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Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation 总被引:127,自引:0,他引:127
Rafael La porta Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes rei Shleifer & Robert Vishny 《The Journal of Finance》2002,57(3):1147-1170
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder. 相似文献
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Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World 总被引:62,自引:0,他引:62
Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes rei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny 《The Journal of Finance》2000,55(1):1-33
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends. 相似文献
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