虚设还是威慑：退市制度市场效应研究

通过建立动态博弈模型分析股市摘牌的作用机理,实证研究"ST预警—摘牌"退市体系的市场认可程度。结果发现,虽然退市预警制度在短期内能较好地向市场传达风险信号,但在中长期里给予了投资者投机炒作的空间,这有助于解释为何以往理论研究与市场观察结果相悖;即便我国股市摘牌强度相对较低,但市场能识别摘牌强度的信号并对其做出显著反应,摘牌起到了"杀鸡儆猴"的威慑作用。     

The recurrence of financial distress: A survival analysis

Companies often suffer periods of financial distress before filing for bankruptcy. Unlike one-off bankruptcies, financial distress can occur repeatedly within the same individual firm. This paper is focused on the recurrence of financial distress and studies the Chinese stock market, where Special Treatment – an official indicator of financial distress – can be repeatedly applied to a listed company. We employ a stratified hazard model to predict the probability of subsequent distress with variables, including duration dependency, event-based factors, institutional variables, financial ratios, market-based variables and macroeconomic conditions. Our empirical results show that accounting and market-based variables have limited power in predicting the recurrence of distress, whereas the duration of recovery, restructuring events and their interaction terms with the accounting and macroeconomic factors affect the recurrent risk significantly. Tested on out-of-time samples, our proposed hazard models show a robust performance in the prediction of recurrent risk over time.