The dynamics of switching between governmental and independent venture capitalists: theory and evidence

Small Business Economics - In this paper, we study the switching dynamics between independent VCs (IVCs) and governmental VCs (GVCs) by means of a theoretical model and an empirical analysis. By...     

Board Efficiency and Internal Corporate Control Mechanisms

We analyze the interactions between internal and external control mechanisms in a framework in which the board selects the CEO and then decides whether to retain or dismiss him after observing a signal regarding his ability. The novel aspect of our paper is that we consider both the hiring and the firing of the CEO by the board. The type of board is defined by its ability to select a good CEO, so that the quality of the CEO depends on the type of board. Then, the dismissal-retention decision provides information not only on the quality of the CEO but also on the board's type. We show that the board's behavior depends on the pressure from the takeover market and on whether its type is publicly known. When the pressure from the takeover market is high and the type of board is private information, the board prefers not to dismiss the manager even if it has received a very low signal regarding his quality. Hence, our model endogenously derives a collusion between board and CEO in which the board does not fire a bad CEO. This behavior emerges as an attempt to hide the board's inability to accomplish the first task, CEO selection, by distorting the second task, the CEO retention-dismissal decision.     

A simulation analysis of the microstructure of an order driven financial market with multiple securities and portfolio choices

In this paper we propose an artificial market where multiple risky assets are exchanged. Agents are constrained by the availability of resources and trade to adjust their portfolio according to an exogenously given target portfolio. We model the trading mechanism as a continuous auction order-driven market. Agents are heterogeneous in terms of desired target portfolio allocations, but they are homogeneous in terms of trading strategies. We investigate the role played by the trading mechanism in affecting the dynamics of prices, trading volume and volatility. We show that the institutional setting of a double auction market is sufficient to generate a non-normal distribution of price changes and temporal patterns that resemble those observed in real markets. Moreover, we highlight the role played by the interaction between individual wealth constraints and the market frictions associated with a double auction system to determine the negative asymmetry of the stock returns distribution.     

The Pricing of Italian Equity Returns

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between common risk factors and average returns for Italian stocks. Our research has identified the Italian stock market's economic variables by using the results from factor analyses and time series regressions. We study several multi‐factor models combining the relevant macroeconomic variables with the mimicking equity portfolios SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low) proposed by Fama and French (1993). The key question we want to ask ourselves, is whether the influential role of the size and book‐to‐market equity factors in explaining average stock returns can stand up well when competing with some macroeconomic factors. In other words, do stock returns carry some risk premium that is independent of either the market return or the economic forces that underlie the common variation in returns? Our empirical work estimates risk premiums using both traditional two‐pass procedures and one‐pass (full information) methodologies. We show that only the market index and variables linked to interest rate shifts are consistently priced in the Italian stock returns. The role of other factors, and in particular both the size and the price‐to book ratio, are crucially dependent on the estimation procedure. (J.E.L.: G11, G12).     

High‐Performance Management Practices and Employee Outcomes in Denmark

High‐performance work practices are frequently considered to have positive effects on corporate performance, but what do they do for employees? After assessing the correlation between organizational innovation and firm performance, this article investigates whether high‐involvement work practices affect workers in terms of wages, wage inequality and workforce composition. The analysis is based on a survey directed at Danish firms matched with linked employer–employee data and also examines whether the relationship between high‐involvement work practices and employee outcomes is affected by the industrial relations context.     

Voting in small committees

We analyze the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a project proposal whose return is uncertain. Members have diverse preferences: some of them want to maximize the expected value, while others have a bias towards project approval and ignore their information on the project value. We focus on the most efficient use of scarce information when members cannot communicate prior to voting, and we provide insights on the optimal composition of the committee. Our main result is that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome, by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, committees with diverse members perform as well as homogeneous committees, and even better in some cases. In particular, when value-maximizing members outnumber biased members by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique.     

Measuring and Optimizing Portfolio Credit Risk: A Copula‐based Approach*

In this work, we present a methodology for measuring and optimizing the credit risk of a loan portfolio taking into account the non‐normality of the credit loss distribution. In particular, we aim at modelling accurately joint default events for credit assets. In order to achieve this goal, we build the loss distribution of the loan portfolio by Monte Carlo simulation. The times until default of each obligor in portfolio are simulated following a copula‐based approach. In particular, we study four different types of dependence structure for the credit assets in portfolio: the Gaussian copula, the Student's t‐copula, the grouped t‐copula and the Clayton n‐copula (or Cook–Johnson copula). Our aim is to assess the impact of each type of copula on the value of different portfolio risk measures, such as expected loss, maximum loss, credit value at risk and expected shortfall. In addition, we want to verify whether and how the optimal portfolio composition may change utilizing various types of copula for describing the default dependence structure. In order to optimize portfolio credit risk, we minimize the conditional value at risk, a risk measure both relevant and tractable, by solving a simple linear programming problem subject to the traditional constraints of balance, portfolio expected return and trading. The outcomes, in terms of optimal portfolio compositions, obtained assuming different default dependence structures are compared with each other. The solution of the risk minimization problem may suggest us how to restructure the inefficient loan portfolios in order to obtain their best risk/return profile. In the absence of a developed secondary market for loans, we may follow the investment strategies indicated by the solution vector by utilizing credit default swaps.     

Creditor protection,judicial enforcement and credit access

We investigate the impact of the legal system on whether firms obtain the credit they apply for or not. Data comprise unique information provided directly by 48,590 firms from 11 European countries. We look at the strength of creditor protection, the strength of property rights, the time taken to resolve a dispute, the dispute resolution process’s costs and the number of procedures the plaintiff faces using data provided by the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation. The results suggest that the more efficient the judicial enforcement system is, and the higher the creditor protection is, the lower the probability that the firms are partially or totally denied credit. Our results are robust to selection bias (Heckman selection) as well as different controls and different estimation techniques. We find that these variables have considerable economic impact: the probability of obtaining credit is up to 40% higher in countries with more robust legal systems.