发展森林保险的政策研究

林业是国民经济的重要基础产业,也是为社会提供生态产品的重要公益事业,但是林业生产面临巨大的自然灾害风险。森林保险是重要的林业风险保障机制,但由于其准公共产品的性质和信息不对称等原因,森林保险在我国的发展历经曲折,严重滞后于林业发展对风险保障的巨大需求。通过对森林保险的经济学分析和对国外森林保险制度的研究和借鉴,本文认为建立政策性森林保险机制对于我国森林保险事业的发展具有重要的意义,并提出了相应的政策建议。  

Intrafirm Trade,Bargaining Power,and Specific Investments

This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.  

总部经济对中国货币政策传导渠道影响机制研究

总部经济是当前我国经济发展过程中出现的一种新型形态,对金融运行以及货币政策传导机制产生了重要影响。在计量分析得到我国货币政策传导以信贷为主要渠道的基础上,通过加入总部经济冲击的金融市场博弈模型,本文分析了总部经济对信贷渠道的影响机制。辅以在实际调研中发现总部经济影响银行信贷渠道发挥作用的若干特征事实,本文认为,总部经济通过强有力的融资能力、资金集中管理能力以及较强的利率议价能力降低了对银行信贷的依赖,削弱了银行信贷渠道的传导效率,针对这种现象,本文提出了相关建议。  

次贷危机下美国和全球股市之联动

本文选用NADCC-EGARCH模型研究了次贷危机影响下全球主要股票市场的反应,并捕捉到欧亚五个股市同美国股市联动关系的变化过程。实证显示,由美国次贷危机引发的金融危机造成了全球股票市场不同程度的动荡,出现熊市迹象。美国同全球股市间的联动关系在危机扩散后存在结构性变化,且欧洲、日本等成熟市场与美国市场的联动关系受美国股市负面消息的影响较大。中国虽受到一定程度的冲击,但是国内股票市场结构相对稳定。  

Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.  

Who knows what when? The information content of pre-IPO market prices

To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs that starts as soon as the offer range is published. We examine these pre-IPO prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the offer range and the offer price. The pre-IPO prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests. They cast doubt on the informational role of bookbuilding and the relevance of the winner's curse problem.  

信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是"疏",而不是"堵".  

Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information

This article analyzes mortgage-market equilibrium when borrower default costs are private information. By applying the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is shown that asymmetric information regarding default costs distorts the contract choices available in the mortgage market, preventing safe borrowers (those with high default costs) from fully satisfying their demand for mortgage debt. Large loans are available for a substantial interest-rate premium, but only risky borrowers find this premium worth paying. The article builds on an empirical literature designed to test the ruthless-default principle from option-based models of mortgage pricing. That literature provides evidence against ruthless behavior, suggesting that default costs play an important role in borrower decisions. The article takes a further step by arguing that such costs are private information, which has important implications for market equilibrium.  

信息不对称视角下财税库银横向联网：山东案例

传统的税款经收缴库是一个非典型的信息不对称模式,商业银行、税务机关、国库部门在这种模式下的行为博弈具有较强的隐蔽性。解决这一问题的关键在于降低各部门的信息不对称。山东省推行的财税库银横向联网系统就是解决信息不对称的有效途径。