Paying before consuming: Examining the robustness of consumers’ preference for prepayment

Prior research on consumers’ preference for timing of payment suggests that consumers prefer to prepay for certain kinds of purchases (e.g., vacations) and postpay for others (e.g., washer dryers). This research extends this finding by first comparing preference for timing of payment for products that vary by type (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and durability (nondurable vs. durable) to reveal that it is only hedonic-nondurable products that elicit a preference for prepayment (study 1). The two studies that follow examine the robustness of the prepayment preference by (1) varying the favorability of the transaction (study 2), and, (2) by eliminating the choice of payment timing from the transaction (study 3). Results reveal that the preference for prepayment for hedonic-nondurable goods is robust when transaction characteristics are favorable but shifts when transaction characteristics are unfavorable. Furthermore, when the choice of payment timing is not offered, consumers become indifferent towards when they prefer to pay for hedonic-nondurable products. The implications of these findings for marketers and retailers are discussed.     

Coordination,timing and common knowledge

There is tight link between coordination and common knowledge. The role of higher order beliefs in static incomplete information games has been widely studied. In particular, information frictions break down common knowledge. A large body of literature in economics examine dynamic coordination problems when there are timing frictions, in the sense that players do not all move at once. Timing frictions in dynamic coordination games play a role that is closely analogous to information frictions in static coordination games.This paper makes explicit the role of higher order beliefs about timing in dynamic coordination games with timing frictions. An event is said to be effectively known if a player knew the event when he last had an option to change his behavior. The lack of effective common knowledge of the time drives results of dynamic coordination games.     

On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies

We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite׳s redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite׳s policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.     

Capital budgeting, information timing, and the value of abandonment options

This paper investigates how an abandonment option influences the optimal timing of information in a sequential adverse selection capital budgeting model. While the divisional manager has imperfect private pre-contract information, headquarters can time whether the manager obtains perfect project information before (timely information) or after (delayed information) the contract is signed. In the absence of the abandonment option, headquarters favors timely (delayed) information if the investment costs are high (low). The presence of the abandonment option favors delayed information because under the timely information regime the value of the abandonment option is zero, whereas under the delayed information regime the value of the option is positive.     

Competitive sprawl

Sprawl and low urban density are often considered challenges to the vitality and efficiency of metropolitan areas. Utilizing a difference equation approach to endogenize density choices, this paper examines how competition between new cities causes development to occur too quickly compared to welfare maximizing development. Early development causes land to be sold in larger lots to a smaller number of buyers, causing lower population density. Competition in a timing game among developers causes early development, lower population density and lower capital density. I would like to thank James Peck, Don Haurin, Bruce Weinberg, David Hineline and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier drafts.     

开放式基金在上升市场与下降市场中选时与选股能力的实证研究

选取我国10只开放式基金作为样本,根据它们的收益情况并联系市场背景,对它们基金管理人的选时与选股能力进行的实证研究表明,不同基金在市场上升和市场下降过程中所表现出来的选时能力指标和选股能力指标与整体指标并不相同.这一结论可用于基金整体性指标研究.     

计算机网络中的计时进程及链路层应用

本文首先简述链路层的环境,然后对计时进程设计、链路层的超时和繁忙状态处理作了详细的分析说明。     

时间Petri网在项目进度管理建模中的应用

通过分析现有时延Petri网和时间Petri网在项目进度管理仿真模型的不足,提出基于库所时间约束Petri网的项目进度管理模型,该模型具备全局时钟特性,不仅能体现工序自身时间参数,同时能对外部资源等工序外延时间约束进行建模。实例仿真结果表明该模型的有效性。     

When does the majority become a majority? Empirical analysis of the time at which main market adopters purchase the bulk of our sales

The idea of a dual-market structure in the early stages of a product's life cycle has become one of the most widely accepted ideas among new product marketing practitioners in the past decade. Concepts such as “Early Market/Main Market” and “Visionaries/Pragmatists” have entered the lexicon of high-tech executives to express the notion that the market for new products is composed of early and main markets with a discontinuity in the diffusion process in between them. Moreover, these concepts have been at least partially tested and verified in the marketing academic literature in the past few years.We extend this branch of research by investigating the timing issues in dual-market cases. We define Change-of-Dominance Time (CD-Time) as the number of years it takes main market adopters to outnumber early market adopters. We empirically investigate this timing issue on a comprehensive data set of new product sales in the consumer electronics industry. We find that regarding explanatory determinants of CD-Time, external influence, such as advertising, to the early market is the most important explanatory variable.We examine the relationship between CD-Time and other early product life cycle phenomena: Takeoff, Saddle, and Rogers' size of adopter categories. We found relatively high correlations between these phenomena and CD-Time.The answer to the question “When does the majority become a majority?” is indeed “at 16%”! In a dual-market setting, the average time at which the main market outnumbers the early market is when 16% of the market has already adopted the product. In terms of time, in 75% of the cases the majority becomes a majority in 5 to 10 years.     

会计信息披露时机与内幕交易——基于年报首季报披露时差与异常超额交易量的实证研究

考虑到资金成本、市场的系统性风险和被监管的可能性,内幕交易者最可能利用两个相隔时间很短的定期报告进行内幕交易。因为这种交易模式最隐蔽,最安全。同时,因承担了高成本和高风险,内幕交易需要巨额的交易量才能获得超额收益。本文正是利用内幕交易的这些特征,找到了极好的研究样本（年报亏损下年首季报盈利且年报首季报先后公布的样本）和控制样本（年报亏损下年首季报盈利但年报首季报同时披露的样本或者年报亏损下年首季报仍然亏损且年报首季报先后公布的样本）,通过异常的超额交易量验证了内幕交易的存在。本文研究表明,在信息披露监管政策中,不仅要考虑信息披露的及时性和充分性,还应考虑信息披露过程是否为内幕交易提供了可乘之机。