Rethinking bank shareholder equity: The case of Deutsche Bank

We introduce and apply an innovative accounting approach to analyse the equity position of a European systemically important financial institution, Deutsche Bank, between 2001 and 2015. According to our findings, the actual contribution by shareholders to bank equity capital was limited, while shareholder payout policies, including share buybacks and trading on its own shares, were both material. These findings raise concerns on the actual capacity by shareholder equity to assure protection against (residual) risk and loss absorption. Customer and investor protections appear to lay with bank entity equity dynamics. These findings have implications for bank financial sustainability and resilience, company capital maintenance, and regulatory capital requirements. Further developments based upon this innovative methodology may improve on existing prudential and accounting regulations.     

公司战略、大股东持股与财务欺诈

以2001-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,考察企业公司战略定位对财务欺诈行为的影响,研究发现:公司战略对财务欺诈行为有显著影响,公司战略定位越激进,越可能导致财务欺诈行为的发生;经过稳健性测试后,结果依然成立.进一步研究发现:提高大股东持股比例,可以增强大股东对管理者的"监督效用",从而提升企业内部监督效率,进而抑制公司战略对财务欺诈行为的影响.     

企业低碳行为与股东价值关系的实证研究

结合我国低碳政策背景，实证检验了我国企业低碳行为与股东价值的关系，研究发现：总体而言我国企业低碳行为有利于股东价值的提升，环境敏感行业的低碳行为与股东价值的关系更显著，但是与被动的低碳行为相比，主动低碳行为并来获得更大的股东价值。这表明我国政府制定的低碳政策取得了一定的效果，但是还需要进一步培育低碳产品需求、明确碳交易或碳税等低碳政策，从而使企业主动低碳行为获得应有的更大市场回报。     

Independent directors and earnings management: The moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights

The research results on the suppressing effect of independent directors on earnings management are not consistent in existing literature. In addition, it has been argued that using financial statements provided by top management to investigate top management's earnings management is not appropriate. Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, we used external auditors (including the auditors of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the auditors of two Big Four accounting firms – Deloitte & Touche and KPMG in Taiwan) as respondents in order to obtain less biased data. Second, we investigate the moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. The results show that both the existence of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights have significant suppressing effects on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed.     

Individual Large Shareholders,Earnings Management,and Capital‐Market Consequences

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.     

股权制衡、法律保护与控股股东侵占——来自中国A股民营上市公司关联交易的实证分析

控股股东利用关联交易对中小投资者利益进行侵占已经成为公司治理研究中最重要的问题。本文采用中国A股民营上市公司的相关数据,从关联交易规模的角度实证检验了股权制衡因素和外部投资者法律保护对于控股股东侵占的影响。研究结果发现,股权制衡程度越高,控股股东的侵占水平会越低;但是法律保护和股权制衡之间存在替代关系,两者对于控股股东侵占的作用具有一定的重合性,如果同步提高的话,可能会削弱股权制衡对于控股股东侵占的限制作用。     

大股东过度自信行为与公司治理的有效性——基于大股东增持的实证检验

大股东是公司治理的重要参与主体,但大股东行为未必都是理性的。本文以大股东增持为研究的切入点,研究了大股东过度自信行为对公司治理有效性的影响。结果发现,大股东过度自信行为对公司治理有效性有显著的负面影响,而公司外部治理环境的完善对其具有矫正作用。即使剔除政府救市因素对大股东增持的影响,上述研究结论也依然成立。本文认为,在公司治理机制构建中对参与主体非理性因素的考虑,是提高公司治理机制有效性的重要前提。     

大股东参与、定增并购主体关联与利益输送

定增并购的出现为追溯探讨定向增发的价值驱动性或利益输送性提供了新证据。本文采用2006—2013年交易数据对定增并购中大股东参与效果及其双主体关联性的经济后果进行实证检验。研究发现,大股东参与行为虽然短期内可能给市场传递涉嫌利益输送的不利讯号,但从长期看却能起到提升内部资本配置效率及公司价值的战略效能,且大股东参与程度越高,其提升效果越显著;进一步观察双主体差异性发现,只有大股东未参与时,定增主体关联度才与利益输送呈现正相关性,而并购主体关联度则以积极效应为主。由此不仅能够自然破除“大股东剥夺假说”,同时还可为定增并购的科学决策以及“全要素”监管模式的架构提供经验支持。     

控股股东的诚信义务与中小股东利益的保护

我国上市公司中大量存在着控股股东滥用控制权损害中小股东利益的现象,这不仅违反股权平等原则,而且破坏了证券市场的的正常秩序。为了矫正控制权滥用而导致的控股股东与中小股东的利益失衡,应当要求控股股东行使控制权时承担诚信义务,并通过具体制度架构确保其诚信义务的履行。