Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

Discounting long run average growth in stochastic dynamic programs

Summary. Finding solutions to the Bellman equation often relies on restrictive boundedness assumptions. In this paper we develop a method of proof that allows to dispense with the assumption that returns are bounded from above. In applications our assumptions only imply that long run average (expected) growth is sufficiently discounted, in sharp contrast with classical assumptions either absolutely bounding growth or bounding each period (instead of long run) maximum (instead of average) growth. We discuss our work in relation to the literature and provide several examples. Received: July 26, 2000; revised version: July 10, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am specially grateful to Cuong Le Van and to anonymous referee for detecting an error in a previous version of this paper and for suggestions that sensibly improved the paper. Comments and suggestions are also acknowledged to Michele Boldrin, Raouf Boucekkine, Fabrice Collard, Tim Kehoe, Omar Licandro, and Luis Puch. I am also indebted to participants to the III Summer School on Economic Theory held at the Universidade de Vigo, the Macroeconomics Workshop at the Universitat Autò}noma de Barcelona, and the Econometrics Seminar at Tilburg University. Financial support from the Belgian government, under project PAI P4/01, at the IRES-UCL, from a European Marie Curie fellowship, Grant HPMF-CT-1999-00410, at the CEPREMAP, and from IVIE and Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER, under project BEC2001-0535, at the Universidad de Alicante, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Optimising a Probabilistic Model of the Development of Play in Soccer

We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social, 16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations. However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed. This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed.     

The victim matters – experimental evidence on lying,moral costs and moral cleansing

In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations.     

“地铁房地产”投资动力机制研究——基于行为博弈视角

地铁建设不仅极大地改善了城市的交通状况,还促进了沿线房地产的飞速发展。通过对“地铁房地产”投资主体进行分类,在此基础上构建相关行为博弈的均衡模型,分析其投资动力的内在机理,进而指出备投资主体只有愿意部分让出自己的利益时,才能最大程度享受“地缺效应”所带采的巨大潜在收益。     

U.S. and Latin American stock market linkages

This paper examines to what extent the Latin American equity markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico have become more integrated with the US equity market. We empirically measure integration by finding the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) between each market and that in the U.S. using a DCC multivariate GARCH model. We then track how these correlations evolve over time using a smooth transition model which not only shows when greater integration first occurred but also how long it took these correlations to transition to their new levels. Our sample period stretches from December 30th, 1988 to March 26th, 2004. Results show an increase in the degree of co-movement between these countries’ equity returns and those in the U.S. although the magnitude and speed of these increases greatly varies across these four countries.     

金融开放背景下金融发展对跨境资本流动的影响研究

金融开放能够促进跨境资本流动,也具有引发跨境资本流动失衡和波动性增加的风险,而一国金融发展水平在其金融开放效应中发挥着重要作用。本文基于58个国家及地区1999-2016年的数据建立动态面板模型,研究金融开放背景下金融发展对直接投资和证券投资流入、流出以及总跨境资本流动波动性的影响。研究结果表明:金融开放本身有可能造成跨境资本流出大于流入的失衡现象,并显著增加跨境资本流动波动性风险,而金融发展水平的提高有助于在一定程度上抑制金融开放带来的跨境资本流动失衡现象和波动性风险。因此,在扩大金融开放进程中,为获得跨境资本流动的积极效应,应密切关注跨境资本流向和资本波动性变化,提高国内金融发展水平,使之与金融开放水平相匹配。