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This paper conductsan experiment to investigate the economic effect of public disclosureswithin a multi-move adaptation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.The game, which has multiple equilibria, is characterized by:(1) a stochastic endpoint, (2) random, repeated pairings withanonymous partners, and (3) public disclosures concerning thecurrent partner's previous strategies. In the experiment, cooperationis improved by the disclosures. In addition, subjects cooperatemore frequently when encountering a player who has tended tocooperate in the past, and less frequently when encounteringa player who has tended to defect in the past. Delayed disclosureleads to levels of cooperation only slightly less than thoseobtained with timely disclosure.  相似文献
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行为经济学的礼物交换博弈、信任博弈的试验实证结果及囚徒困境博弈的理论分析揭示了收入分配规则对人类行为进行规范的基础:建立公平正义的收入分配规则是人类本性的要求,否则的话会制约人类的合作倾向,使社会经济趋向非帕累托状态。现实经济中对"做大蛋糕"与"分好蛋糕"的不休争论,基于行为经济学,我们认为要"做大蛋糕",必须坚持先"分好蛋糕"的原则。  相似文献
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卡特尔组织是由竞争企业所构成的共谋联盟.企业通过在商品价格、产量和市场份额等方面订立协定而形成的同盟.本文将先阐述卡特尔组织的优点及其不稳定性,并运用保洁与联合利华的例子来分析卡特尔组织在现实生活中的稳定性.  相似文献
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在市场博弈中.以自身利益最大化为目标的策略安排本是一种理性选择,但这种理性选择并不一定总能实现自身收益最大化,有时这种个体理性可能会导致集体非理性的结局。本文通过对威海市金融竞争和维权过程中因银行自利行为导致信贷风险产生、爆发并最终使金融债务大量悬空的个案描述,分析“囚徒困境”现象是导致这一非理性均衡结果的主要原因,指出类似的“囚徒困境”现象在一定条件下完全可以通过检查和监管等手段减少或避免发生。  相似文献
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作为近十多年大量涌起的一种保证形态——“担保圈”,其风险因担保过度的驱使,在经济逆向波动中表现出某种不可控的放大趋势,演化成一定程度上的系统性风险隐患。为测度和控制风险,在量子理性思维启示下建立跨行担保风险识别系统等将具有重要意义。  相似文献
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施政骏 《中国外资》2012,(16):164-165
卡特尔组织是由竞争企业所构成的共谋联盟。企业通过在商品价格、产量和市场份额等方面订立协定而形成的同盟。本文将先阐述卡特尔组织的优点及其不稳定性,并运用保洁与联合利华的例子来分析卡特尔组织在现实生活中的稳定性。  相似文献
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An aggregator is a technology that consolidates liquidity—in the form of bid and ask prices and amounts—from multiple sources into a single unified order book to facilitate ‘best-price’ execution. It is widely used by traders in financial markets, particularly those in the globally fragmented spot currency market. In this paper, I study the properties of execution in an aggregator where multiple liquidity providers (LPs) compete for a trader’s uninformed flow. There are two main contributions. Firstly, I formulate a model for the liquidity dynamics and contract formation process, and use this to characterize key trading metrics such as the observed inside spread in the aggregator, the reject rate due to the so-called ‘last-look’ trade acceptance process, the effective spread that the trader pays, as well as the market share and gross revenues of the LPs. An important observation here is that aggregation induces adverse selection where the LP that receives the trader’s deal request will suffer from the ‘Winner’s curse’, and this effect grows stronger when the trader increases the number of participants in the aggregator. To defend against this, the model allows LPs to adjust the nominal spread they charge or alter the trade acceptance criteria. This interplay is a key determinant of transaction costs. Secondly, I analyse the properties of different execution styles. I show that when the trader splits her order across multiple LPs, a single provider that has quick market access and for whom it is relatively expensive to internalize risk can effectively force all other providers to join her in externalizing the trader’s flow thereby maximizing the market impact and aggregate hedging costs. It is therefore not only the number, but also the type of LP and execution style adopted by the trader that determines transaction costs.  相似文献
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