Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.     

What has New Zealand gained from The FTA with China?: Two counterfactual analyses†

We investigate the effects of the 2008 New Zealand (NZ)–China free trade agreement (FTA) on exports from NZ to China, and real GDP per capita in NZ using the synthetic control method to estimate the counterfactuals. NZ exports to China were more than 200% higher in 2014 than what they would have had the FTA never been signed. NZ's food and live animals exports to China were more than 180% higher in 2014 than the counterfactual. Our counterfactuals indicate a small but negative effect of the FTA on NZ's real GDP per capita between 2009 and 2012.     

Denmark’s Agricultural Institutions: An Instrumental Evaluation

This paper begins with a tax and a specially organized commission proposed by John R. Commons. Commons made his proposal because high tariffs were not benefiting workers. The paper contends that his proposal also applies to a current problem - the failure of trade agreements to improve working conditions. The paper bases its argument on data, standard economic reasoning, and Commons’ approach in “constructive research” to wage transactions, public purpose, limiting factors, and power imbalances.

The paper argues that Commons’ proposal could improve the evolution of American labor law and that it could ameliorate power imbalances created by laws that give corporations and trade associations a bargaining advantage over nations and organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO). It concludes that economic discourse could benefit from consideration of the belief behind Commons’ proposal - that costs of production passed on to consumers should include the cost of good working conditions.     

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Summary. This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Received: October 9, 2001; revised version: April 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Licun Xue, Joseph Greenberg and the participants of PET 2000 for very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his/her valuable comments. The paper has been previously circulated under the title Binding Agreements.     

Mean-Variance Optimal Reinsurance Arrangements

Reinsurance reduces the risk but it also reduces the potential profit. The aim of the paper is to derive optimal, from the cedent's point of view, reinsurance arrangements balancing the risk measured by variance and expected profits under various mean-variance premium principles of the reinsurer. We find that quota share, excess of loss or combinations of excess of loss with quota share are the optimal rules according to a fixed expected gain of the cedent     

A model of the origins of basic property rights

This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysis explores, in particular, the roles of the players' fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right.