A behavioral theory of governments’ ability to make credible commitments to firms: The case of the East Asian paradox

An expansive literature exists linking institutional constraints, credible commitments, and economic growth. Yet, this literature runs into difficulty when it tries to explain the East Asian “paradox:” rapid economic growth achieved by countries with low levels of formal constraints on government discretion. We use a behavioral theory of commitment to argue that the characteristics of the salient actors (governments) and their actions (policies) affect the credibility of their behaviors in ways independent of the structural underpinnings of a country’s political institutions. This behavioral theory of commitment provides a distinct but complementary lens through which to view the apparent paradox presented by these East Asian countries, and more generally provides an alternative theoretical mechanism to explain and predict governments’ ability to credibly signal their commitment to a course of action to investing firms. The success of East Asian countries in encouraging investment from both domestic and foreign firms implies that firms interpret governments’ actions as credible signals of their intention to honor their commitments to firms, consistent with the behavioral theory of commitment.     

Inefficiency in Earnings Forecasts: Experimental Evidence of Reactions to Positive vs. Negative Information

Prior archival studies of analysts' forecasts have found evidence for systematic underreaction, systematic overreaction, and systematic optimism bias. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) attempt to reconcile the conflicting evidence by testing the robustness of Abarbanell and Bernard's (1992) underreaction results to the nature of the information. Consistent with systematic optimism, forecasts are found to underreact to negative earnings information but overreact to positive information. However, Easterwood and Nutt are unable to distinguish between misreaction caused by incentives unique to analysts with misreaction caused by human decision bias that may be typical of investors. We address this issue by analyzing forecast reactions to positive versus negative information in the controlled experimental setting of Gillette, Stevens, Watts, and Williams (1999). The forecast data reveal systematic underreaction to both positive and negative information, and the underreaction is generally greater for positive information than negative information. This suggests that prior empirical evidence of forecast overreaction to positive information is unlikely to be attributable to human decision bias.     

Firm heterogeneity and worker turnover

Previous empirical analyses of job mobility focus on worker rather than firm characteristics. This paper exploits a unique data set on enterprise employment. We describe sectoral differences in turnover rates and in the persistence of turnover. We also present evidence of persistent turnover differences at the level of the individual firms—a result that is expected if firms have managers with differing ability to screen workers. When we consider the consequences to the firm of such turnover, we discover that high turnover firms are less likely to survive.     

The FASB's cost/benefit constraint in theory and practice

The FASB in its Conceptual Framework has set high principles in the ethics of standard-setting in accounting. This paper concentrates on what the FASB calls the cost/benefit constraint, i.e., the commitment to setting an accounting standard only when the benefits of the standard exceeds the costs of that standard toall stakeholders. This constraint is supposed to take precedence over other concerns, such as neutrality (freedom from bias) of account information.The major conclusion of this paper is that a conflict exists between the FASB's commitment and its practice. There is no evidence that the FASB has always made a costs and benefits judgement with respect to proposed standards. In the cases when such a judgement is made, the FASB discounts social costs; therefore, it is not considering costs to all stakeholders. At the same time the FASB discounts social costs, it seems to have an undue concern for standards that do not increase the volatility of net income. The Conceptual Framework explicitly defines costs as the costs to society as a whole.Stanley Martens is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at DePaul University. He has written many articles for philosophy publications and accounting publications.Kevin Stevens is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at DePaul University. He has written many articles for various accounting publications.     

FOCUS: Ethics in the Accountancy Profession in Ireland

Accountants confronted with ethical dilemmas are expected to comply with their ethical guide or seek advice from their professional body. This study of Chartered Accountants in Ireland records their views on the usefulness of a Code of Ethics, the efficacy of their professional Institute and the need for ethics courses in Continuing Professional Development. Peter Clarke is a lecturer in the Department of Accountancy, University College Dublin, Dublin 4; Nancy Hill and Kevin Stevens are members of the School of Accountancy, DePaul University, Chicago.