首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   18篇
  完全免费   2篇
  财政金融   20篇
  2019年   1篇
  2018年   1篇
  2017年   3篇
  2014年   2篇
  2012年   3篇
  2011年   2篇
  2009年   1篇
  2005年   1篇
  2003年   1篇
  2001年   1篇
  2000年   3篇
  1997年   1篇
排序方式: 共有20条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Consumption and Investment Motives and the Portfolio Choices of Homeowners   总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5  
This article investigates the portfolio choices of homeowners, taking into account the investment constraint introduced by Henderson and Ioannides (1983). This constraint requires housing investment by homeowners to be at least as large as housing consumption. It is shown that when the constraint is binding, the homeowner's optimal portfolio is ineffcient in a mean-variance sense. Thus, portfolio inefficiency is not an indication that consumers are irrational or careless in their financial decisions. Instead, inefficiency can be seen as the result of a rational balancing of the consumption benefits and portfolio distortion associated with housing investment.  相似文献
2.
This paper generalizes the Myers and Majluf (1984) model by introducing an agency cost structure based on private benefits of control. This new model predicts that many corporate finance variables each have opposing effects on under- and overinvestment. Private benefits exacerbate overinvestment but, interestingly, a small amount of private benefits can enhance firm value by alleviating underinvestment. Likewise, an increase in insider ownership alleviates overinvestment but aggravates underinvestment. When private benefits are small, the adverse effect of insider ownership on underinvestment tends to dominate. When there are considerable private benefits, the incentive-alignment effect of insider ownership is pronounced. Additionally, this model reconciles existing equity financing theories on announcement effects. It helps resolve the puzzle that small-growth firms do not seem to have an asymmetric information disadvantage when they issue new equity.  相似文献
3.
We study the relationship between firm value and investment to test the underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses. The results obtained, using panel data methodology as the estimation method, indicate that the abovementioned relation is quadratic, which implies that there exists an optimal level of investment. As a consequence, firms that invest less than the optimal level suffer from an underinvestment problem, while those investing more than the optimum suffer from overinvestment. The quadratic relation is maintained when firms are classified depending on their investment opportunities, the optimum being in accordance with the quality of investment opportunities.  相似文献
4.
本文从股权分置制度变迁的角度研究管理层股权激励有效性及内在机理。以2005年股权分置改革为结构断点进行Chow检验,发现股权激励治理效应回归方程在2003—2009年全样本期间发生了显著的结构性变化,股权分置改革改善了管理层股权激励的治理效应,减少了过度投资。进一步研究表明,股权分置制度变迁对国有公司管理层股权激励效应影响显著,缓解了公司代理问题,但是对非国有公司没有显著影响。上述研究对于解决国有公司过度投资具有重要的现实意义。  相似文献
5.
以2004~2009年间701家上市公司为样本,研究政府干预、政治关联对企业非效率投资行为的影响。研究发现:政府干预一方面会加剧有自由现金流量公司的过度投资,对国有企业过度投资的影响更为严重;另一方面可以有效地缓解融资约束企业的投资不足,尤其是国有企业的投资不足。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,政府会损害或支持所控制的企业,这为政府"掠夺之手理论"和"支持之手理论"提供了实证支持。研究还发现,政治关联与过度投资和投资不足均负相关,这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害,并为企业谋取利益。  相似文献
6.
We conjecture that golden parachutes are initiated when the agency cost of free cash flow is most severe. We examine the relation between golden parachutes and investment levels in firms that have been successfully acquired. Our results support these three conclusions. First, target firms overinvest prior to an acquisition when golden parachutes are present. Second, the acquirers of targets with golden parachutes reduce investment subsequent to the takeover. Third, the reversal in capital investment by the combined firm is correlated with the magnitude of the target's pre-acquisition overinvestment. The latter findings indicate the takeover acts as a disciplining mechanism with the acquirer reversing the target overinvestment subsequent to the acquisition  相似文献
7.
We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.  相似文献
8.
We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.  相似文献
9.
Foreign acquisitions have been growingdramatically since the 1980s despite academic studiesshowing that shareholders of acquirers generally donot realize any significant gain. In this paper, weinvestigate whether foreign acquisitions aremotivated by managerial self-interest. Logisticregressions are performed to establish a link betweenforeign acquisitions and the acquirer's free cashflow. The results show that foreign acquisitions oflow-Q firms are strongly influenced by managerialdiscretion. In addition, acquisitions of low-Q firmsare conducted without consideration of theperformance of the acquirers. Foreign acquisitions ofhigh-Q firms, however, do not representoverinvestments.  相似文献
10.
近期的研究支持了转型经济条件下政府与企业之间的密切联系,但却少有研究关注政府公共治理效力对微观企业的影响。基于此,本文以地方政府财政透明度为对象,将政府公共治理因素纳入到企业行为的分析中,观察其对企业投资效率的影响。本文发现,与央企和民企相比,地方政府财政透明度的增加更有助于提高地方国有企业的投资效率;地方政府财政透明度的增加对地方国有企业的过度投资具有更强的抑制作用。本文的研究提供了政府公共治理影响企业价值的经验证据,丰富了转型经济条件下政府——企业的行为分析框架。并且本文对推进财政信息公开、加强社会主义民主制度和责任型政府建设,亦具有积极的实践指导价值。  相似文献
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号