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1.
When physically similar products, of similar quality, are offered by retailers both online and offline, we often observe that the dispersion in prices of these products online is greater than the price dispersion offline. This observation runs counter to early theories that suggested price dispersion online would be smaller than that offline due to the ease of search and information availability online. This paper investigates and provides an explanation for this puzzling phenomenon by examining the impact of two important drivers of price dispersion: retailer type and consumers’ shopping risk. Retailer type refers to whether a retailer is a pure offline, pure online, or dual channel retailer. Shopping risk is defined as the product of consumers’ perceived risk of shopping and the transaction uncertainty related to shopping at different types of retailers.A game-theoretic approach is adopted to model consumers’ price search and product purchase, as well as price competition within and across retailer types in online and offline markets. Equilibrium pricing strategies are derived for different retailer types competing for different consumer segments with different levels of perceived shopping risk. The impact of retailer type and shopping risk on online versus offline price dispersion are quantified, and conditions when price dispersion is greater online than offline are identified.Results indicate that price dispersion is greater online when the number of pure online retailers is sufficiently large and is increasing in the number of pure online retailers. In addition, a reduction in online shopping risk may actually increase online price dispersion. Results further suggest that even without any online sales, dual channel retailers should maintain their online presence for the purpose of information dissemination, which justifies the importance for pure offline retailer to incorporate webrooming strategies, where consumers can search for prices online but purchase offline. 相似文献
2.
Gregor Schwerhoff Ulrike Kornek Kai Lessmann Michael Pahle 《Journal of economic surveys》2018,32(2):491-517
Initiatives in favor of unilateral action on climate change are frequently challenged by concerns over free riding. Nevertheless, we observe an increasing number of unilateral efforts at different administrative levels and in different parts of the world. Previous academic literature described various individual mechanisms where emissions abroad may increase or decrease as a reaction to unilateral emission reductions. In this paper, we collect a comprehensive set of both positive and negative reactions and analyze them in stylized models. This allows us to identify the most important characteristics that determine the potential of a leader to boost mitigation efforts abroad. We find that this potential depends on (i) a strong ability to generate knowledge through leadership, (ii) a high degree of credibility in the international community, and (iii) a similar economic structure to the most important emitters. While most effects are difficult to quantify, this comprehensive assessment suggests that leakage effects resulting from unilateral mitigation may well be outweighed by positive reactions. 相似文献
3.
《International Journal of Research in Marketing》2022,39(4):1150-1165
Dynamic pricing is widely adopted in many industries, such as travel and insurance. These industries are also gaining extensive capabilities in identifying and segmenting customers, partly fueled by the increasing availability of data. It is natural to ask whether firms should take advantage of such developments by charging different prices to different customer segments. If so, under what conditions? We seek answers to these highly managerially relevant questions.We consider a market with two customer segments served by a monopolist. The monopolist can choose among a set of pricing strategies to exploit consumers’ inter-temporal preferences and/or inter-segment variations. At one end of the spectrum, the firm can charge a constant price to all customers, which is called static pricing. At the other end of the spectrum, the firm can charge different prices to different customer segments and vary these prices over time, which is referred to as dynamic targeted pricing. We systematically compare these alternative pricing strategies. We show that dynamic pricing without targeting can be more effective than static targeted pricing when customers are not very forward looking, which corroborates the findings in the empirical literature. Interestingly, we find that the monopolist can be worse off when she adopts targeting in addition to dynamic pricing. We conduct laboratory experiments to test several key model predictions. The studies show that individuals behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model. 相似文献
4.
《Socio》2019
We aim to quantify the benefits of cooperation between humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stocking decisions. We consider two agencies that stock the same type of relief item at different locations prone to individual disaster risks and agree to transship the shortage amount from available stocks in case of a disaster. We incorporate the disaster risk to the Newsvendor model by conditioning the stock quantity decisions on the event that a major disaster occurs within the lifetime of the stocked relief item. We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity and compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically. We apply this game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul to optimize the stocking decisions of an agency for shelter units in cooperation with another agency. We investigate the characteristics of the solutions under various parameter settings and identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies. 相似文献
5.
6.
Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost. 相似文献
7.
《Socio》2020
To combat the critical stresses of rising urbanization, the government acquires land from private owners using the power of eminent domain. This land assembly causes negative externalities such as increasing social tension and injustice that may impose a long-term threat to stability and sustainable development. Therefore, there is a need to make the land acquisition process more transparent and just. Considering the unique Indian context where informality has a strong presence, we propose an approach based on game theory that models the bargain through a three-stage Nash equilibrium game. Four agents – the government, the private developer, the landowner, and the free rider – are considered. We provide conditional solutions for the generalizable Case and proceed to model different stakeholder behavior patterns through two utility functional forms – linear and exponential. In the linear case, we find that the free rider obtains half of the revenue of the project, whereas the landowner gains between one-fourth and one-half of the revenue. Thus, we highlight the undeniably crucial role free riders play in land acquisition negotiations. However, closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the exponential form, due to which we use simulations to demonstrate a solution procedure. We conclude by stating that the proposed model can be useful in formulating future land policies in a sustainable and inclusive manner, with optimal utility derivations for all concerned stakeholders. Our model can also be extended to other spatial contexts where informality features heavily in the land market, especially in the Global South. 相似文献
8.
《Socio》2020
The goal of public enterprises is to increase the wealth and happiness of individuals. This target lets them make the investment to fulfill these expectations. However, not all citizens in a country might have the same opportunities. This case requires comparing citizens who live in cities with regard to satisfaction levels. This study consists of two stages. In the first stage, a composite index called the General Satisfaction Index (GSI), which aims to explain the satisfaction levels of citizens living in cities, is obtained by using the Benefit of the Doubt method. Contrary to the previous studies, the satisfaction indicators based on the emotions and senses of citizens are used to construct a composite index. Satisfaction indicators’ contribution to GSI is ensured using the minimum weights. In the second stage of this study, socioeconomic determinants of GSI are investigated in both countrywide and regions by using regularized regression methods. In the result of the regression analyze, it is confirmed that there are different socioeconomic determinants of satisfaction levels for countrywide and each region. For this reason, it is proposed that policymakers should follow different politicizes in each region to increase the satisfaction levels of citizens in the country. 相似文献
9.
In this paper, we analytically model different government subsidy strategies in a supply chain manufacturing and selling a green product. We model the interaction between greening degree and transparency level set by a manufacturer and its impact on not only the supply chain, but also consumers and the government. The supply chain is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer can choose two different strategies. First, he only cares about his production profit; and second, he concerns with CSR in addition to his production profit. We develop a new transparency-based index of consumer satisfaction to model how the market reacts to manufacturer CSR decisions. The government decide three different subsidy strategies. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is developed and solved to analytically derive managerial insights. As a result, if the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the greening degree and transparency level in CSR concerns strategy are higher than when the manufacturer is not concerned with corporate social responsibility. In addition, when the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the profit of supply chain members and government are equal in both strategies. We give a real-world example of Iranian brick industry. 相似文献
10.
Showrooming, a phenomenon in which customers use brick-and-mortar stores to assess products and then purchase them from online retailers (o-retailers) for lower prices, is considered a great threat to traditional retailers (t-retailers). To combat showrooming, many t-retailers have executed price matching which enables customers to pay o-retailers' lower prices for the identical product. To avoid direct competition with t-retailers who execute price matching, many o-retailers have begun to sell differentiated products from t-retailers, which weakens the information advantage to customers from practicing showrooming. Motivated by these observations, we construct a duopoly game, where a t-retailer and an o-retailer sell products in a same category, to study the profitabilities of product differentiation and price matching in the context of showrooming. The results show that in the scenario without price matching, the o-retailer is likely to benefit from product differentiation only when the o-retailer's differentiated product is more popular with customers than the t-retailer's product. However, in the price matching scenario, the o-retailer also has the opportunity to benefit from product differentiation when the o-retailer's differentiated product is less popular with customers than the t-retailer's product, and product differentiation can be a win-win strategy for the two retailers under certain conditions. Considering the o-retailer's product differentiation decision, the t-retailer is only likely to execute price matching if the non-digital attributes of the product category sold by two retailers are not very obvious. 相似文献