机动车辆保险承保周期的回归模型分析

通过构造一个包含多个变量的回归模型来检验各种因素对保费变动的影响,结果表明:滞后损失率和滞后保费增长率对当期保费增长影响非常显著;滞后损失增长率对当期保费增长率影响不显著;在我国机动车辆保险中,宏观经济因素包括利率和GDP对保费增长率的影响很小.因此,我国机动车辆保险承保周期存在原因较为符合承保能力限制假说.  

推进机动车辆保险费率市场化改革势在必行

机动车辆保险费率市场化是近些年来保险市场上的一个热门话题,也是制约机动车辆保险市场发展的一个瓶颈和唯一的出路。回顾30多年来车险费率的变化、利弊以及市场化的前提条件等,对加快费率市场化有一个更为清晰的认识,既要充分认识车险费率市场化的重要性和必要性,摈弃那些保守怕乱的错误认识,从市场经济和市场化对接的高度理解车险改革特别是费率改革的迫切性,又要认真做好思想准备、技术准备、人员准备和流程准备工作,积极搭建适合费率市场化操作平台的步伐,坚定不移地走机动车辆保险费率市场化改革之路。  

我国车险市场道德风险的博弈分析

车险已成为我国产险的龙头险种,但由于信息不对称,车险市场道德风险已严重制约产险业的发展。各利益主体为自身效用最大化不断博弈的最终结果,使得车险市场整体运行效率大打折扣。本文运用博弈论的研究方法,通过构建博弈模型,对投保人、保险人、保险代理人以及汽车修理商四方行为主体的道德风险进行博弈分析,探寻其最优策略,并给出对策建议。  

Deregulation,Pricing Strategies,and Claim Behavior in the Taiwan Automobile Insurance Market

Stringent pricing regulations have long been in effect in the Taiwan automobile insurance market. In April 2009, a pricing deregulation was adopted, enabling insurers to establish their own auto insurance premium rates. This study examines the effects of deregulation in terms of three hypotheses that we propose pertaining to market shares, loading factors, and last policy month claims. The quantitative analysis results show that pricing deregulation prompts insurers to lower their rates. The effects of deregulation for insurers are determined by not only the decision to deduct premiums and the deduction percentages, but also by policy type.  

On Compulsory Per-Claim Deductibles in Automobile Insurance

The purposes of this paper are to analyze the theoretical characteristics of the compulsory deductible system and to verify the rationality of an increasing per-claim deductible in automobile insurance. We derive the optimal variable per-claim deductible by assuming the insurers are financially balanced and the expected utility of the insured is maximized in the absence of moral hazard. Our result suggests that a variable per-claim deductible increasing with the number of claims per year is not optimal. Instead, deductibles should be charged in a decreasing rate forming a second-best solution.  

Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data

Insurance has for a long time been perceived as a way of transferring responsibility from insured agents to insurers and thus as potentially influencing insured agents' behavior. Two particular opportunistic behaviors have been analyzed. First, the theory of adverse selection predicts that high-risk agents are likely to demand more insurance than are low-risk agents. Second, the theory of moral hazard predicts that the wider the insurance coverage, the less agents will try to prevent accidents. Both theories thus conclude that agents who are totally insured should have a higher probability of accident than those with only partial insurance, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, one of the aims of insurance rating systems is to control for these opportunistic behaviors. In this article, we use individual data to see if the French automobile insurance rating system has achieved this aim. We do this using a two-step maximum-likelihood method. First, we compute a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive versus third-party insurance. We then calculate the generalized residual, which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model estimating the probability of having an accident. The coefficient of this variable is argued to represent adverse selection and ex-ante moral-hazard behavior.  

市场结构与财产险公司承保绩效——来自中国机动车保险市场的经验证据

近年,我国机动车保险行业性承保亏损已引起经营者与监管机构重点关注。本文以我国2004年～2008年各地机动车保险市场的经验数据为样本,从市场结构与承保绩效关联性入手,验证了产业组织理论在我国机动车保险市场的适用性,以从市场结构角度阐述近年机动车保险业务承保亏损的原因。研究得到了经验证据的支持,为改善我国机动车保险市场结构,提高市场绩效提供新的视角。