Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

Discounting long run average growth in stochastic dynamic programs

Summary. Finding solutions to the Bellman equation often relies on restrictive boundedness assumptions. In this paper we develop a method of proof that allows to dispense with the assumption that returns are bounded from above. In applications our assumptions only imply that long run average (expected) growth is sufficiently discounted, in sharp contrast with classical assumptions either absolutely bounding growth or bounding each period (instead of long run) maximum (instead of average) growth. We discuss our work in relation to the literature and provide several examples. Received: July 26, 2000; revised version: July 10, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am specially grateful to Cuong Le Van and to anonymous referee for detecting an error in a previous version of this paper and for suggestions that sensibly improved the paper. Comments and suggestions are also acknowledged to Michele Boldrin, Raouf Boucekkine, Fabrice Collard, Tim Kehoe, Omar Licandro, and Luis Puch. I am also indebted to participants to the III Summer School on Economic Theory held at the Universidade de Vigo, the Macroeconomics Workshop at the Universitat Autò}noma de Barcelona, and the Econometrics Seminar at Tilburg University. Financial support from the Belgian government, under project PAI P4/01, at the IRES-UCL, from a European Marie Curie fellowship, Grant HPMF-CT-1999-00410, at the CEPREMAP, and from IVIE and Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER, under project BEC2001-0535, at the Universidad de Alicante, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Optimising a Probabilistic Model of the Development of Play in Soccer

We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social, 16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations. However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed. This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed.     

The victim matters – experimental evidence on lying,moral costs and moral cleansing

In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations.     

会计信息失真的博弈分析

会计信息失真是长期困扰会计工作的顽症 ,也是导致国家宏观经济决策和企业内外微观决策失误的祸根。采用博弈论的分析方法对会计信息失真产生的条件、机制以及治理的有效方法进行了深层次的探讨 ,并指出要提高会计数据的质量 ,以确保会计信息的真实性 ,就必须要建立完善的监督体系 ,严格监督 ,并加大执法力度 ,对作假者进行严惩 ,同时又不能使监督和惩罚的成本过高。     

从一个简单博弈探讨中小企业信用体系建设

市场经济是信用经济,诚信是市场经济机制的第一法则。信用缺失已成为我国中小企业面临的一个严重问题,其结果不仅使社会交易成本不断提高,而且在很大程度上抑制了中小企业的健康发展。采用博弈论的分析方法,在信用博弈模型分析的基础上,对中小企业信用缺失的成因进行分析,并提出中小企业信用体系建设的思路。     

供应链视角下的农产品质量安全管理研究

近年来,我国农产品安全问题事件层出不穷,解决农产品的安全问题已经成了一个紧迫性的全国性问题。文中基于供应链的视角,从农产品供应链的各个环节、上下游企业角色的博弈、激励和惩罚机制、政府监管等各个角度分析了目前中国农产品供应链管理中存在的食品安全问题的症结所在,并且提出了相对应的解决措施,最后以安徽青松食品有限公司的“安心豆芽”项目为例进行了实证研究。     

地方政府公共投资与区域经济增长的差异性分析

文章采用全国31个省、自治区和直辖市1995~2008年的面板数据,构建动态面板数据模型,考察了地方政府公共投资对区域经济增长的影响。研究表明,1995年以来我国地方政府公共投资总体上推动了区域经济增长,但不同公共投资项目的拉动效应在区域间存在着较大差异。