Women's employment, intra-household bargaining, and distribution: a two-sector analysis

This paper investigates the intra-household impact of an expansionin employment opportunities for women in a dual labor market,when the informal sector functions as a gateway to the formalsector. We us a variant of the Harris-Todaro framework withtwo-period overlapping generations to model this economy. Laborallocation decisions and distribution of household consumptionare determined according to the generalized Nash cooperativebargaining solution, and agents have perfect foresight. It isshown that an increase in demand for women's labor can shiftintra-household distribution in favor of men and thereby reducewomen's welfare.     

Do Intra-Household Effects Generate the Food Stamp Cash-Out Puzzle?

Previous empirical studies have noted the higher marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps in the United States, compared to that out of cash income. Analyzing data from U.S. Food Stamp Program participants, we find evidence that this discrepancy may be driven primarily by the behavior of multiple-adult households. Single-adult households show no evidence of any discrepancy. Thus, our results suggest that food stamp and cash income (welfare or market) may have very different impact on the intra-household allocation process, and that this is reflected empirically in the cash-out puzzle.     

Pricing strategy and financial policy

Recent empirical evidence indicates that capital structure changesaffect pricing strategies. In most cases, prices increase followingthe implementation of a leveraged buyout of a major firm inan industry, with the more leveraged firm in the industry charginghigher prices on average. Notable exceptions exist, however,when the leverage increasing firm's rival is relatively unlevered.The first observation is consistent with a model where firmscompete for market share on the basis of price. The second observationcan be explained within the context of a Stackelberg model wherethe relatively unlevered rival acts as the Stackelberg priceleader.