现阶段寻租对国有商业银行竞争力的影响及其治理

寻租现象普遍存在于社会经济各个领域,具有非生产性的基本特征,其产生和存在与特定的制度、体制环境相关.在中国经济体制转轨的背景下,国有商业银行正处于商业化、市场化改革的特定发展阶段,这造成了在银行监管领域、银行与政府之间、国有企业与国有银行之间和银行内部普遍存在寻租行为.这些形式各异的寻租行为从多个方面制约着国有商业银行竞争力的提高.本文在对寻租的特性进行界定的基础上,对国有商业银行运营中的寻租行为及其对国有商业银行竞争力的影响机制进行了分析,并建议重点通过制度的完善和创新、引入竞争机制和优化社会环境三个方面对寻租行为加以治理.  

企业并购中政府行为的目标选择与寻租模式分析

企业并购中的政府行为过程也即政府各子目标的博弈过程.政府行为在企业并购中同时受"公共利益"假设和"经济人"假设双重调节,并购的寻租模式也由此产生,进而导致了并购参与者之间的利益调整.在单一产权结构下的企业并购,由于并购主体间仍然存在相对独立的利益边界,政府行为的目标选择和寻租模式均能合理存在.同时强调,中央政府与地方政府在企业并购中的行为目标有所区别.  

The Costs of Free Land: The Oklahoma Land Rushes

There is an extensive literature in economic history on the disposition of public lands of the United States. Absent from this literature is any consideration of the Oklahoma Territory and the two unusual methods used to dispose of its lands. One method was a land rush where entrants literally raced to claim surveyed lots; the other was a lottery where random chance determined who won. This article develops a model of resource allocation applicable to land rushes and lotteries and examines evidence drawn from the Oklahoma land competitions. The model suggests that rent dissipation occurred. The available evidence corroborates this: some, if not all, of the benefits participants gained from the allocation of free lands were dissipated, although there are distinguishable differences in the real costs imposed by the two methods.  

The Natural Economic Advantage of Dictatorship over Democracy: A “Gresham's Law” of Governance

We show that when democratic and autocratic governments peacefully compete for governance over the same jurisdiction the autocratic has a natural advantage. The autocratic government, which unambiguously reduces welfare for everyone except the autocrat, will drive the competing democratic government to voluntarily shut down in the interests of its own electorate. For instance, if an autocratic government allows the creation of democratic local governments, with the authority to tax and spend at will, these democratic local governments will remain inert and ineffective: A Gresham's Law of Political Economy.  

The Costs of Free Land: The Oklahoma Land Rushes

There is an extensive literature in economic history on the disposition of public lands of the United States. Absent from this literature is any consideration of the Oklahoma Territory and the two unusual methods used to dispose of its lands. One method was a land rush where entrants literally raced to claim surveyed lots; the other was a lottery where random chance determined who won. This article develops a model of resource allocation applicable to land rushes and lotteries and examines evidence drawn from the Oklahoma land competitions. The model suggests that rent dissipation occurred. The available evidence corroborates this: some, if not all, of the benefits participants gained from the allocation of free lands were dissipated, although there are distinguishable differences in the real costs imposed by the two methods.  

寻租、R&D投资与公司业绩——基于民营上市公司的经验证据

本文手工搜集了2005-2009年中国民营上市公司R&D投资及高管政治联系的数据,从寻租行为与R&D投资活动的竞争性视角,实证研究了两者对公司业绩的影响趋势。本文结果表明,R&D投资持续、稳定地对公司业绩具有显著地提升作用,而寻租行为虽然短期对公司业绩有利,但却显著地损害了公司未来的业绩。本文研究结果表明,R&D投资,而非寻租,才是公司持续性业绩增长的关键。  

Laddering IPO shares

Regulators, investors, and the financial media argue that underwriters tie Initial Public Offering (IPO) allocations to investor post-listing purchases in the issuer shares. Using unique data from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) I investigate if these tie-in agreements are driven by price stabilization (reducing price falls below the offer price) or laddering (inflating prices above the offer price). I find that both stabilizing and laddering investors are rewarded with increased allocations for their service. However, only laddering investors increase allocations in very oversubscribed future issues. Secondary investors also lose from falling returns following laddering. I conclude that underwriters use both price stabilization and laddering across different IPOs. However, the rewards for cooperating investors and the economic consequences for secondary investors are much greater following laddering.  

Rent seeking and aid effectiveness

We introduce foreign aid and a rent seeking contest for public funds into the Barro (JPE 1990) growth model. We find that aid effectiveness depends on fiscal policies, the level of aid inflows and the quality of institutions that restrict appropriation of public funds by rent seeking agents. These results can be shown to be consistent with the best established findings in the empirical literature on aid effectiveness. Rent seeking may thus indeed be a major determinant of aid effectiveness. We further discuss how aid effectiveness depends on the way foreign aid is disbursed and on the determinants of institutional quality. JEL Classification F35 · D72 · D9 · H2  

信息披露、寻租与政府补贴有效性

采用深交所信息考评结果作为信息披露质量的代理变量,考量政府补贴的寻租行为及其有效性。实证显示,信息披露质量较低的企业,获得的政府补贴更多,但政府补贴无益于企业绩效和社会绩效的提高,从而支持了企业寻租假设。结果表明,信息透明度的提高有助于政府补贴资金的有效配置,提高社会整体福利。  

（武汉大学 经济与管理学院会计系，湖北 武汉430072）

复杂不透明的避税交易为公司高管的自利行为提供了机会。国企高管薪酬激励扭曲程度较大，所握权力缺乏监督，当他们从显性薪酬契约中获得的货币性私有收益较低时，可以通过避税交易寻租，此时国有上市公司避税程度较大；国有上市公司与子公司、受同一母公司控制的其他公司发生的异常关联交易、以及对异常经营活动现金流的操纵是国企高管避税寻租的实现途径。但是，“四大”审计并不能对高管避税寻租产生治理作用。