Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective

The panic buying behavior under public health emergencies will lead to many adverse consequences, such as material waste, price fluctuation and uneven distribution of epidemic prevention materials, which will pose a threat to the social stability and economic development. In this paper, we construct a tripartite game model to explore the strategic choices of the public, merchants and the government in order to effectively respond to the panic buying behavior in the epidemic. The results demonstrate that: (1) Eight evolutionary stable strategies emerge in the panic buying events. The worst scenario can be improved by adjusting some relevant parameters. (2) The probability of the public choosing the strategy of “not involving in panic buying” depends on the potential benefits and losses of snapping up, rather than the extent of price rising. (3) The probability of merchants choosing the strategy of “not bid up price” depends on the intangible benefits. (4) The probability of the government choosing the strategy of “active supervision” depends on the supervision costs and government credibility, rather than the amount of fines. In addition, strategic suggestions to mitigate panic buying behavior are put forward from the perspective of each stakeholder.     

应对新冠疫情冲击的货币政策国际协调*

新冠疫情冲击了世界经济增长和金融市场稳定。很多国家推出极度宽松货币政策应对危机。从经典货币政策国际协调的博弈理论来看，应对本次疫情冲击的各国货币政策协调性不足，“以邻为壑”的非合作均衡效果明显。为数不多的货币政策协调也存在执行力不足、深度与广度不够、新兴市场国家话语权低等问题。在世界经济紧密联系、货币政策溢出效应加强的背景下，为了应对疫情冲击，国际组织需要创设协议和合作剩余分配机制，寻找货币政策刺激效果和防止国际资产泡沫之间的平衡，加强政策沟通和信息共享，提高新兴市场国家话语权，建设有效的应对危机的货币政策国际协调机制。中国应在“一带一路”倡议的框架下建立长期货币政策协调机制，在现有的IMF和G20等平台上发挥发达国家与新兴市场国家之间的协调桥梁作用，通过持续开展央行间技术性合作等措施参与和推进协调进程。     

Determinants of spectator no-show behaviour: first empirical evidence from the German Bundesliga

The analysis of stadium attendance demand has a long tradition in the economic literature. However, despite its evident merits, this previous research has been critiqued at several levels, in particular for relying on a suboptimal demand proxy, i.e. published attendance data. In this short note, we address these shortcomings by exploring a highly unique data set containing official information on spectators’ decisions of whether or not to physically attend 704 German football Bundesliga games played between August 2014 and January 2017.     

政府随机审计的动态博弈模型及政策启示

本文在一个三阶段动态博弈框架下，对政府随机审计过程中的政府审计机关与政府审计对象以及国家与政府审计对象之间的动态博弈特征进行了分析。分析结果显示：政府审计机关与政府审计对象之间存在一个纯策略纳什均衡，而国家和政府审计对象之间存在一个混合策略纳什均衡。政府审计对象接受国家实质性审计的概率是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数的单调递减函数，而政府审计对象的违规或不作为的概率分别是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数和政府审计对象的应尽义务或责任的单调递减函数，却是政府审计机关审计行为成本的单调递增函数。同时，结合研究结论和中国政府审计全覆盖的现实，给出了一些政策建议。     

An evolutionary Cournot oligopoly model with imitators and perfect foresight best responders

We consider the competition among quantity setting players in a linear evolutionary environment. To set their outputs, players adopt, alternatively, the best response rule having perfect foresight or an imitative rule. Players are allowed to change their behavior through an evolutionary mechanism according to which the rule with better performance will attract more followers. The relevant stationary state of the model describes a scenario where players produce at the Cournot‐Nash level. Due to the presence of imitative behavior, we find that the number of players and implementation costs, needed to the best response exploitation, have an ambiguous role in determining the stability properties of the equilibrium and double stability thresholds can be observed. Differently, the role of the intensity of choice, representing the evolutionary propensity to switch to the most profitable rule, has a destabilizing role, in line with the common occurrence in evolutionary models. The global analysis of the model reveals that increasing values of the intensity of choice parameter determine increasing dynamic complexities for the internal attractor representing a population where both decision mechanisms coexist.     

Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

土地流转：弱转入土地意愿的博弈分析

[目的]我国土地制度的施行使得农户拥有较多小块土地,家庭农场实现连片规模经营的前提是获得规模连片土地,家庭农场与农户进行土地流转协商时,农户将土地流转给家庭农场的意愿如何值得探讨。因此本文研究目的是对家庭农场实现规模连片生产提出建议,期望家庭农场实现规模化经营。[方法]博弈分析法。[结果]家庭农场存在从农户手中转入土地困难,转入土地意愿不强的现象,家庭农场弱转入土地意愿的根源在于土地租金过低、农户转出土地净利润过低、实际转入土地意愿过低。[结论]由此文章提出了3点建议:(1)尝试"确权不确地,确地不确人"的确权政策(2)创建农村土地经营权流转信息平台,建立农村土地流转交易所(3)工商资本下乡租田的做法需谨慎。     

Rotating group representatives and group members’ requests in repeated public goods game

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the effect of group representatives on contribution behaviour in response to group members’ requests in repeated public goods games. Data came from 135 students in 15 groups enrolled in the experiment, grouped in the following treatments: no group representatives (NR, NRG) and group representatives (R1, R2). We also tested initial requests wherein the group members’ initial requests (i.e. NRG, R2) mediated the positive relationship between individual-level contribution preferences and group contributions. We used a fixed-effects GLS regression and IV regression to analyse the effect of group representatives and group members’ requests. The results indicated the following: (a) rotating group representative/group members’ requests was related to group contributions at the session (within-members) and group (between-group) levels; (b) the reactions to members’ requests positively predicted group contributions; (c) subjects in the no group representatives treatment formed their requests by relying more on previous group contributions than subjects in the group representatives treatment, who relied more on the previous group members’ requests; and (d) the initial requests explained long-term contribution levels, which resulted in variations in group contributions observed between the NRG and R2 treatments. Our findings highlight the role of rotating group representatives in stimulating cooperation among members, while group members’ requests impel individuals to make contribution decisions at the group level.