民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

融资难是制约民营企业发展的关键因素,而这种金融困境从根本上讲是一种信用困境。本文构建的理论模型论证了民营企业的政治关系对其融资中的作用,并以中国民营上市公司2002～2005年的经验数据为样本,实证检验了民营企业的政治关系对减轻融资约束的作用。研究发现,相对于没有参与政治的民营企业来说,有政治关系的民营企业其外部融资时所受的融资约束更少;同时,越在金融发展水平低的地区,民营企业的政治关系对其融资的帮助越明显。  

金融生态环境、股价波动同步性与上市企业融资约束

我国股票市场股价波动同步性是否正向地反映了股价的信息吸收效率?本文将股价波动同步性作为衡量信息不对称的指标,以2003~2006年我国上市企业为样本,检验在不同金融生态环境下股价波动同步性对企业融资约束的影响。研究发现在交易噪声广泛存在的我国股票市场,股价波动同步性与上市企业融资约束呈负相关关系,且对那些处于发达金融生态环境中的企业而言,这一负相关关系表现得更为明显。研究表明在控制企业规模等因素后,股价包含更多的市场和行业信息本身正向地反映了股价的信息吸收效率,而发达的金融生态环境有助于提高股价对市场和行业信息的吸收。  

The real effects of financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.  

财务困境企业资本投资行为的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以2003～2005年因连续两年亏损被ST的79家公司为对象,从投资对现金流敏感度的变化和投资战略的调整两方面对财务困境企业的资本投资行为进行理论分析和实证检验.结果表明,陷入困境后的企业因更严重的信息不对称和代理问题而遭受更严重的融资约束;与缩减投资规模相比,财务困境企业扩大投资规模更有利于其走出困境.  

Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.  

A theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns

This paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance. I present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends, and default while facing cash flows with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquidity shocks. The model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice. These interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows. The optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows. I also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads.  

Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.  

金融发展、汇率变动与中国省区制造业出口

本文使用中国省区细分行业的数据和一系列反映金融发展的指标,检验了金融发展对于中国省区制造业出口的影响,同时观测了汇率变动对于各省区行业出口绩效的影响。在控制了各省区要素禀赋以及基础设施条件后发现,在金融发展水平高的省份,高融资依赖性的行业具有较高的出口份额。此外,金融发展有利于融资依赖性行业抵御外部汇率冲击带来的负面影响,扩大市场份额。在选取工具变量以及采取IVTobit模型克服模型的内生性后,结果依然稳健。  

特定金融服务与专业化经营：齐鲁银行“科技金融特色支行”案例

特定金融需求需要相对专业化的经营模式来满足。齐鲁银行通过设立专门的科技金融特色支行，开展标准化、专业化经营，满足了科技型企业特殊的融资需求。齐鲁银行的实践表明，将个性化、特殊化的需求进行标准化转换，有利于提高效率、降低风险、实现规模经济。  

Does q-theory with investment frictions explain anomalies in the cross section of returns?

Q-theory predicts that investment frictions steepen the relation between expected returns and firm investment. Using financing constraints to proxy for investment frictions, we show only weak evidence that the investment-to-assets and asset growth effects in the cross section of returns are stronger in financially more constrained firms than in financially less constrained firms. There is no evidence that q-theory with investment frictions explains the investment growth, net stock issues, abnormal corporate investment, or net operating assets anomalies. Limits-to-arbitrage proxies dominate q-theory with investment frictions in explaining the magnitude of the investment-to-assets and asset growth anomalies in direct comparisons.