税收优惠政策与高技术产业创新效率

研究目标：分析税收优惠政策对创新效率的影响以及创新效率的收敛性，测度税收优惠政策对创新带来的实际贡献。研究方法：构建随机前沿模型测度高技术产业的创新效率，采用σ收敛和β收敛检验方法检验创新效率收敛性，并采用反事实计量方法测度税收优惠政策对创新带来的实际贡献。研究发现：税收优惠政策对研发效率有显著正影响，对市场转化效率的影响为正但不显著，政策实施后效率分布也更集中；研发效率的收敛主要是由东中西地区内部之间差距的缩小造成的，而市场转化效率的收敛是由三大地区内部差距的缩小以及中西部和东部地区的差距缩小共同造成的；税收优惠政策使研发效率大约上升了8%～10%，带来的创新产出占总产出的比重也一直维持在10%以上。研究创新：从效率水平和收敛性两个角度来定量分析税收优惠政策对创新效率的影响。研究价值：为更好地采取措施提高创新效率和减小地区创新效率差距提供经验证据。     

Viewpoint: Soda taxes – Four questions economists need to address

The popularity of soda taxes as a public health policy has grown rapidly in the last few years. While the evidence that the tax works in reducing the purchases of soda is emerging, there are a number of questions that are yet to be answered before the broader effectiveness of this measure can be determined. Beyond health effects, there is more specifically a need to better understand the economic mechanisms of change, redistributive effects, as well as causal and spillover effects in food systems and economy more broadly.     

Effects of investor tax heterogeneity on stock prices and trading behaviour around the ex-dividend day: the case of Australia

Using a sample of Australian stocks during the 1996–2014 period, this study examines how tax heterogeneity between domestic and foreign investors affects trading behaviour and stock prices around the ex-dividend day. Domestic investors prefer dividends and tend to buy stocks cum-dividend and sell them ex-dividend whereas foreign investors tend to trade in the opposite direction. Abnormal trading turnover increases with tax heterogeneity. Moreover, stocks with a larger domestic investor base are associated with a higher price drop-off ratio on the ex-dividend day and higher market value of franking credits. Overall, our findings support the dynamic dividend clientele hypothesis.     

Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.     

Conditions influencing the adoption of a soda tax for public health: Analysis of the French case (2005–2012)

Although over 40 jurisdictions have adopted a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) for public health worldwide, it is still debated in many places. Policy processes can influence the prospect of an SSB tax, its design and its public health benefits. To get an insight into such processes, we undertook a case study of the soda tax enacted in France on the 1^st of January 2012. Newspaper articles (2003–2013) and institutional documents (2007–2012) were identified using keywords and search engines. Qualitative data extraction and analyses were performed on a thematic and chronological basis, with guidance from Kingdon’s multiple streams theory (MST). Triangulation was enhanced by using complementary sources. This study shows that in August 2011, the French government surprisingly announced a €3.58 cent/L excise tax on SSBs, excluding juices with no added sugars and non-calorically sweetened beverages (NCSBs). As part of a large budgetary plan, the proposal aimed to reduce SSB consumption and raise revenue that was earmarked for health care. Several conditions contributed to opening a policy window: The announcement occurred in the context of severe budgetary deficits; soda tax scenarios had already been discussed at a high level; and the bill was supported by convinced political leaders. Subsequently, the tax successfully passed through the legislative process due to a series of unexpected events, but its public health rationale and design were weakened. The first event was the disorganised reaction by the food industry, despite their sharp opposition to the tax. The next event was the support of the soda tax that came from a majority of Deputies, provided that the revenues would serve another purpose: relieving wage costs in the farming sector. Finally, policy entrepreneurs favoured a compromise to make the tax politically acceptable and legally viable: The tax rate doubled, the scope was extended to NCSBs and revenues were split between health care and agriculture. This study sheds light on influence factors that could be taken into account by public health actors willing to influence soda tax policy processes.     

Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.     

提高出口退税能够“稳就业”和“稳外贸”吗?

近年来,全球贸易保护主义抬头加剧了各国之间的贸易摩擦。本文以中美贸易为例,探讨中国出口退税政策在稳就业、稳外贸以及应对贸易摩擦中的作用机制。首先基于1994-2020年季度数据发现:中国就业的波动较平稳;净出口则呈现高波动特征;中国就业和净出口呈现弱顺周期。这些周期特征与其他国家存在显著差异。其次构建了一个含有不完全金融市场和价格不完全传递的对称两国开放经济DSGE模型,数值模拟发现:在本国出口退税冲击和它国技术冲击下,模型能够较好地拟合中国就业和净出口的周期特征,其中财富效应和由贸易条件变化引起的支出转移效应是主要的内在传导机制。借助模型对中美贸易摩擦的反事实实验发现:中国单方面提高1%出口退税时,中国就业增长0.05%,净出口增长0.28%,呈现较强持续性,提高出口退税能够稳就业和稳外贸;当中国提高1%出口退税和美国提高1%进口关税时,中国就业增长0.03%,净出口增长0.16%,呈现较强持续性,勒纳中性不成立,此时出口退税在稳就业和稳外贸中的作用尽管有所削弱,但依然有效。     

A supply-demand model of public sector size

We develop a supply-demand model for the public sector with a political equilibrium. The model considers the inefficiencies caused by taxes and includes costs associated with the provision of public goods to consumers. We show that the size of the public sector may depend on the median voter's income, population size, costs associated with paying tax, and quality of institutions, all of which reflect the costs of provisioning public goods. The estimates for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries are compatible with theoretical predictions; however, they do not confirm Wagner's law, which holds that the public sector share does not grow with an increase in income. A greater dependency ratio and the Gini coefficient increase demand for redistribution policies. Greater government effectiveness is a supply-side factor that increases the public sector's share in an economy.     

Tax competition,imperfect capital mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements

The gain to competing governments from entering into binding non-preferential tax agreements (that prevents discriminatory taxation in favor of mobile capital) depends on the extent of capital mobility between jurisdictions. In particular the gain is increasing in the cost of relocation of capital and the fraction of the domestic tax base which is relatively immobile. We show this in a symmetric model of tax competition between two governments where all capital is imperfectly mobile and differ only in their cost of relocation.     

Tax incentive,R&D investment and firm innovation: Evidence from China

We estimate the effect of R&D tax incentives on firm-level R&D expenditures (RDE) and patenting using a change in the eligibility criteria for a super deduction in China. In 2006, the Chinese government relaxed the “10 % eligibility criterion”, which stated that only firms with a 10 % or higher increase in prior-year RDE can claim an additional 50 % tax deduction. We use an event study approach to show that firms that became newly eligible to claim the super deduction (those just below the criterion) catches up on RDE and product innovation measured by the sales of new products. In the long run, we also observe a closing gap in the number of patents between the two groups of firms. Moreover, extending tax benefits to all firm helps to lower the tax burden, and we find no evidence of manipulation and relabeling.