Price matching and product differentiation strategies considering showrooming

Showrooming, a phenomenon in which customers use brick-and-mortar stores to assess products and then purchase them from online retailers (o-retailers) for lower prices, is considered a great threat to traditional retailers (t-retailers). To combat showrooming, many t-retailers have executed price matching which enables customers to pay o-retailers' lower prices for the identical product. To avoid direct competition with t-retailers who execute price matching, many o-retailers have begun to sell differentiated products from t-retailers, which weakens the information advantage to customers from practicing showrooming. Motivated by these observations, we construct a duopoly game, where a t-retailer and an o-retailer sell products in a same category, to study the profitabilities of product differentiation and price matching in the context of showrooming. The results show that in the scenario without price matching, the o-retailer is likely to benefit from product differentiation only when the o-retailer's differentiated product is more popular with customers than the t-retailer's product. However, in the price matching scenario, the o-retailer also has the opportunity to benefit from product differentiation when the o-retailer's differentiated product is less popular with customers than the t-retailer's product, and product differentiation can be a win-win strategy for the two retailers under certain conditions. Considering the o-retailer's product differentiation decision, the t-retailer is only likely to execute price matching if the non-digital attributes of the product category sold by two retailers are not very obvious.     

Relief aid stocking decisions under bilateral agency cooperation

We aim to quantify the benefits of cooperation between humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stocking decisions. We consider two agencies that stock the same type of relief item at different locations prone to individual disaster risks and agree to transship the shortage amount from available stocks in case of a disaster. We incorporate the disaster risk to the Newsvendor model by conditioning the stock quantity decisions on the event that a major disaster occurs within the lifetime of the stocked relief item. We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity and compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically. We apply this game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul to optimize the stocking decisions of an agency for shelter units in cooperation with another agency. We investigate the characteristics of the solutions under various parameter settings and identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies.     

The airfare pricing and seat allocation problem in full-service carriers and subsidiary low-cost carriers

This study investigates the competitive market situation in the air transport industry considering full-service carriers (FSC), subsidiary low-cost carriers (LCC) and rival LCCs on the flight-leg level while subsidiary LCCs are established by FSCs against rival LCCs to keep the market share and to make more profit. It is assumed that the demand of economy class for each airline follows a known distribution, and the mean value of that distribution is a function of its airfare and the airfare differences with other airlines. In addition, no-shows and cancellations are introduced to reflect a real situation. Based on this situation, a mathematical model is developed to derive efficient airfare pricing and seat allocation for each airline for maximizing the profit sum of both FSCs and subsidiary LCCs using a repeated game. A repeated game model integrated with a Tabu search algorithm and an EMSR based heuristic is suggested to deal with the proposed repeated game. A numerical example is provided to validate the model and solution procedure with hypothetical system parameter values under two kinds of market situations that show before and after the emergence of subsidiary LCCs.     

LEADERSHIP IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: CONSEQUENCES AND INCENTIVES

Initiatives in favor of unilateral action on climate change are frequently challenged by concerns over free riding. Nevertheless, we observe an increasing number of unilateral efforts at different administrative levels and in different parts of the world. Previous academic literature described various individual mechanisms where emissions abroad may increase or decrease as a reaction to unilateral emission reductions. In this paper, we collect a comprehensive set of both positive and negative reactions and analyze them in stylized models. This allows us to identify the most important characteristics that determine the potential of a leader to boost mitigation efforts abroad. We find that this potential depends on (i) a strong ability to generate knowledge through leadership, (ii) a high degree of credibility in the international community, and (iii) a similar economic structure to the most important emitters. While most effects are difficult to quantify, this comprehensive assessment suggests that leakage effects resulting from unilateral mitigation may well be outweighed by positive reactions.     

Pricing,greening, and transparency decisions considering the impact of government subsidies and CSR behavior in supply chain decisions

In this paper, we analytically model different government subsidy strategies in a supply chain manufacturing and selling a green product. We model the interaction between greening degree and transparency level set by a manufacturer and its impact on not only the supply chain, but also consumers and the government. The supply chain is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer can choose two different strategies. First, he only cares about his production profit; and second, he concerns with CSR in addition to his production profit. We develop a new transparency-based index of consumer satisfaction to model how the market reacts to manufacturer CSR decisions. The government decide three different subsidy strategies. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is developed and solved to analytically derive managerial insights. As a result, if the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the greening degree and transparency level in CSR concerns strategy are higher than when the manufacturer is not concerned with corporate social responsibility. In addition, when the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the profit of supply chain members and government are equal in both strategies. We give a real-world example of Iranian brick industry.     

A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality

To combat the critical stresses of rising urbanization, the government acquires land from private owners using the power of eminent domain. This land assembly causes negative externalities such as increasing social tension and injustice that may impose a long-term threat to stability and sustainable development. Therefore, there is a need to make the land acquisition process more transparent and just. Considering the unique Indian context where informality has a strong presence, we propose an approach based on game theory that models the bargain through a three-stage Nash equilibrium game. Four agents – the government, the private developer, the landowner, and the free rider – are considered. We provide conditional solutions for the generalizable Case and proceed to model different stakeholder behavior patterns through two utility functional forms – linear and exponential. In the linear case, we find that the free rider obtains half of the revenue of the project, whereas the landowner gains between one-fourth and one-half of the revenue. Thus, we highlight the undeniably crucial role free riders play in land acquisition negotiations. However, closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the exponential form, due to which we use simulations to demonstrate a solution procedure. We conclude by stating that the proposed model can be useful in formulating future land policies in a sustainable and inclusive manner, with optimal utility derivations for all concerned stakeholders. Our model can also be extended to other spatial contexts where informality features heavily in the land market, especially in the Global South.     

绿色贸易措施的政治博弈

随着贸易自由化和全球经济一体化,世界各国出于维护本国国际竞争比较优势战略目标和实现贸易与环境协调发展的客观需要,以可持续发展为口号,以保护环境和人类健康为目的或借口,以产品标准、环境标志、绿色包装、贸易制裁等为手段的绿色贸易措施正在成为国际社会特别是发达国家越来越频繁使用的新的国际贸易保护手段。形形色色的绿色贸易措施正在向系统化、制度化和国际化方向演进。本文通过对近期一些国外经济学家的相关文献回顾,对绿色贸易措施产生的政治博弈过程进行简单的综述,为我国参与新一轮的WTO谈判提供一些理论参考。     

低碳发展视域下的科技政策:模式构建与演化路径

科技政策具有鲜明的时代特征,随着时代进步而不断演进与发展。基于低碳发展视域,以低碳经济理论、政策设计理论为基础,分析科技政策发展现状,从政策主体、政策客体、政策目标3个方面识别科技政策维度,构建基于战略、中观与基础层面的S-M-B科技政策模式系统框架,并运用博弈观点分析科技政策模式作用机理。研究表明,低碳科技政策是一个不断发展演变的政策体系,需要基于系统观构建政策模式,并保障主客体之间在低碳发展中的政策均衡。最后,运用放大镜模型探析科技政策体系演化模型,提出对接-整合-融合的动态演化路径及具体管理启示。     

企业异质性与服务贸易保护水平的决定——基于中国数据的实证检验

笔者从政治经济学的分析视角,运用博弈论的分析方法,对企业异质性和服务贸易保护水平的相关性进行了理论分析,并结合中国服务部门的数据进行实证检验。结果表明:一个服务部门的产业集中度越高,劳动生产率越低,资本密集度越低,其贸易保护水平也越高。此外,中国所有制结构的特殊性赋予企业异质性更多的内涵,在一个服务部门内,国有企业的比重越大,贸易保护水平也越高。     

How category characteristics affect the number of store brands offered by the retailer: a model and empirical analysis

Our research examines why retailers offer, not one, but multiple store brands in some product categories. More specifically, we are interested in how certain product category characteristics affect the number of store brands. We model a product category consisting of two incumbent national brands that may differ in strength. The retailer may introduce one or two store brands depending on which maximizes category profits. Our analysis suggests that the retailer is likely to carry two store brands in categories where (i) the national brands are similar in strength; and (ii) the price sensitivity between the national brands is low. Interestingly, the conditions that support the introduction of more than one store brand are quite different than the conditions that would facilitate the introduction of additional national brands. We provide empirical evidence that support our model-based predictions.