排序方式: 共有3条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Do Institutions Cause Growth? 总被引:16,自引:5,他引:11
Edward L. Glaeser Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer 《Journal of Economic Growth》2004,9(3):271-303
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions. 相似文献
2.
Simeon Djankov Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer 《Journal of Financial Economics》2008
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights. 相似文献
3.
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World 总被引:62,自引:0,他引:62
Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes rei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny 《The Journal of Finance》2000,55(1):1-33
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends. 相似文献
1