人类合作之谜:群体选择及其演化仿真研究

基因-文化共同进化塑造了人类物种。专业化和分工是人类独特的生存策略和行为模式,一系列先天心理倾向和文化本能等基础性适应器发展出来,通过组织和市场交换支持这种生存策略和行为模式。群体选择是驱动人类合作的主导力量。普莱斯方程揭示了群体间选择与群体内个体选择的净效应如何导致合作的进化。本文基于普莱斯方程的数值模拟和演化仿真发现,尽管非合作策略在"群体内个体选择"中占优,而在考虑"群体间选择"的净效应是合作策略占优。把合作行为收益b作为测度合作剩余的平均项,演化仿真发现,群体中合作者频率越高、平均适应度越大,都会导致所需b值降低,而当迭代次数越多,所需b值增加;合作者成本成倍增加时,所需最小b值是成倍增加;当加入促进合作的"执行机制"(迭代后的合作者频率乘1.001),所需b值降低。利己和利他作为主观行为动机在很多场合不具备第三方不可证实性,而合作和非合作则在人类实际生活和实验室实验中具有第三方可证实性,因此本文纠正传统上利己、利他这一对具有误导性的概念,提出将"合作行为"替换"利他主义行为","非合作行为"替换"利已主义行为",使群体选择理论在解释人类合作秩序的涌现时更具一般性。     

Non-random selection into entrepreneurship in the realm of government decentralization and corruption

For the past few decades, the extant literature on corruption has primarily relied on firm-level survey measures – for example, those from the World Bank – to explore the relevant empirical determinants of this illegal practice. However, these studies have potentially overlooked an underlying econometric problem – namely, non-random selection into entrepreneurship – that may bias all the estimated determinants to date if ignored in the analysis. Here, I assess this possibility by applying the traditional Heckman (1979) correction procedure in a novel way: using two different samples. I use my proposed solution in the context of government decentralization and firm-level corruption as a plausible application. Specifically, I revisit the question of the causal impact of government decentralization on firm-level corruption when the underlying sample selection issue is addressed. Results are worth noting. I find reasonable evidence of selection bias. On controlling for this, fiscal decentralization substantially decreases firm-level bribery, in general. This finding is in contradiction to the results reported by naive estimation strategies where the sample selection issue is completely ignored.     

公司特征、审计需求与区域性事务所选择影响因素的实证研究

高质量审计度量存在争议①,以区域性事务所作为低质量审计的代理变量②检验低质量审计需求的公司特征,结果表明,公司规模、公司所处地域经济水平以及公司是否有发行外资股与区域性事务所选择负相关,公司负债水平与区域性事务所选择正相关,第一大股东持股比例与区域性事务所选择呈倒"U"型关系,而股权制衡可以在一定程度上制约"一股独大"公司选择区域性事务所.