Why do security prices change? A transaction-level analysis of NYSE stocks

This article develops and tests a structural model of intradayprice formation that embodies public information shocks andmicrostructure effects. We use the model to analyze intradaypatterns in bid-ask spreads, price volatility, transaction costs,and return and quote auto-correlations, and to construct metricsfor price discovery and effective trading costs. Informationasymmetry and uncertainty over fundamentals decrease over theday, although transaction costs increase. The results help explainthe U-shaped pattern in intraday bid-ask spreads and volatility,and are also consistent with the intra-day decline in the varianceof ask price changes.     

Consolidation, fragmentation, and the disclosure of trading information

It is commonly believed that fragmented security markets havea natural tendency to consolidate. This article examines thisbelief, focusing on the effect of disclosing trading informationto market participants. We show that large traders who placemultiple trades can benefit from the absence of trade disclosurein a fragmented market, as can dealers who face less price competitionthan in a unified market. Consequently, a fragmented marketneed not coalesce into a single market unless trade disclosureis mandatory. We also compare and contrast fragmented and consolidatedmarkets. Fragmentation results in higher price volatility andviolations of price efficiency.     

In search of liquidity: block trades in the upstairs and downstairs markets

We analyze the ability of various market mechanisms to provideliquidity for large equity trades. Using data on 21,077 blocktransactions in Dow Jones stocks, we find that the 'downstairs'NYSE floor market is a significant source of liquidity. Althoughnegotiation in the informal 'upstairs' market provides betterexecution than the downstairs market for large trades, thesedifferences are economically small. We find, however, that upstairsmarkets are used by traders who can credibly signal that theirtrades are liquidity motivated. Thus, upstairs markets allowtrades that may not otherwise occur.     

Evolving Efficiency of Dually-Listed Indian Stocks: A Nonlinear Perspective

This paper examines the degree of efficiency of Indian ADRs and their underlying stocks trading in NSE/BSE from an adaptive markets hypothesis (AMH) perspective that is theoretically grounded in nonlinear serial dependence. For this purpose, the authors employ the windowed as well as the rolling hinich bicorrelation test procedures on ADRs and the underlying stocks issued by Indian firms such as, and limited to, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Infosys, Wipro, Tata Motors, and Sterlite Industries. The study’s findings indicate that the degree of market efficiency witnessed at the level of individual scrips (ADRs or underlying domestic stocks) differs considerably from the degree of efficiency of the broader stock market in which such scrips trade. Further, the degree of efficiency witnessed amidst all US and Indian scrips considered for this study was found to be heterogeneous in nature and in-turn warrants a ranking approach. Lastly, the degree of efficiency witnessed in certain (not all) dually-listed Indian scrips was found to be homogenous across trading locations. However, this does not happen to be the case for all other dually-listed scrips considered for this study. The study’s findings bring to light the need for disaggregated, firm level market efficiency studies aimed at examining firm-level market efficiency at different trading locations and in-turn identifying the antecedents behind homogeneity (or lack-thereof) in firm-level market efficiency across multiple trading locations.

     

Price discovery in auction markets: a look inside the black box

Opening mechanisms play a crucial role in information aggregationfollowing the overnight nontrading period. This article examinesthe process of price discovery at the New York Stock Exchangesingle-price opening auction. We develop a theoretical modelto explain the determinants of the opening price and test themodel using order-level data. We show that the presence of designateddealers facilitates price discovery relative to a fully automatedcall auction market. This is consistent with specialists extractinginformation from observing the evolution of the limit orderbook. In addition, the specialist's opening trade reflects noninformationalfactors such as price stabilization requirements.