Price matching and product differentiation strategies considering showrooming

Showrooming, a phenomenon in which customers use brick-and-mortar stores to assess products and then purchase them from online retailers (o-retailers) for lower prices, is considered a great threat to traditional retailers (t-retailers). To combat showrooming, many t-retailers have executed price matching which enables customers to pay o-retailers' lower prices for the identical product. To avoid direct competition with t-retailers who execute price matching, many o-retailers have begun to sell differentiated products from t-retailers, which weakens the information advantage to customers from practicing showrooming. Motivated by these observations, we construct a duopoly game, where a t-retailer and an o-retailer sell products in a same category, to study the profitabilities of product differentiation and price matching in the context of showrooming. The results show that in the scenario without price matching, the o-retailer is likely to benefit from product differentiation only when the o-retailer's differentiated product is more popular with customers than the t-retailer's product. However, in the price matching scenario, the o-retailer also has the opportunity to benefit from product differentiation when the o-retailer's differentiated product is less popular with customers than the t-retailer's product, and product differentiation can be a win-win strategy for the two retailers under certain conditions. Considering the o-retailer's product differentiation decision, the t-retailer is only likely to execute price matching if the non-digital attributes of the product category sold by two retailers are not very obvious.     

政府研发补贴促进企业创新了吗

政府补贴能否促进企业创新一直存在争议。与以往从资源视角探讨政府补贴与企业创新关系的研究不同，基于信号理论视角，以2012—2016年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本，通过剔除非研发补贴的噪音并控制样本自选择偏误，实证检验中国转型经济背景下，政府研发补贴对企业创新的微观政策效应，以及企业层面制度因素（产权性质）和区域层面制度因素（制度环境）对该效应的调节作用。研究发现，政府研发补贴释放的积极信号能够帮助企业获取外部创新资源，有效促进企业创新；相比于国有企业，政府研发补贴对非国有企业创新的激励效应更强；制度环境越好，政府研发补贴对企业创新的激励效应越强。研究理论丰富了科技创新政策有效性和信号理论相关研究。同时，研究发现，政府应继续加大对企业创新活动的补贴额度，不断深化所有制改革，为企业创新营造良好的外部制度环境；另外，企业还应充分发挥政府研发补贴信号的杠杆效应，拓宽外部创新资源获取渠道。     

名山风景区风景特质理论体系及其实践 ——以武当山为例

名山风景区“人与天调”的风景系统代表了中国独有的山岳文化现象和山水相融的总体特征。在风景自然和文化整体性视角下研究风景系统的形态、类型及其形成原因和规律，分析了风景资源评价和风景特质评价的互补性；构建了“相-制-理”的名山风景区风景特质理论及其实践框架。以武当山为例，探索“以脉绘景”的风景特质之相、“山川流峙”的风景特质之制以及“因脉而成”的风景特质之理。最后总结了风景特质理论作为形态学理论、作为图谱理论、作为地脉文脉认识论实践的整体性特点及其应用前景。     

集成动员理论下军民科技协同创新机制设计研究

军民科技协同创新能力是国家科技整体竞争力的重要组成部分。近年来，军民科技协同创新取得显著成效，但也存在诸多问题，严重阻碍了军民科技协同创新深入发展。因此，迫切需要对军民科技协同创新机制进行系统性设计。基于集成动员理论的核心思想，借鉴其组织模式和运行机制理论，针对军民科技协同创新机制不明晰等问题，对军民科技协同创新机制进行系统性设计，提出在军民科技协同创新管理机构的引导下，将军民科技协同创新的各种资源要素和功能集成于军民科技协同创新服务平台，为军民科技协同创新流程和成果转化流程两大板块提供相关服务，并构建相关运行保障机制，进而实现军民科技协同创新集成化、敏捷化、模块化、高效化管理，进一步完善军民科技协同创新管理体系。     

20世纪50—60年代的中国财政学:一个传统的移入与退出

20世纪50—60年代既是新中国财政学初建时期,也见证了苏联财政学传统移入和退出的过程。就其理论和实践来源看,苏联财政学是苏联化的马克思主义、苏联特殊年代政治实践和计划经济体制等诸多因素的混合物。虽然它在发展和创新马克思主义财政理论方面作出了首创性的贡献,但其历史局限性也不可避免。在苏联财政学移植中国之时,其中一些负面特征也参与了新中国财政学的重建,并对其后中国财政学的发展起到了长久的羁绊作用。20世纪50年代后期以来,中国财政学“去苏联化”的目标未能完全实现,这一方面源于塑造苏联财政学的思维模式仍然在当时的中国财政学界起着支配作用;另一方面在那些影响财政学发展的主要因素上,当时的中苏两国极为雷同。吸取20世纪50年代中国移植苏联财政学的历史经验和教训,对当下中国合理借鉴域外学术资源、发展和创新马克思主义财政理论,有着重要的借鉴意义。     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

Relief aid stocking decisions under bilateral agency cooperation

We aim to quantify the benefits of cooperation between humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stocking decisions. We consider two agencies that stock the same type of relief item at different locations prone to individual disaster risks and agree to transship the shortage amount from available stocks in case of a disaster. We incorporate the disaster risk to the Newsvendor model by conditioning the stock quantity decisions on the event that a major disaster occurs within the lifetime of the stocked relief item. We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity and compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically. We apply this game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul to optimize the stocking decisions of an agency for shelter units in cooperation with another agency. We investigate the characteristics of the solutions under various parameter settings and identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies.     

The airfare pricing and seat allocation problem in full-service carriers and subsidiary low-cost carriers

This study investigates the competitive market situation in the air transport industry considering full-service carriers (FSC), subsidiary low-cost carriers (LCC) and rival LCCs on the flight-leg level while subsidiary LCCs are established by FSCs against rival LCCs to keep the market share and to make more profit. It is assumed that the demand of economy class for each airline follows a known distribution, and the mean value of that distribution is a function of its airfare and the airfare differences with other airlines. In addition, no-shows and cancellations are introduced to reflect a real situation. Based on this situation, a mathematical model is developed to derive efficient airfare pricing and seat allocation for each airline for maximizing the profit sum of both FSCs and subsidiary LCCs using a repeated game. A repeated game model integrated with a Tabu search algorithm and an EMSR based heuristic is suggested to deal with the proposed repeated game. A numerical example is provided to validate the model and solution procedure with hypothetical system parameter values under two kinds of market situations that show before and after the emergence of subsidiary LCCs.