DEBT, FOLKLORE, AND CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN FINANCIAL STRUCTURE

Conventional wisdom has long held that, in relationship-based economies such as Japan and Germany, corporations are able to borrow more than U.S. companies, which in turn reduces their cost of capital and gives them a competitive edge. But such folklore does not stand up to scrutiny. In Japan and Germany, large businesses do not borrow more than U.S. companies–and, in fact, judging from coverage ratios, German companies (as well as U.K. companies) seem to borrow considerably less than their international competitors.
The article also reports that, in countries where financial markets are "transparent," the development of the banking sector has little additional impact on the growth of "financially dependent" industries. That is, although industries that require a lot of external finance grow faster in countries where the bank credit-to-GDP ratio is high, the growth rates of such industries are much more correlated with the level of accounting standards (with high standards serving as a proxy for well-developed capital markets) than with a strong banking system.     

RISK MEASURES: RATIONALITY AND DIVERSIFICATION

When there is uncertainty about interest rates (typically due to either illiquidity or defaultability of zero coupon bonds) the cash‐additivity assumption on risk measures becomes problematic. When this assumption is weakened, to cash‐subadditivity for example, the equivalence between convexity and the diversification principle no longer holds. In fact, this principle only implies (and it is implied by) quasiconvexity. For this reason, in this paper quasiconvex risk measures are studied. We provide a dual characterization of quasiconvex cash‐subadditive risk measures and we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for their law invariance. As a byproduct, we obtain an alternative characterization of the actuarial mean value premium principle.     

Market Orientation and R&D Effectiveness in High‐Technology Firms: An Empirical Investigation in the Biotechnology Industry*

There seems to be lack of consensus among informed scholars about the importance a of market orientation for high‐technology firms. This paper gives a comprehensive review of existing empirical studies on the relationship between market orientation and innovation performance and pinpoints two limitations in this research stream that might be at the origin of such controversy. First, extant research often overlooked key innovation outcomes for high‐technology firms, such as those related to research and development (R&D) performance. Second, organizational conditions that can ensure an optimal integration of market knowledge in the innovation process have been less analyzed in the case of these firms. Against this background, the present study contributes to the literature by providing a test of the effect of market orientation on R&D effectiveness and the moderating role of knowledge integration in this relationship, using a sample of Italian biotechnology firms. The study's objectives are addressed in two steps. The first one consists of an in‐depth qualitative study based on semistructured interviews in five biotechnology firms. The second step consists of a follow‐up survey of 50 biotechnology firms. Results from hierarchical multiple regression analysis show that the different dimensions of a market orientation have diverse effects on R&D effectiveness of high‐technology firms: whereas interfunctional coordination has a positive main effect, the effect of customer orientation is moderated by knowledge integration, and competitor orientation has no effect on R&D effectiveness. Post hoc analyses also show two additional results involving a broader set of dependent variables. First, R&D effectiveness mediates the effects of customer orientation and interfunctional coordination on organizational performance. Second, market orientation does not appear to significantly affect R&D efficiency. The present study contributes to current literature in two main respects. First, it adds to previous work on market orientation and innovation by proposing a new dependent variable—R&D effectiveness—which offers a better perspective to understand the impact of market orientation on innovation performance in high‐technology contexts. Second, while part of the current debate on the role of market orientation in high‐tech markets seems to be polarized by positions that sustain its potential drawbacks or, on the contrary, its advantages, this study's findings on the moderating role of knowledge integration shed light on important contingency factors, such as organizational capabilities. The authors discuss the study's limitations and provide directions for future research.     

SCALE ECONOMIES AND HETEROGENEITY IN BUSINESS MONEY DEMAND: THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

This paper investigates the demand for money by firms and the existence of economies of scale in the Italian manufacturing industry. We estimate a model for cash elaborated by Fujiki and Mulligan using a different estimation procedure from the previous literature. We then introduce an iterative procedure based on backward exclusion of firms from model estimation which points out the high heterogeneity of Italian companies in money demand. Our estimates show that the Italian manufacturing industry, considered as a whole, does not enjoy scale economies in money demand. However, our iterative procedure points out that the cause of this result has to be ascribed to small firms which are characterized by thin cash money holdings and a consequent very modest opportunity cost.     

A note on contribution games with loss functions

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.     

Competition for Power and Altruism

The paper analyzes the trade-off between power and altruism by using an experimental framework which involved a group of experimental agents, undergraduate students of the University of Siena. The results show that the introduction into the experimental structure of a tournament for the power appreciably altered the behaviour of agents. More specifically the degree of altruism, measured by the dictator offers, significantly decreased when the agents were able to trade altruism for power. The results were more clear-cut and robust in the case of the dictator game, but also in the case of the ultimatum game the introduction of the tournament for power altered the behavior of subjects. A significant gender effect emerged.     

Network Interaction with Material and Relational Goods: An Exploratory Simulation

We model interaction within the members of a work group, who carry on different projects and can choose to cooperate with each other or to exploit the work of the others. We focus our attention on the dynamic interdependence between their material performance and the structure of the relations among them. In particular, we assume that their satisfaction depends both upon the material outcome of their projects and upon the quality of their reciprocal relations (so that these two aspects are seen, to a certain extent, as psychological substitutes). As dissatisfaction may generate the disruption of social links, the consequent failure of the projects is a possible outcome. In turn, satisfactory relations and stable cooperation may loop positively together. Our model merges game theory and network representation of the relations among actors, thus opening a route of research that, to our knowledge, has not yet been explored.     

Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison

We estimate private benefits of control in 39 countries using 393 controlling blocks sales. On average the value of control is 14 percent, but in some countries can be as low as ?4 percent, in others as high a +65 percent. As predicted by theory, higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership, and more privately negotiated privatizations. We also analyze what institutions are most important in curbing private benefits. We find evidence for both legal and extra‐legal mechanisms. In a multivariate analysis, however, media pressure and tax enforcement seem to be the dominating factors.     

Consumption insurance and entrepreneurial risk: Evidence from Italian micro-data

Using cross-sectional data from the Bank of Italy's Survey on Household Income and Wealth, we make an attempt to assess the relevance of entrepreneurial risk, i.e., idiosyncratic risk borne by firm owners while running their operations. Our new testing procedure will show that progressively more articulated forms of entrepreneurship do not enjoy a larger degree of risk sharing and will suggest some links between a larger or smaller degree of consumption insurance and variables such as net wealth, asset holding, and net indebtedness. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the corresponding institutions.     

A new formula on a particular type of «Gambler's ruin» problem withN players

The «gambler's ruin» problem both in the fair game and in the unfair game with two players is a classical one. Some results are known also for a fair ruin game among more than two players. In this note an unfair ruin game among more than two players is tackled and a new formula is derived.

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Riassunto Il problema della rovina in un gioco (equo o non) tra due giocatori è classico. Alcuni risultati sono noti per un gioco equo di rovina tra più di due giocatori.In questa nota un gioco non equo di rovina tra più di due giocatori è preso in considerazione, ricavando per esso una nuova formula.

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Work performed under the auspices of GNAFA, Italian C.N.R.