Monetary Policy and Financial Markets

Monetary policy and financial markets are intrinsically linked. Central banks conduct monetary policy by influencing financial market prices. Financial market prices reflect the expectations of market participants about future economic and monetary developments. Monetary policy works primarily through expectations. Transparency and credibility render monetary policy more effective. However, they are no substitutes for action. If a credible central bank uses words with the explicit aim of substituting them for action, it will risk losing credibility. To avoid what has been described as “the dog chasing its tail” problem, central banks must exercise caution in basing their monetary policy decisions on financial market information. The information about expected future developments reflected in market prices must be continuously cross-checked against economic and monetary indicators in what amounts to a “checks and balances” approach to monetary policy.     

Guarantees,transparency and the interdependency between sovereign and bank default risk

Bank debt guarantees have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to prevent bank runs. However, as recent experiences in some European countries have demonstrated, guarantees may link the coordination problems of bank and sovereign creditors and induce a functional interdependence between the likelihoods of a government default and bank illiquidity. Employing a global-game approach, we model this link, showing the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative statics properties. In equilibrium, the guarantee reduces the probability of a bank run, while it increases the probability of a sovereign default. The latter erodes the guarantee’s credibility and thus its effectiveness ex ante. By setting the guarantee optimally, the government balances these two effects in order to minimize expected costs of crises. Our results show that the optimal guarantee has clear-cut welfare gains which are enhanced through policies that promote greater balance sheet transparency.     

The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-segment Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms

Our study assesses whether SFAS No. 131 improved disclosure about the diversity of multiple segment firms’ operations. We find a post-SFAS No. 131 increase in cross-segment variability of segment profits, an increase in the association between reported and inherent cross-segment variability, and an increase in association between reported variability and capital market incentives to disclose. We interpret the results as evidence that SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of segment profitability disclosures, and as indicating SFAS No. 131 allowed firms depending more on external financing to disclose more about differences in segment profitability.

打击“避税天堂”国际准则的主要内容

本文以有关打击避税天堂的国际准则为主线,在理解和分析避税天堂的含义和危害的基础上,指出保障税制透明度和进行税务信息分享是打击避税天堂的国际准则中最重要的内容。     

财政信息透明度的理论分析

提高财政信息透明度对一国的财政管理活动至关重要,国际货币基金组织编写的《财政透明度手册》对此作了很好的诠释。理解财政信息透明度,应当抓住财政信息是一种特殊的公共品这一本质,供给者是政府,需求者是公众。由于不对称信息的存在,使得政府与公众的财政信息供求背离均衡点。提高财政信息透明度,就是通过一系列制度安排,去努力接近财政信息供求均衡的理想状态。     

Communication and transparency – The example of the ECB

Communication by central banks has two goals to fulfill: One is to be accountable and transparent to the public for its policy. The other is to make monetary policy by guiding expectations as effective as possible. Diversity of views inside the bank is instrumental for appropriate monetary policy decisions, but creates a tremendous challenge for communication. Central banks dispose of a variety of communication tools. Forward guidance seen as a revolution in central banks׳ communication raises new questions. Not maximum, but optimal transparency should be the final stage to strive for.