Misallocation and financial market frictions: Some direct evidence from the dispersion in borrowing costs

Financial frictions distort the allocation of resources among productive units—all else equal, firms whose financing choices are affected by such frictions face higher borrowing costs than firms with ready access to capital markets. As a result, input choices may differ systematically across firms in ways that are unrelated to their productive efficiency. We propose an accounting framework that allows us to assess empirically the magnitude of the loss in aggregate resources due to such misallocation. To a second-order approximation, the framework requires only information on the dispersion in borrowing costs across firms, which we measure—for a subset of U.S. manufacturing firms—directly from the interest rate spreads on their outstanding publicly-traded debt. Given the observed dispersion in borrowing costs, our approximation method implies a relatively modest loss in efficiency due to resource misallocation—on the order of 1 to 2 percent of measured total factor productivity (TFP). In our framework, the correlation between firm size and borrowing costs has no bearing on TFP losses under the assumption that financial distortions and firm-level efficiency are jointly log-normally distributed. To take into account the effect of covariation between firm size and borrowing costs, we consider a more general framework, which dispenses with the assumption of log-normality and which implies somewhat higher estimates of the resource losses—about 3.5 percent of measured TFP. Counterfactual experiments indicate that dispersion in borrowing costs must be an order of magnitude higher than that observed in the U.S. financial data, in order for misallocation—arising from financial distortions—to account for a significant fraction of measured TFP differentials across countries.     

Social strategies that work

Although most companies have collected lots of friends and followers on social platforms such as Facebook, few have succeeded in generating profits there. That's because they merely port their digital strategies into social environments by broadcasting their commercial messages or seeking customer feedback. To succeed on social platforms, says Harvard Business School's Piskorski, businesses need to devise social strategies that are consistent with users' expectations and behavior in these venues--namely, people want to connect with other people, not with companies. The author defines successful social strategies as those that reduce costs or increase customers' willingness to pay by helping people establish or strengthen relationships through doing free work on a company's behalf. Citing successes at Zynga, eBay, American Express, and Yelp, Piskorski shows that social strategies can generate profits by helping people connect in exchange for tasks that benefit the company such as customer acquisition, marketing, and content creation. He lays out a systematic way to build a social strategy and shows how a major credit card company he advised used the method to roll out its own strategy.     

Taxonomy methods in credit risk evaluation

In their bid for integration with the European Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are faced with the need to introduce numerous significant improvements to their economic systems. A highly important role in this process is to make changes in the existing banking systems. The credit risk evaluation method presented here, using taxonomic measures to plot so-called credit risk maps, may be used to develop sound principles of credit policies. It is a proposition that could solve one of the many problems arising in the course of adaptation of banking systems in Central and Eastern Europe to conditions of market economy.     

Efficiency in Banking: Empirical Evidence from the Czech Republic

The paper examines the cost efficiency of the Czech-banking system in the 1990s by applying the distribution free approach model. Reported results indicate that foreign banks were on average more efficient than the other banks, although their efficiency was comparable with the ‘good’ small banks’ efficiency in early years of their operation. Based on the estimated results it is argued that early privatisation of state-owned commercial banks and more liberal policy towards foreign banks in the early stage of transition would have enhanced the efficiency in the banking system. Anita Taci - The views and opinions are those of the author and not necessarily those of the EBRD.     

On Hypothesis about the Second Eigenvalue of the Leontief Matrix

If an arbitrarily positive eigenvector is repeatedly premultiplied by a positive matrix, then the result tends towards a unique, positive (Frobenius) eigenvector. Brady has demonstrated that the expected absolute magnitude of the estimate of the second largest eigenvalue of a positive random matrix (with identically and independently distributed entries) declines monotonically with the increasing size of the matrix. Hence, the larger the system is, the faster is the convergence. Molnár and Simonovits examined Brady's conjecture in the case where entries of a stochastic matrix are close to 1/n. We prove this hypothesis for any stochastic and positive matrix.     

Resolvable semi-balanced incomplete split-block designs

A method for constructing some new incomplete split-block designs with desirable properties is given. The new class of the designs is characterized with respect to the general balance property. Moreover, the efficiency factors of the designs proposed are given.Received: July 2003 / Revised: November 2003     

Political competition and policy choices: the evidence from agricultural protection

This article investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post‐war period. We use two measures of political competition: one that captures the extent to which political power can be freely contested regardless of election results and one based on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results, based on static and dynamic panel estimators, show unambiguously that the higher the level of political competitions is, the higher the agricultural protection.