Growth and Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model with Public Investment

In this paper we analyze growth and welfare effects of fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model along the balanced growth path. As to the model we assume that sustained per capita growth results from public investment. The government uses its tax revenue for investment in public capital, for investment subsidy and for transfer payments. We then analyze how the balanced growth rate reacts to variations in those policy variables. Further, we study welfare effects of varying the fiscal parameters and demonstrate that, in general, maximizing economic growth is not equivalent to maximizing welfare on the balanced growth path.  

Growth and Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model with Public Investment

In this paper we analyze growth and welfare effects of fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model along the balanced growth path. As to the model we assume that sustained per capita growth results from public investment. The government uses its tax revenue for investment in public capital, for investment subsidy and for transfer payments. We then analyze how the balanced growth rate reacts to variations in those policy variables. Further, we study welfare effects of varying the fiscal parameters and demonstrate that, in general, maximizing economic growth is not equivalent to maximizing welfare on the balanced growth path.  

Corporate governance and firm performance

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature:First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance.Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.  

Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk taking, tax benefit, signaling and cash conservation. We find consistent evidence for the value enhancement motivation to reduce agency costs. As well, they signal for positive price sensitive information. Our results reject the tax benefit and cash conservation motivations. This finding is robust after controlling for the endogenous character of executive stock option grants and other equity-based grants. JEL Classification G32 • J33 • M52  

我国企业高管股权激励与研发投资——基于内生性视角的研究

本文以2002—2009年我国上市公司为研究对象,探讨了股权分置改革前后我国企业管理层股权激励对研发投资的影响,并在此基础上检验了管理层股权激励的内生性。研究发现,高管股权激励存在内生性,在控制了内生性之后,股改前股权激励与研发投资之间存在倒U形曲线关系;股改后股权激励对研发投资具有显著的正向影响。本文结果表明应该将研发投资作为股权激励方案的激励条件之一;此外,合理的安排股东与管理层之间的股权配置比例是保证企业有效进行研发投资、提升企业自主创新能力的必要手段。本文的结论深化了我们对股权激励内生性的理解,并为我国企业更好地实施管理层股权激励和企业自主创新战略提供了理论支持和实证证据。  

资源资本化推动下的中国货币化进程（1978—2008）

以资源资本化为实践逻辑的基本框架，重新解读高货币化率背后的内生货币供给现象得出：资源资本化是货币化进程的强大内驱力，在渐进改革的市场化进程中，政府持续不断地将各类要素和其他资源推向市场，使得各类资源持续不断被资本化，由此带来大量的实质性货币需求，从而拉动了较强的货币供给。伴随着自然资源、劳动力资源、资金要素、技术要素、管理要素等资源和要素市场的加速开放和市场化程度的持续加深，中国的资源资本化进程还在加速。由此，中国的经济高货币化进程还将持续一段时期．直至资源资本化推动的M2增速低于GDP增速为止。  

麦克勒姆规则及其中国货币政策检验

本文以中国1995～2006年季度数据对麦克勒姆规则及其扩展形式分别进行了实证检验,结果表明:中国基础货币调控对经济增长反应显著,对通货膨胀反应偏弱,而对汇率的反应则与理论要求相悖。进一步对中国基础货币内生性进行协整检验,发现中国基础货币投放受国内固定资产投资与外汇储备影响较大。呈现出较强的内生性特征。因此,应尽快完善货币政策调控方式,由数量型调控逐步过渡到价格型调控,提高调控效果。  

开放经济条件下我国货币内生性问题研究

1994年以来,基础货币投放中外汇占款所占比例越来越高,我国货币供给表现出很强的内生性。本文把货币内生性放在开放经济的框架下进行研究,在对货币内生性基本原理进行阐述的基础上,对强制结售汇与盯住汇率制度组合下我国货币供给的内生性问题进行探讨,分析了货币内生性对我国货币政策的影响,在此基础上就如何应对挑战、提高货币政策有效性提出了政策建议。  

论商业银行资产增长约束机制构建与资本充足率提升

我国商业银行资本充足率低且呈现不断下降的趋势,原因在于没有建立起约束资产扩张的内在机制。提高商业银行资本充足率,不能片面依赖于在资本市场扩股增资,根本出路在于建立资产增长的内在约束机制。  

资源可耗竭、知识积累与内生经济增长

资源的可耗竭性对持续的经济增长起到严重的制约作用。抵消资源耗竭对经济增长的负面影响只能依赖于技术进步。在内生经济增长的框架中 ,引入知识积累将抵消资源耗竭的作用 ,实现持续增长。同时 ,由于自主决策会产生低效率 ,因而需要借助于政府干预 ,促进知识积累 ,抵消资源耗竭对经济增长的影响。