Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations

Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal.     

民间借贷债务催收市场的田野调查与经济解释

针对我国东部、中部和西部民间金融乱象高发地不同人群展开田野调查,在总结民间借贷债务催收市场四个特征事实基础上,运用“中介理论”解释了催收组织结构演化的内在逻辑,并用“博弈论”对民间借贷债务催收涉黑隐患的形成机理进行分析。民间借贷是一个自由选择的市场,高利贷往往由高风险借款人与高风险放款人相匹配形成“尖刀上的双人舞”。违约产生后,由于民间借贷债务催收是不完全信息条件下的隐秘市场,催债人无法区分“策略性违约”债务人,只能通过施压以增加其不还款的内在成本。市场分割导致债务催收难以形成统一流程,催债人施压过程中往往使用层层分级的非常规手段,“边缘策略”无法正确实施,最后往往导致民间借贷债务催收涉黑现象频发。为此,可借鉴海外经验,促进债务催收市场实现合法化,引导半地下的债务催收机构走向阳光化,同时,制订相关法律以规范债务催收机构行为。