Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71     

Optimising a Probabilistic Model of the Development of Play in Soccer

We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social, 16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations. However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed. This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed.     

The victim matters – experimental evidence on lying,moral costs and moral cleansing

In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations.     

会计信息失真的博弈分析

会计信息失真是长期困扰会计工作的顽症 ,也是导致国家宏观经济决策和企业内外微观决策失误的祸根。采用博弈论的分析方法对会计信息失真产生的条件、机制以及治理的有效方法进行了深层次的探讨 ,并指出要提高会计数据的质量 ,以确保会计信息的真实性 ,就必须要建立完善的监督体系 ,严格监督 ,并加大执法力度 ,对作假者进行严惩 ,同时又不能使监督和惩罚的成本过高。     

从一个简单博弈探讨中小企业信用体系建设

市场经济是信用经济,诚信是市场经济机制的第一法则。信用缺失已成为我国中小企业面临的一个严重问题,其结果不仅使社会交易成本不断提高,而且在很大程度上抑制了中小企业的健康发展。采用博弈论的分析方法,在信用博弈模型分析的基础上,对中小企业信用缺失的成因进行分析,并提出中小企业信用体系建设的思路。     

供应链视角下的农产品质量安全管理研究

近年来,我国农产品安全问题事件层出不穷,解决农产品的安全问题已经成了一个紧迫性的全国性问题。文中基于供应链的视角,从农产品供应链的各个环节、上下游企业角色的博弈、激励和惩罚机制、政府监管等各个角度分析了目前中国农产品供应链管理中存在的食品安全问题的症结所在,并且提出了相对应的解决措施,最后以安徽青松食品有限公司的“安心豆芽”项目为例进行了实证研究。     

博弈视角下的地王现象及其治理建议

自土地出让方式改革后,"地王"逐渐出现在人们的视野中,高位上扬的房价引起了社会各界对"地王"的高度关注。"地王"在促进我国土地市场化的同时,也直接推高了房价并使人们对未来房价有上涨的预期。如何理性地看待"地王"这一现象,探索其形成原因,有利于土地市场的健康发展。鉴于此,文章基于博弈论这一独特视角,对引起"地王"这一现象的土地拍卖制度进行了系统的研究。研究得出:在土地出让过程中,地方政府和房地产开发商更加青睐高价拍卖土地。研究认为:"地王"现象必须从完善土地招拍挂制度、改革财税制度以改善地方政府的财政困境、改善地方政府的绩效评估制度等方面入手对其进行治理。     

环境会计信息供求双方的博弈分析

在构建我国环境会计信息披露体系的过程中,我们通常以国家宏观利益为研究导向,忽视信息供求双方的微观利益及其内部效用;以外在制约为主要手段,缺乏内在激励。我国环境信息披露目标难以达成的症结之一在于信息供求双方的内部效用无法满足而造成的披露动力不足。文章以信息供求双方内部效用为逻辑起点进行博弈分析,提出从短期和长期两方面激励企业环境披露信息的建议。     

基于博弈论的军队物资供应商信息甄别研究

军用物资保障是战斗力生成和提升的重要支撑。以供应链管理思想为指导,基于博弈论,建立了军用物资管理部门和军用物资供应商不完全信息动态博弈模型,构建了科学的报酬机制,消除了信息不对称和逆向选择现象。