Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk taking, tax benefit, signaling and cash conservation. We find consistent evidence for the value enhancement motivation to reduce agency costs. As well, they signal for positive price sensitive information. Our results reject the tax benefit and cash conservation motivations. This finding is robust after controlling for the endogenous character of executive stock option grants and other equity-based grants. JEL Classification G32 • J33 • M52  

Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover

We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.

How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from China's Privatization Experience

The effect of government ownership on firm performance remains a controversial issue, especially in a transitional economy like China. Government ownership is typically viewed as adversely affecting firm performance. This study of that of Mainland China's privatization experience indicates the opposite. No matter whether it is in the form of state ownership or legal person ownership, government ownership has a positive impact on partially privatized state-owned enterprises. However, this relationship is nonlinear and shows an inverted U-shape. Given the situation of highly indebted, non-performing state-owned enterprises, we argue that too much government control is indeed bad for enterprises. But too little government ownership may not be good either. It might mean a lack of the government's political support and business connections, which are valuable and necessary to vitalize performance.  

债务重组会计准则变更的经济后果

本文对2001年债务重组会计准则变更的经济后果进行了研究,实证分析了1999年和2001年债务重组会计准则下重组公司盈余管理行为和重组后公司长期业绩的差异。研究结果发现,2001年债务重组会计准则减少了重组公司利用重组收益以达到扭亏为盈、股权再融资和撤销ST的动机;同时,2001年债务重组会计准则下重组公司重组后的长期业绩比1999年债务重组会计准则下要好。研究结果表明,2001年债务重组会计准则的变更抑制了公司运用债务重组收益进行盈余管理的动机,从而使得重组公司的长期业绩更好。本文的研究结论可以为我国会计准则的制定和投资者的投资决策提供重要依据。  

董事会行为与公司业绩关系研究——一个理论框架及我国上市公司的实证检验

本文研究了董事会行为与公司业绩之间的关系。我们首先从董事会成员的能力、努力程度和董事会组织认同与和谐等三个方面提出了董事会行为与公司业绩相关性的逻辑框架。然后,利用我国沪市上市公司的数据对董事会行为与公司业绩之间的相关性进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,董事会成员的能力、努力程度与公司业绩正相关,董事会成员之间的和谐程度与公司业绩相关。这表明董事会行为确实影响着公司业绩,而且这种影响比起董事会结构与特征更为直接。  

Oil prices and accounting profits of oil and gas companies

This paper investigates the relationship between commodity prices of crude oil, capital structure, firm size and accounting measures of firm performance using a sample of oil and gas firms from 1990 to 2008. We employ estimates based on panel least squares, a fixed effects model and a random effects model. We also use generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). Our findings show that crude oil prices positively and significantly impact the performance of oil and gas firms in North America using accounting measures of performance. The recent financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 negatively influenced oil prices and the financial performance of oil and gas firms. On the other hand, the earlier global crises (Asian financial crisis and 9/11) did not have a significant impact on the return on equity of oil and gas companies. Our primary contribution to the literature is a comprehensive and econometric analysis of the relation between commodity prices and accounting measures of performance oil and gas companies.  

Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

Although there has been an intensive debate on the relative merits of different systems of corporate governance, empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and firm performance almost exclusively refers to the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon system. This paper therefore investigates the more network- or bank-oriented German system. In panel regressions for 361 German corporations over the time period 1991 to1996, we find ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively. However, this effect depends intricately on stock market exposure, the location of control rights, and the time horizon (short-run vs. long-run). We conclude from our results that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, (2) ownership concentration seems to be sub-optimal for many German corporations, and, finally, (3) having financial institutions as largest shareholders oftraded corporations improves corporate performance.  

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.  

An Examination of Multiple Governance Forces within Bank Holding Companies

This study explores multiple means of governance and monitoring in bank holding companies and their impact on performance and executive compensation. We exploit variables unique to the banking industry to aid in our understanding of this simultaneous relationship. Our primary finding is that after controlling for both regulatory oversight and capital market discipline, a strong board is associated with higher firm performance, lower levels of executive pay and lower growth rates of executive pay. The findings support the fundamental role of corporate governance in overseeing management and ultimately firm performance.  

我国商业银行业市场集中度与厂商绩效的实证分析

本文运用CRn和HHI这两个指标,对我国商业银行业2007-2009年期间的资产、存款、贷款和净利润的市场集中程度进行测定。结果显示:商业银行业正处在从寡头垄断到垄断竞争的市场结构转变中。同时通过实证检验发现,我国商业银行的厂商绩效同市场集中度、市场份额呈负相关关系,原因在于商业银行业较高的市场集中度并不是市场自发运作的结果。建立和完善商业银行业体系应着重考虑如何提高企业效率,促进市场竞争。