Peer firms in relative performance evaluation

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the firm's technology, the complexity of the organization, and the ability to access external credit, which depend on firm size. When peers are composed of similar industry-size firms, evidence is consistent with the use of RPE in CEO compensation.  

相对业绩差距评估对基金经理风险承担的激励研究

基金经理在选择投资组合风险时,不仅会考虑基金的业绩排名,同时会考虑基金业绩之间的差距,由此提出了业绩差距排名,并提出了新的实证方法,即线性回归的方法来研究业绩差距排名对基金经理风险承担的影响,同时验证了BHS结论在中国基金市场中的适用性。结果表明BHS结论在中国基金市场中是不成立的,同时表明在中国基金市场中基金经理具有相对业绩排名目标,但此相对业绩排名是本文中所提出的业绩差距排名,此结论可以为监管部门规范基金投资行为以及为投资者选择基金提供参考。  

Difference in interim performance and risk taking with short-sale constraints

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers are expected to increase their volatility so as to catch up with winners. We consider a rational model of a mutual fund tournament in the presence of short-sale constraints and find the opposite: Interim winners choose more volatile portfolios in equilibrium than interim losers. Several empirical works present evidence consistent with our model. However, based on the above informal argument, they appear to conclude against the tournament behavior. We argue that this conclusion is unwarranted. We also demonstrate that tournament incentives lead to differences in interim performance for otherwise identical managers and that mid-year trading volume is inversely related to mid-year stock return.  

Responses to risk in tournaments

Due to their inefficient use of information, promotion incentives, which can be modeled as tournaments, can induce sub-optimal actions on the part of managers. This is a problem for firms because it leads to choices that do not maximize profit. This also can pose interpretation and comparison problems for research studies that employ tournament incentives. We demonstrate a situation where tournament incentives eliminate the effects of project risk on managers’ decisions as concerns with winning take precedence over concerns of maximizing expected profit. We also report the results of an experiment and find actual behavior to be fairly well explained by theoretical predictions. However, we find systematic deviations that lead to decisions that are more consistent with profit maximization than the economic theory predicts.  

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.  

Implied measures of relative fund performance

We evaluate the relative performance of funds by conditioning their returns on the cross-section of portfolio characteristics across fund managers. Our implied procedure circumvents the need to specify benchmark returns or peer funds. Instead, fund-specific benchmarks for measuring selection and market timing ability are constructed. This technique is robust to herding as well as window dressing and mitigates survivorship bias. Empirically, the conditional information contained in portfolio weights defined by industry sectors, assets, and geographical regions is important to the assessment of fund management. For each set of portfolio characteristics, we identify funds with success at either selecting securities or timing-the-market.

EXPLAINING THE UTILIZATION OF RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A MULTI-THEORETICAL STUDY USING DATA FROM SWEDEN

One of the more lasting imprints that New Public Management (NPM) has made in the public sector is an increase in the popularity of performance measurement. In Sweden, performance measurement has gained popularity in the public sector, not least at the local government level with the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE). Because utilization of RPE is a decentralized and optional mode of governance, a somewhat heterogeneous practice has evolved. The aim of this paper is to examine the causes of this differentiated practice. We jointly examine economic, political and institutional/cultural explanations in order to account for the utilization of RPE. The empirical material consists of archival data and a questionnaire sent to all Swedish municipalities in late 2005. We show that RPE adoption and use partly has different antecedents and that the institutional/cultural perspective appears to have greater explanatory power than economic and political, not least as a consequence of the potential to explain decoupling and the importance of change facilitating capabilities. The investigation contributes specifically to the literature on the utilization of RPE in local governments and more generally to the literature on why and to what extent management accounting practices are utilized.  

The effect of relative performance feedback on individual performance in team settings under group-based incentives*

This study reports the results of an experiment that analyses the behavioural effect of relative performance feedback (RPF) on individual performance when compensation is based on team performance. Specifically, it investigates whether RPF affects individual performance differently when the comparison focuses on other members of that individual’s team (within-group RPF) or on other teams (between-group RPF). We predict a negative effect of within-group RPF on individual performance. We also predict that between-group RPF moderates that negative effect, since it encourages individuals to focus on group goals rather than individual goals. Consistent with our predictions, results show that the negative effect of within-group RPF on individual performance is mitigated by between-group RPF. Our results can help accountants to better understand how the effects of relative performance feedback differ according to the predominant comparison target.  

A Strategic Asset Pricing Model for Relative Performance Concern

We propose a strategic asset pricing model for the relative performance concern with heterogeneous beliefs in the framework of Nash equilibrium. In our model, the presence of heterogeneous beliefs generates the upward pressure on the stock market volatility and gives rise to the separation of agents’ perceived Sharpe ratios. We show that if one of the agents temporarily wins the market, the presence of relative performance concern will reduce the impacts of the winner and make the investors who have been edged out of the market more inclined to return. Besides, the sufficiently strong concern of relative performance will bring investors the extreme aversion to losing and get them to trade similarly.  

Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios

Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.