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排序方式: 共有49条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Controlling Investment Decisions: Depreciation- and Capital Charges   总被引:9,自引:5,他引:4  
This paper examines a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a divisional manager has superior information regarding the profitability of an investment project available to his division. The manager also contributes to the periodic operating cash flows of his division through personally costly effort. We demonstrate that it is optimal for the principal to delegate the investment decision and to base the manager's compensation on the residual income performance measure. Our analysis points to a class of depreciation rules and to a particular capital charge rate which together ensure that a profitable (unprofitable) project makes a positive (negative) contribution to residual income in every period. As a consequence, the compensation parameters for each period can be chosen freely so as to address the moral hazard problems without impacting the manager's investment incentives.  相似文献
2.
一般认为 ,产权改革是我国国有企业改革的关键。但对于同样属于国有企业的国有商业银行的改革 ,人们却往往把重点放在经营问题上 ,以至无法从根本上提高国有商业银行的效率。本文以我国国有商业银行的贷款量为切入点 ,运用模型和数据说明在产权关系不明晰的前提下 ,政府运用行政手段对银行经营者进行监管的不良效果 ,同时论证了产权关系对委托—代理问题的决定性作用  相似文献
3.
企业集团特征与成员企业价值   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
作为外部市场机制的一种替代形式,企业集团在发展中国家广泛存在。一方面,企业集团通过建立内部市场降低成员企业(Group-affiliated Com- panies)之间的交易成本,能够提高企业的价值;另一方面,企业集团内部控股股东与其他股东之间的代理问题相对于独立经营的公司更加严重,对其成员企业价值存在负面影响。本文以我国A股上市公司中的集团成员企业为样本,采用实证的方法研究了集团化经营方式对其成员企业价值的影响。结果表明:集团成员企业的经营效率和市场价值总体上均显著优于其所在行业的中值;同时,集团内上市公司数量的增多、集团层面的多元化经营都会显著提高成员企业的市场价值;但是,政府作为集团最终控股人或者控股股东持股比例过高时,集团产生的代理问题对成员公司价值存在显著的负面影响。  相似文献
4.
This paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999–2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms.  相似文献
5.
Ownership Differences and Firms' Income Smoothing Behavior   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper examines the association between differences in ownership structure and income smoothing behavior in firms. The underlying constructs affecting this association include agency relationships, managerial incentives, information asymmetry, and firm profitability. A logistic regression model is used to test the association between income smoothing and variables related to inside ownership, institutional holdings, leverage, managerial compensation, profitability, and firm size. The evidence suggests that ownership differences, managers' incentive structures, and firm profitability are important in explaining income smoothing behavior in firms. By separating inside ownership and levels of debt into different levels, we are able to show the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between ownership differences and firms' income smoothing behavior.  相似文献
6.
伊斯兰银行业公司治理:理论与实践   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
伊斯兰银行业公司治理由于其自身不同的经营特点而与传统银行业治理存在较大的差异,其治理结构、代理关系较为复杂,成为英美、德日模式之外较具代表性的一种模式。本文从伊斯兰银行的治理结构及其复杂的委托代理关系出发,论述了其面临的代理问题,并就其代理问题介绍了伊斯兰银行业的公司治理实践,以期为我国的银行业治理提供一定的借鉴。  相似文献
7.
The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
I demonstrate that acquisitions are accompanied by large, permanent increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation, which create strong financial incentives for CEOs to pursue acquisitions earlier in their career. Accordingly, I document that a firm's acquisition propensity is decreasing in the age of its CEO: a firm with a CEO who is 20 years older is ∼30%30% less likely to announce an acquisition. This negative effect of CEO age on acquisitions is strongest among firms where CEOs likely anticipate or can influence high post-acquisition compensation, and is absent for other investment decisions that are not rewarded with permanent compensation gains. The age effect cannot be explained by the selection of young CEOs by acquisition-prone firms, nor by a story of declining overconfidence with age. This paper underscores the relevance of CEO personal characteristics and CEO-level variation in agency problems for corporate decisions.  相似文献
8.
Abstract:  We investigate whether family controlled firms use dividends, debt and board structure to exacerbate or mitigate agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders in a capital market environment with high investor protection and private benefits of control. Results indicate family controlled firms employ higher dividend payout ratios, higher debt levels and lower levels of board independence compared to non-family firms. This suggests family controlled firms use either dividends or debt as a substitute for independent directors. We also find that dividends and debt are more effective governance mechanisms in mitigating the families' expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth. Independent directors are, in contrast, more effective in controlling owner-manager conflict in non-family firms.  相似文献
9.
Abstract:   This paper investigates the capital investment decisions of Korean firms and their impact on shareholder wealth. Overall, we find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcements of 697 cases of investment projects during the period 1992–1999. This paper also finds that the investment decisions of business group ( chaebol ‐affiliated) firms do not increase shareholder wealth, while the capital investment decisions of non‐ chaebol firms generate significantly positive abnormal returns. The multivariate tests provide consistent evidence that the announcement effects for chaebol firms are lower than for non‐ chaebol firms, after growth opportunities, investment size and firm size are controlled for. The findings support the view that the organizational structure of Korean chaebols creates an incentive for managers to make non‐value maximizing capital investment decisions.  相似文献
10.
This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk–taking. We find robust evidence that the greater risk taking incentives of stockholder controlled banks (compared to managerially controlled banks) are more pronounced for the set of banks with larger asset size, lower stock–return volatility, and lower balance–sheet–risk characteristics. Considering that the probability of failure for these banks is relatively low, these results may suggest that the efficacy of insider ownership in mitigating the agency problem could be affected by the costs perceived by the managers associated with aligning their interests with outside stockholders (i.e., the expected loss of benefits from control of the firm in the event of failure).  相似文献
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