如何提高我国金融业的国际竞争力

针对经济全球化和我国金融业的对外开放，文章从金融创新、金融风险、金融体制改革等方面论述了我国金融业面对挑战应采取的措施。     

Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets

We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are perfectly dissipated in material terms at a steady state, efficiency is greater than if everybody had been risk neutral, since risk lovers specialize in rent seeking.     

卫星通信地球站终端技术的发展

本文介绍了卫星通信地球站终端技术的发展过程,初步论述了新技术应用的环境,为今后研制卫星通信设备提供某些参考。     

电子商务环境下的内部控制与风险管理

会计职业人员对评估内部控制并实施风险管理的技能已熟知多年。这种经过时间检验并证明行之有效的经验和专业技能是会计职业产业独特影响的知识基础。随着电子商业的发展，尽管目前尚没有统一且标准的定义，但其发展对会计职业却提出了挑战。从某种意义上讲，企业的风险评估增加了很多新的内容，而与之相对应的内部控制也需要进行必要的调整，从而实行风险管理。本文拟就电子商务环境下的内容控制和风险 管理及其手段进行分析。     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.     

电子商务的风险管理与审计研究

电子商务尽管现在处于低潮期，但是作为重要的变革力量，它仍然是2l世纪的一个必然趋势。另外，电子商务发展受阻的一个重要原因就是电子商务的安全问题，这一问题影响了消费的决策，也极大地改变了企业的整个风险结构。本从外部审计与内部审计两个角度分析了审计可以在应对电子商务风险中发挥的重要作用。从外部审计来看，数据完整性与机密性是网站审计与认证的重要方面，从内部审计来看，审计应该在包括了电子商务风险的全面风险管理框架内发挥重要的作用。     

The negative trade-off between risk and incentives: Evidence from the american whaling industry

This paper analyzes the trade-off between risk and incentives in the share contracts of the American whaling industry. Using a newly collected panel of 5378 individuals who sailed on more than 1000 whaling voyages from 1855–68, the response of sailors’ compensation to an increase in risk is estimated. The risks used to identify this response resulted from the commerce-raiding naval vessels of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As the Confederate cruisers sailed primarily in the Atlantic, and therefore posed far less of a threat to whaling voyages to other oceans, a quasi-experimental approach focusing on the differences between Atlantic voyages compared to others is implemented. The results are consistent with a negative trade-off between risk and incentives in the industry’s contracts. Moreover, evidence is found of selection among less risk-averse sailors and merchants into riskier voyages during the war.     

Decomposition of Fraud‐Risk Assessments and Auditors' Sensitivity to Fraud Cues*

Practitioners and regulators are concerned that when auditors perceive management's attitude or character as indicative of low fraud risk, they are not sufficiently sensitive to high levels of incentive or opportunity risks in their overall fraud‐risk assessments. In this study, we examine whether a fraud‐triangle decomposition of fraud‐risk assessments (that is, separately assessing attitude, opportunity, and incentive risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk) increases auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues when perceptions of management's attitude suggest low fraud risk. In an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers, we find that auditors who decompose fraud‐risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply make an overall fraud‐risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues appears to happen only when those cues suggest low fraud risk. When opportunity and incentive cues suggest high fraud risk, auditors are equally sensitive to those cues whether they use a decomposition or a holistic approach. We discuss and examine potential explanations for this finding.