民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

融资难是制约民营企业发展的关键因素,而这种金融困境从根本上讲是一种信用困境。本文构建的理论模型论证了民营企业的政治关系对其融资中的作用,并以中国民营上市公司2002～2005年的经验数据为样本,实证检验了民营企业的政治关系对减轻融资约束的作用。研究发现,相对于没有参与政治的民营企业来说,有政治关系的民营企业其外部融资时所受的融资约束更少;同时,越在金融发展水平低的地区,民营企业的政治关系对其融资的帮助越明显。  

金融生态环境、股价波动同步性与上市企业融资约束

我国股票市场股价波动同步性是否正向地反映了股价的信息吸收效率?本文将股价波动同步性作为衡量信息不对称的指标,以2003~2006年我国上市企业为样本,检验在不同金融生态环境下股价波动同步性对企业融资约束的影响。研究发现在交易噪声广泛存在的我国股票市场,股价波动同步性与上市企业融资约束呈负相关关系,且对那些处于发达金融生态环境中的企业而言,这一负相关关系表现得更为明显。研究表明在控制企业规模等因素后,股价包含更多的市场和行业信息本身正向地反映了股价的信息吸收效率,而发达的金融生态环境有助于提高股价对市场和行业信息的吸收。  

The real effects of financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.  

财务困境企业资本投资行为的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以2003～2005年因连续两年亏损被ST的79家公司为对象,从投资对现金流敏感度的变化和投资战略的调整两方面对财务困境企业的资本投资行为进行理论分析和实证检验.结果表明,陷入困境后的企业因更严重的信息不对称和代理问题而遭受更严重的融资约束;与缩减投资规模相比,财务困境企业扩大投资规模更有利于其走出困境.  

商业信贷、融资约束与我国中小企业融资行为——基于江苏省制造业企业的问卷观测和实证分析

与商业信贷在我国中小企业中的作用与地位相比，相关理论和实证研究在国内尤显滞后。作者在对江苏省制造业中小企业问卷调查和计量分析基础上，从微观行为层面揭示了商业信贷在我国中小企业融资行为中的行为模式和运作机理。研究发现，基于企业间商业信用的商业信贷相对发达国家使用不足，是我国中小企业融资难的首因；我国中小企业的自身产业特性和技术能力，决定了其在交易市场上的弱势地位，进而决定了其2／3商业信贷净借出者身份；商业信贷中应收款和应付款普遍的“期限错配”特征，形成在宏观紧缩政策冲击下“银行信贷渠道”和“商业信贷渠道”交互作用机制下的资金链风险。  

Proxy-quality thresholds: Theory and applications

We consider alternative models of a regression containing a proxy for an unobserved regressor. For each model at most two pieces of prior information are necessary to determine the sign of any regressor coefficient: the sign of the partial correlation between the proxy and the unobserved regressor, and a lower bound on the partial or simple correlation between the proxy and the unobserved regressor. We apply our technique to investment and leverage regressions that contain a proxy for the incentive to invest. In both cases proxy quality must be high for the coefficient of interest to be non-zero.  

Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints: Evidence from Belgian Firms

In Belgium, financial and industrial groupings play a crucial role in the accumulation and allocation of capital in the economy. In this paper, it is hypothesized that Belgian firms for which investment is partly financed on an internal capital market, will not be subject to financing constraints to the same extent as firms which have to borrow from banks. Moreover, it is hypothesized that firms belonging to a group, transfer internal surpluses of funds to other group members by investing in financial assets. An empirical analysis confirms the first hypothesis, but rejects the second hypothesis.  

商业信贷、融资约束与我国中小企业融资行为——基于江苏省制造业企业的问卷观测和实证分析

与商业信贷在我国中小企业中的作用与地位相比,相关理论和实证研究在国内尤显滞后.作者在对江苏省制造业中小企业问卷调查和计量分析基础上,从微观行为层面揭示了商业信贷在我国中小企业融资行为中的行为模式和运作机理.研究发现,基于企业间商业信用的商业信贷相对发达国家使用不足,是我国中小企业融资难的首因;我国中小企业的自身产业特性和技术能力,决定了其在交易市场上的弱势地位,进而决定了其2/3商业信贷净借出者身份;商业信贷中应收款和应付款普遍的"期限错配"特征,形成在宏观紧缩政策冲击下"银行信贷渠道"和"商业信贷渠道"交互作用机制下的资金链风险.  

Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.  

A theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns

This paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance. I present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends, and default while facing cash flows with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquidity shocks. The model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice. These interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows. The optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows. I also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads.