Comparisons of heterogeneous distributions and dominance criteria

We are interested in the comparisons of standard-of-living across societies when observations of both income and household structure are available. We generalise the approach of A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (1987) [3] to the case where the marginal distributions of needs can vary across the household populations under comparison. We assume that a sympathetic observer uses a utilitarian social welfare function in order to rank heterogeneous income distributions. Insofar as any individual can play the role of the observer, we take the unanimity point of view according to which the planner?s judgements have to comply with a certain number of basic normative principles. We impose increasingly restrictive conditions on the household?s utility function and we investigate their effects on the resulting rankings of the distributions. This leads us to propose four dominance criteria that can be used for providing an unambiguous ranking of income distributions for heterogeneous populations.     

Mr. Market's Mind: Finance's Hard Problem

The market as a mind is the implicit premise in any discussion on whether the market is rational or not. Still, its implications, in terms of ontology and epistemology, are hardly understood. In particular, this paper defines the market's version of the mind-body problem and labels it as finance's “hard” problem. Its denial by modern finance causes this dominant paradigm to fail in dealing with reality in general and to produce incomplete investment knowledge in particular. Finally, as part of facing up to this problem, this paper offers a glimpse at a practical approach which may enrich investment research.     

Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade‐offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice‐witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice‐witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.     

Cost-effectiveness of rivaroxaban compared with enoxaparin plus a vitamin K antagonist for the treatment of venous thromboembolism

Background:

Venous thromboembolism (VTE), comprised of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE), is commonly treated with a low-molecular-weight heparin such as enoxaparin plus a vitamin K antagonist (VKA) to prevent recurrence. Administration of enoxaparin?+?VKA is hampered by complexities of laboratory monitoring and frequent dose adjustments. Rivaroxaban, an orally administered anticoagulant, has been compared with enoxaparin?+?VKA in the EINSTEIN trials. The objective was to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of rivaroxaban compared with enoxaparin?+?VKA as anticoagulation treatment for acute, symptomatic, objectively-confirmed DVT or PE.

Methods:

A Markov model was built to evaluate the costs, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios associated with rivaroxaban compared to enoxaparin?+?VKA in adult patients treated for acute DVT or PE. All patients entered the model in the ‘on-treatment’ state upon commencement of oral rivaroxaban or enoxaparin?+?VKA for 3, 6, or 12 months. Transition probabilities were obtained from the EINSTEIN trials during treatment and published literature after treatment. A 3-month cycle length, US payer perspective ($2012), 5-year time horizon and a 3% annual discount rate were used.

Results:

Treatment with rivaroxaban cost $2,448 per-patient less and was associated with 0.0058 more QALYs compared with enoxaparin?+?VKA, making it a dominant economic strategy. Upon one-way sensitivity analysis, the model’s results were sensitive to the reduction in index VTE hospitalization length-of-stay associated with rivaroxaban compared with enoxaparin?+?VKA. At a willingness-to-pay threshold of $50,000/QALY, probabilistic sensitivity analysis showed rivaroxaban to be cost-effective compared with enoxaparin?+?VKA approximately 76% of the time.

Limitations:

The model did not account for the benefits associated with an oral and minimally invasive administration of rivaroxaban. ‘Real-world’ applicability is limited because data from the EINSTEIN trials were used in the model. Also, resource utilization and costs were based on the US healthcare system.

Conclusion:

Rivaroxaban is a cost-effective option for anticoagulation treatment of acute VTE patients.     

On the Differential Effects of European Patents

Since the invention of the European Patent System, national patent systems have continued to co-exist, although they did lose appeal. How have the different national systems been affected in view of their characteristics? In order to answer this question a constant-market-share (CMS) analysis is carried out. While on a theoretical level, the different elements adding to the appeal of each patent system are discussed, the CMS-analysis reveals the importance of country size in that the national systems of smaller countries lose.     

How to estimate market concentration given grouped data

A novel method is proposed of estimating market concentration for the census case in which firms are grouped into size classes and all that is known about the firms in each category is their number and aggregate size. The formula arises as a way of applying an alternative expression for the concentration ratio based upon the original and first moment size distributions of firms. The semi-parametric technique, which includes a method of interval as well as point estimation, is derived, applied and validated using actual and simulated data. It is anticipated that the estimator will be of use in competition analysis as well as in academic research.     

Alcohol-related crashes and alcohol availability in grass-roots communities

This paper employs a unique panel data from 111 small non-metropolitan incorporated cities in California during a 108 month period from January 1981 to December 1989 in order to analyse the effect of alcohol availability on highway safety. Negative binomial regression models are estimated which include alcohol licences per square mile as a measure of alcohol availability. Theoretically, the sign of the alcohol licence density is indeterminate as it reflects a trade-off of its effect on traffic exposure and on the time price alcohol. Among the findings, increases in the density of general alcohol licences for off-site (on-site) alcohol consumption are beneficial (detrimental) to highway safety whereas increasing the density of beer/wine licences have non-uniform effects. Additional findings important to municipal policymakers are that DUI arrests and increasing the price of alcohol reduce alcohol-related crashes.     

家族企业的品牌长青术

家族企业的品牌管理不太为外界所熟知，但是，家族企业由于其独特的“家庭要素”的背景，在核心理念、客户关联、一致性、员工融入和锐意进取等各个方面都有突出的表现，而这些要素也恰好是全球领先品牌的五个核心特征。     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.