资本市场开放与股权资本成本——基于沪港通、深港通的实证研究

本文基于沪港通和深港通研究资本市场开放对中国内地股权资本成本的影响。研究发现,受政策风险和市场环境等因素所限,沪港通在初始阶段并未对沪市公司的股权资本成本产生显著影响,但随着政策进一步完善、市场逐渐稳定和交易不断活跃,其对股权资本成本的降低效果于实施两年后开始显现;深港通建立在沪港通的制度基础和运行经验上,其在开通后显著降低了标的公司的股权资本成本。本文还进一步分析了资本市场开放影响股权资本成本的竞争渠道和信息渠道,发现深港通对股权资本成本的降低作用主要集中在投资者竞争程度较高,或是公开信息质量较高、信息不对称程度较低的股票样本。     

非国有大股东对国企超额雇员的影响:成本效应还是激励效应

基于竞争理论的国企改革思路强调减少政策性负担摊派,基于产权理论的改革思路侧重于引入非国有资本,以解决产权不清晰与所有者缺位问题.本文尝试融合两种理论,以国企超额雇员问题为研究对象,从非国有大股东视角探究混合所有制改革成效.研究发现:非国有大股东能够显著降低国企超额雇员,减弱超额雇员对公司价值的损害作用,且该治理作用会随非国有大股东相对力量的提高而增强;从作用机制来看,该治理作用不仅表现为劳动力成本尤其是员工薪酬的节约,还表现为内部薪酬差距和管理层薪酬业绩敏感性的提高,兼具成本效应与激励效应;该作用在地区就业压力较小、劳动密集度较低以及劳动保护水平更低的环境下更为显著.     

AI-chatbots on the services frontline addressing the challenges and opportunities of agency

AI-chatbots as frontline agents promise innovative opportunities for shaping service offerings that benefit customers and retailers. Examining current practice through the lens of agency, as defined by Social Cognitive Theory, we present a 3-level classification of AI-chatbot design (anthropomorphic role, appearance and interactivity) and examine how the combination of these three aspects of chatbot design impacts on the complementarities of agency. Recognizing current implementation challenges, we advance that the complementarities of agency at each level are the lynchpin mechanism that translates AI-chatbot design into service relevant outcomes. We develop a research agenda focused on the emotion interface, resolution of the proxy agency dilemma and development of collective agency to support the implementation of AI-chatbots as frontline service agents.     

委托理财导致上市公司脱实向虚吗?——基于企业创新的视角

依据2008-2017年上市公司委托理财与专利数据,本文实证研究了委托理财对企业创新的影响。研究发现随着委托理财规模与理财收益对公司业绩贡献的增加,上市公司总体上创新数量变化不明显,但创新质量却显著下降。对于不同的委托理财而言,上市公司购买银行与非银行委托理财对创新质量的影响均为负面,但对创新数量的影响却正好相反。两种类型委托理财对创新数量的影响可能相互抵消,从而导致总体上委托理财对创新数量的影响不显著。进一步研究发现,购买更多的委托理财导致上市公司更加倾向于进行风险低的开发性创新,减少风险高的探索性创新。购买银行理财的上市公司更倾向于机会主义创新,而购买非银行理财的上市公司更可能消极创新。总之,基于企业创新视角的分析发现大规模和投机性的委托理财会干扰上市公司创新行为,导致其经营"脱实向虚"。     

Relief aid stocking decisions under bilateral agency cooperation

We aim to quantify the benefits of cooperation between humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stocking decisions. We consider two agencies that stock the same type of relief item at different locations prone to individual disaster risks and agree to transship the shortage amount from available stocks in case of a disaster. We incorporate the disaster risk to the Newsvendor model by conditioning the stock quantity decisions on the event that a major disaster occurs within the lifetime of the stocked relief item. We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity and compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically. We apply this game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul to optimize the stocking decisions of an agency for shelter units in cooperation with another agency. We investigate the characteristics of the solutions under various parameter settings and identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies.     

Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest

Rating agencies produce ratings used by investors, but obtain most of their revenue from issuers, leading to a conflict of interest. We employ a unique data set on the use of non-rating services, and the associated payments, in India, to test if this conflict affects ratings quality. Agencies rate issuers that pay them for non-rating services higher (than agencies not hired for such services). Such issuers also have higher default rates. Both effects are increasing in the amount paid. These results suggest that issuers which hire agencies for non-rating services receive higher ratings despite having higher default risk.     

Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.     

The effect of shared auditors in the supply chain on cost stickiness

Do supply chain audits have real effects?We focus on the effect of shared auditors in the supply chain on corporate cost stickiness.When a supplier shares audit...     

Persistence of Price–Cost Margin and Technical Efficiency in the Indonesian Food and Beverage Industry

Abstract

This research investigates the persistence of price–cost margin (PCM) and technical efficiency (TE) of firms and the relation between these two factors in 44 subsectors of the Indonesian food and beverage industry in the period 1980–2014. Data envelopment analysis with a bootstrapping approach is applied to estimate TE. An autoregressive model, accounting for endogeneity, is applied to estimate the persistence coefficients of PCM and TE. A cross-sectional regression model is also applied to estimate the relation between the persistence of the PCM and the persistence of TE. The results show that for these food and beverage firms, high PCM and low TE persist. Furthermore, the persistence of PCM negatively affects the persistence of TE in the industry.     

Firms’ performance following the initial resignation of independent directors: evidence from Taiwan

This study investigates the operating performance of firms listed on the Taiwan stock exchange following the initial resignation of independent directors. The results show that the firms’ operating performance following the resignation of these directors has not only deteriorated, but is also significantly below the industry average. In addition, firms with a relatively severe agency problem, including firms that have lower insider or institutional shareholdings, receive audit opinions other than unqualified opinions or change their auditors prior to the resignation of the independent directors, tend to perform more poorly following the resignation.