排序方式: 共有6条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Nicola Gennaioli Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez De Silanes Andrei Shleifer 《Journal of Economic Growth》2014,19(3):259-309
We use a newly assembled sample of 1,528 regions from 83 countries to compare the speed of per capita income convergence within and across countries. Regional growth is shaped by similar factors as national growth, such as geography and human capital. Regional convergence rate is about 2 % per year, comparable to that between countries. Regional convergence is faster in richer countries, and countries with better capital markets. A calibration of a neoclassical growth model suggests that significant barriers to factor mobility within countries are needed to account for the evidence. 相似文献
2.
Do Institutions Cause Growth? 总被引:16,自引:5,他引:11
Edward L. Glaeser Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer 《Journal of Economic Growth》2004,9(3):271-303
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions. 相似文献
3.
Corporate Ownership Around the World 总被引:230,自引:0,他引:230
Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer 《The Journal of Finance》1999,54(2):471-517
We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. 相似文献
4.
Simeon Djankov Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer 《Journal of Financial Economics》2008
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights. 相似文献
5.
Government Ownership of Banks 总被引:33,自引:0,他引:33
Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer 《The Journal of Finance》2002,57(1):265-301
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms. 相似文献
6.
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World 总被引:62,自引:0,他引:62
Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes rei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny 《The Journal of Finance》2000,55(1):1-33
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends. 相似文献
1