Private enforcement,corruption, and antitrust design

We examine how the rationale for enabling versus precluding private antitrust enforcement depends on whether antitrust enforcement is corruption-free or plagued by corruption. Corruption in courts affects the incentives to bring forth private antitrust lawsuits. This, in turn, along with corruption in antitrust agency enforcement, alters the incentives to commit antitrust violations. The social welfare effect of enabling private antitrust enforcement in the presence of corruption depends on whether corrupt officials in the ensuing bribery contests favor a particular firm and if so which one and to what extent. Under some circumstances, corruption actually increases the social desirability of private antitrust enforcement relative to the no-corruption scenario. Our analysis highlights that the effects of a given legal arrangement for antitrust enforcement critically depend on the corruption environment and, thus, that the appropriate design of antitrust institutions is context-specific.     

Relevance of corruption on the effect of public health expenditure and taxation on economic growth

We investigate whether corruption distorts the positive effect of public health expenditure and taxation on growth through panel data analysis of 75 developing countries for the period from 1995 to 2014. The findings indicate that, although both public health expenditure and taxation can increase economic growth, in countries with more corrupt governments this effect is reduced.     

The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

Is R&D spending influenced by disinvestment and local political corruption? The case of Indian central public sector enterprises

The current study examines the effect of disinvestment (dilution of state ownership) and local political corruption on R&D spending in enterprises owned by the central government of India. Based on certain characteristic features of innovation as a strategy available to state-owned enterprises, I build two sets of hypotheses formalising the channels of how these variables may affect the possibility and amount of R&D. Data is drawn from multiple sources to compile a dataset that covers all manufacturing central government-owned enterprises in India over a period of ten years from 2007 to 2016. The study employs an instrumental variable technique to reduce the endogeneity between disinvestment and R&D decisions. We find that, while disinvestment and local political corruption have strong negative effects on whether a firm invests in R&D or not, it has no effect on the amount of R&D. In fact, the amount is driven by a host of firm-specific factors such as size, profit and proficiency of the share of skilled labor, managerial strength and non-unionisation of labor. We also find that the effects are strongly driven by the size of firms, special status awarded to firms and the ideology of the state where the enterprise operates.     

Regional tourism competitiveness using the PROMETHEE approach

The competitiveness of tourism destinations is a key issue because it enables destinations to know their position with regard to their competitors. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to address the measurement of the competitiveness of tourism destinations at the regional level, (2) to show the suitability of using multi-criteria techniques to measure competitiveness, and (3) to apply the PROMETHEE and GAIA methods within a competitiveness study of eight tourist destinations located in the Northern Region of Portugal. The Metropolitan Area of Porto is the first in the ranking, followed by Cávado and Douro. The results of such an analysis show the comparative strengths and weaknesses of destinations, and allow them to identify their true competitors as well as those other destinations that are most similar to them.     

国家战略视角下鄂湘赣新型显示制造业协同创新研究

结合国家产业发展战略，采用复合系统协同度模型，从技术创新环境支撑能力（E）、技术创新获取能力（G）、技术创新应用能力（A）3个维度设计鄂湘赣新型显示制造业EGA协同创新能力评价指标体系。在此基础上，分别对鄂湘赣三省新型显示制造业的序参量变量有序度、省域内协同创新能力、省域间协同创新能力进行测评，并进行全面深入分析，最后提出对策建议。     

乌蒙山片区绿色减贫指数分析

[目的]通过分析2012年和2014年乌蒙山片区绿色减贫指数,评价该地区不同年份扶贫效果,这也为今后各项扶贫政策的实施提供理论参考。[方法]文章依据中国绿色减贫指数指标体系,从经济增长绿化度、资源利用与环境保护程度、社会发展能力和扶贫开发与减贫效果4个方面,以人均地区生产总值、单位地区生产总值能耗等27个因子作为评价指标,利用线性加权综合法分析2012年和2014年经济增长绿化度、资源利用与环境保护程度、社会发展能力和扶贫开发与减贫效果指标值,最终确定绿色减贫指数。同时,分析片区内各贫困县波动较大的第三产业增加值比重、单位耕地面积化肥施用量、城乡收入比和农村人均纯收入增长率等指标。[结果]2014年相比2012年,乌蒙山片区经济增长绿化度、资源利用与环境保护程度和扶贫开发与减贫效果指标值上升,社会发展能力指标值降低,绿色减贫指数提高了15.40%。各县第三产业比重均降低,但农村人均纯收入都有提高。四川省10个县单位耕地面积化肥施用量增加。四川省除叙永县和美姑县,贵州省除赤水市,片区内的各贫困县城乡收入比降低。[结论]2014年,乌蒙山区在落实国家扶贫规划上取得了较好的成效。但各县之间差距较大,在今后的扶贫攻坚中,需要从不同地区的实际情况出发,了解贫困类型和贫困程度,考察当地资源储备和环境现状,统筹区域发展。     

经济开放与货币需求:国际金融风险及持币成本的测度

在中国开放经济体制下的基准货币需求模型中,本文将源于国际金融市场的持币成本设为遗漏潜变量,并构建特定的国际金融综合指数(CIFI)作为该潜变量的测度。借鉴机器学习与测度理论,本文利用对数误差修正模型提出了分步降维的CIFI构造算法,构造了长期CIFI和短期CIFI。结果表明,CIFI构造中的无监督降维步骤有助于减少高维金融数据中的冗余信息。实证分析发现,国际机会成本对中国货币需求具有规律性的前导影响,而在2007至2008年国际金融危机期间,央行的应急措施对长期CIFI所代表的非均衡冲击起到明显的阻截效果,对短期CIFI的影响基本是持续不变的。通过综合指数构造与宏观货币需求模型的算法连接,可以利用CIFI的构成结构从前导时间与影响强度两方面追踪冲击货币需求的国际金融风险的具体来源,这为宏观决策者监测国际金融市场提供了颇有规律的信息。在方法论上,本研究为如何利用模型监测国际金融市场影响宏观经济开辟了一条新路。     

Effects of subject pool culture and institutional environment on corruption: Experimental evidence from Albania

This research uses experimental methods to investigate whether subject pool culture and institutional environment have an effect on participants’ corrupt behavior in the laboratory. While we find that subject pool culture does not affect the overall magnitude of corruption of laboratory participants, it does affect the likelihood of corruption and its distribution. Additionally, we find that the effect on corrupt behavior differs with the framing of the experiment’s instructions. Interestingly, in the context of a weak rule of law and high levels of corruption, loaded negative instructions positively affect corrupt behavior of firms and public officials. Previous research in the context of a country exhibiting a strong rule of law and low levels of corruption finds no framing effects. We also find that increasing the probability of detection significantly reduces corruption as measured by the amount of the bribes offered/accepted and the probability of offering/accepting a bribe. Finally, we find that individual risk preferences negatively affect the level of corrupt behavior.     

The effects of mega-events on perceived corruption

In recent decades, the media have covered many cases of corruption related to the celebration of mega-events around the globe. In most of these cases, politicians and other high officials are involved. This paper analyses the effect of hosting mega-events on the level of perceived corruption in 34 OECD countries, during 1996–2017. Summer and Winter Olympic Games, FIFA World Cups, and Universal Expositions are considered. Results show that, when we take the year of the celebration of the event as the turning point, there is no robust evidence in favour of a positive impact on perceived corruption. However, when we take the election date of the host country as the threshold, the magnitude of the effect is lasting, reaching its maximum value 1–2 years before the celebration itself, and increasing the perceived level of corruption by about 4%.