem, however, insufficient to mitigate the negative impacts on the economy. This paper presents a model based on a comparison between fast privatization and gradual privatization strategies undertaken in some Bahraini economic sectors. It shows that the contribution of privatization to economic restructuring is only as effective as the commitment of the government to maintain a high pace of privatization. This condition can provide needed revenues, and can particularly foster private investments and initiatives. Therefore, it may represent an appropriate context to elevate Bahrain out of the present equilibrium characterized by slow privatization and government dominance on the economy.     

What role should public firms play in the upstream market?

We investigate the upstream public firm's desirable option of production timing in the vertically related upstream market. We find that multiple equilibria may exist, including the Cournot-type and Stackelberg-type, with different degrees of privatization in the presence of upstream firms' efficiency gap. These equilibrium outcomes are also influenced by the intensity of downstream market competition. We further show the corresponding optimal degree of privatization in different phases of gradual privatization.