我国农业保险市场失衡分析——基于效用理论视角

本文在分析农业保险发展现状的基础上,基于马斯洛需求层次理论、风险偏好理论及风险规避程度度量理论,建立农户风险态度呈动态变化的效用函数曲线,推导出政府对农业保险补贴的上限和下限,得出结论：政府补贴过低无法达到刺激农户购买欲望转化为有效需求;但政府对农业保险的补贴并不是越多越好,超过一定限度,反而引发更为严重的道德风险,并导致农户的风险规避程度下降,进而影响农业保险的需求。  

河南省农业保险经营模式探讨

河南省是一个农业大省,农业发展的好坏决定了整个省的经济发展,而农业保险是保证整个农业发展的关键。本文首先分析了河南省曾经出现过的农业保险及其存在的问题,然后又分析了发展农业保险的现实环境。在以上分析的基础上提出了几种适合河南省省情的农业保险经营模式,并指出了在发展农业保险时应该注意的一些问题。  

论中小企业融资方式的改革和创新

进入新世纪以来，我国中小企业在繁荣经济、增加就业、推动创新和催生产业中发挥着越来越大的作用，已成为推动社会生产力发展和促进社会主义和谐社会建设的重要力量。但是，由于种种原因，融资难问题一直是中小企业发展的重要瓶颈之一。而建立健全政府补助机制、大力发展小额贷款公司及担保公司、发行中小企业集合债券或集合票据、加快创业板市场建设、灵活采用多种担保方式进行融资无疑是中小企业融资方式的创新之举。  

新农保最低缴费档次“受宠”原因及对策分析——基于对辽宁省阜新市彰武县400户农户调查的研究

新型农村保险制度根据农民收入水平的差异性将缴费水平设计为5个档次,农民可根据自身经济情况和未来养老消费预期选择相应的缴费档次。辽宁省彰武县400户农户新农保调查显示,该县自新农保试点以来,新农保最低缴费档次格外"受宠",通过定性和定量分析表明,主要是由于信任问题、心理问题、政策设计问题导致的。政府应当从制度本身和农民角度出发,树立公信力、完善政策设计、简化参保程序、加大宣传力度等,引导农户合理选择缴费档次。  

论对低保户进行分类管理的必要性与可行性

由于缺乏一套有效的收入监测机制,低保户隐性收入很难核实,导致低保户是＂只进不退＂,随之而来的是通过骗取低保户资格以享受低保金待遇的骗保行为日趋严重。本文建议借鉴中国银监会主席刘明康＂不看报表看三表＂的思路,通过水、电、气消耗多少来间接核查低保户的准确收入,以便使己不符合低保资格的低保户退保。同时建议根据低保户的收入状况,把低保户分为A、B、C三类来管理,低保金及优惠救助政策也分成三档,这样就可以参照当地低保待遇标准,实行低保金差（缺）额发放,差（缺）多少就发多少,这不仅可节省低保金,有助控制和减少骗保行为,还可使低保户成为节能减排的＂急先锋＂和＂排头兵＂。  

The Marketisation of Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) in Australia: A Structured Response

The marketisation of early childhood education and care (ECEC) offers opportunities to test assumptions about the benefits of a market framework. In Australia, where marketisation included reshaping, extending, and increasing government subsidies, one major listed company (ABC Learning Limited) emerged to dominate child care. Child care prices increased rapidly to become an election issue, and government subsidies increased. ABC acknowledged its economic dependence on government policy and subsidies. Until its collapse in 2008, ABC was the world's largest listed child care operator, and operating internationally. ABC's structured business model separated child care properties (propco) from child care operations (opco). ABC was the opco and leased the child care properties from propcos. As ABC grew and replicated its structured model to other forms of property including intangible assets, the rising child care prices and government subsidies supported a growing array of other enterprises all seeking profitable operations. This paper explains the structured opco‐propco model, identifies its interaction with accounting and lessons to be learned from marketisation.  

Anti-corruption,government subsidies,and investment efficiency

The problem of corruption in socio-economic development has long been a focus of academics and practitioners. To address this concern in China, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China instituted a new anti-corruption policy. In this paper, we examine the impact of this recently enacted anti-corruption policy on the investment efficiency of subsidized enterprises from the perspective of government subsidies. We conclude that government subsidies have a significant positive impact on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises and that the anti-corruption work done by the government has effectively restrained the excessive investment behavior of government-subsidized enterprises. Further, we find that the anti-corruption policy is more effective in restricting overinvestment in subsidized state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises. We examine the impact of the anti-corruption policy on excessive investment caused by government subsidies and enrich the body of research related to investment efficiency. We also provide empirical support for further research on the anti-corruption policy at the macro-market and micro-enterprise levels. The findings highlight the need to establish new cooperation between government and enterprises, to rationalize the distribution of administrative resources, and to promote the sustained and healthy development of the national economy.  

Political Connections and Government Subsidies: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms in China

Previous studies report mixed evidence regarding the effect of political connections on firm value. We seek new evidence in China, an important emerging market with a hallmark of a relationship-based economy. Using financially distressed firms (special treatment or ST firms) as a unique sample, we identify a direct channel through which political connections enhance firm value by showing that politically connected firms receive more government subsidies. Moreover, such effect becomes stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for firms with a better chance of survival, and after the government implemented a new policy to more strictly enforce the delisting in 2012.  

政府补贴能否促进高新技术企业的自主创新？——来自中关村的证据

中国政府对高新技术企业投入了大量补贴以激励它们创新,但是对补贴效果的研究并未达成一致结论。基于中关村3万多个高新技术企业2001-2012年的观察值,本文同时采用PSM与DID法对政府补贴的效果进行了研究,结果发现:第一,整体而言,政府补贴显著提高了创新经费支出、新产品销售收入和专利申请数量;第二,进一步将创新细分为自主创新和购买引进新技术之后发现,政府补贴存在“挤出效应”:被补贴企业的自主创新明显下降,而购买引进新技术显著增加;第三,政府补贴对企业的短期创新激励有显著的促进作用,但是对长期创新激励的促进作用不显著。本文对高新技术企业的补贴效果提供了实证绩效评估,所得出的结论有助于政府优化和调整激励创新政策。  

政府补助对可再生能源投资的门槛效应研究

运用中国A股市场96家可再生能源企业2009-2018年数据，引入能源消耗强度、经济发展水平、市场化程度和银行信贷四个门槛变量建立固定效应面板门槛模型，实证检验能源转型视角下政府补助对可再生能源投资的门槛效应，探讨不同补助类型和企业异质性对门槛效应的影响和差异。结果表明：政府补助对可再生能源投资的促进作用存在门槛效应。在能源消费强度更高、经济发展水平或市场化程度更低的地区，政府补助对可再生能源投资的促进作用更显著，同时政府补助对可再生能源投资的促进作用在银行信贷规模越大的企业更显著；相比于货币型直接补助，税收优惠型的间接补助政策更能促进可再生能源投资；政府补助对非国有企业的投资促进作用强于国有企业。