Institutional investor horizon and stock price synchronicity: Do product market competition and analyst coverage matter?

This paper provides new insights into the relation between institutional investment horizon and stock price synchronicity and investigates whether this relationship depends on the intensity of product market competition and analyst coverage. Based on a sample of French listed companies, we find that long-term (short-term) institutional investors are associated with lower (higher) stock price synchronicity. The results also show that the negative effect of long-term institutional investors is more accentuated for firms in less competitive markets and with high analyst coverage. An additional analysis shows that the synchronicity reduction effect does not vary during the financial crisis. Overall, these findings suggest that unlike their short-term counterparts, long term investors reduce asymmetric information and help disseminate firm-specific information into stock prices.     

Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

银行业联合授信制度制约企业的非效率投资了吗*——基于沪深A股公司的分析

中国银保监会出台联合授信管理制度旨在抑制企业过度融资行为，提高资金使用效率。为检验该制度是否达到预期效果，采用2014—2018年沪深A股上市公司样本，运用非平衡面板数据回归实证考察联合授信机制对企业非效率投资的影响，发现联合授信对企业的非效率投资（包含投资不足和投资过度）呈现显著抑制效应，其中联合授信对投资过度的抑制效应最大。进一步研究发现，相较于国有、大规模、低负债、高盈利等异质属性的企业，联合授信对非国有、小规模、高负债、低盈利等属性企业的非效率投资（尤其是投资过度）抑制效应更为显著。     

不同监督情境下政府创新支持对企业研发投入的影响*——基于农业上市公司的实证研究

近年来，“三农”问题受到极大关注。为了应对外部资源、环境、科学技术等多重压力对农业升级与发展的影响，政府出台了诸多政策支持农业企业的技术研发与创新。本文从政府干预视角分析政府补助和税费返还两种形式的政府创新支持政策对农业企业研发投入的影响，重点分析机构投资者与大股东参与公司内部治理以及社会审计事务机构参与公司外部治理这两者所发挥的不同监督作用。研究发现：第一，不同形式的政府创新支持（政府补助和税费返还）对农业企业研发投入的影响并不一致。政府补助产生替代效应，税费返还则产生互补效应。第二，持股监督（机构投资者和大股东的持股比例上升）能增强政府补助对农业企业研发投入的替代效应，也能增强税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。第三，审计监督（社会审计事务机构的审计意见）会减弱政府补助支持对农业企业研发投入的替代效应，也会减弱税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。本文的研究发现为政府制定适宜的创新支持政策，以及合理发挥持股监督与审计监督的内外部治理作用，提供一定的决策依据和理论支持。     

Farm Capital Investment and Deviations from the Optimal Path

We identify farms’ optimal investment path in capital assets and compare it with their actual investment to assess the direction and extent of deviation from the optimal investment. A probit model is further used to investigate the determinants of the probability that a farmer over‐ or under‐invests in capital assets. We use a panel dataset of Dutch dairy farms over the period 2003–2013, and find that most farms under‐invest in capital assets during the study period. Although the number of farms that had over‐invested in capital assets is relatively small, these farms account for the biggest share of total investment in capital assets. The probit results show that liquidity, agricultural support payments, age, land tenure and standard output size are important variables explaining the likelihood of over‐and under‐investment.     

Efficiency,economy and effectiveness—but what about ethics? Supreme audit institutions at a critical juncture

Ethics is increasingly recognized as one of several important dimensions of performance. Yet, performance audit, or value-for-money audit, as conducted by supreme audit institutions (SAIs), does not typically include this dimension. Instead, the focus is on the classical ‘three Es’ (efficiency, economy and effectiveness). The reluctance to address issues of ethical misconduct has taken the audit practice of SAIs to a critical juncture, where the legitimacy of these audits ultimately is at stake. This paper explains why SAIs need to add a fourth ‘E’— ethical audit. Possible implications are discussed.     

Explaining differences in the productivity of investment across countries in the context of ‘new growth theory’

The purpose of this paper is to explain differences in the productivity of investment across 84 rich and poor countries over the period 1980–2011, and to test the orthodox neoclassical assumption of diminishing returns to capital. The productivity of investment is measured as the ratio of the long-run growth of GDP to a country’s gross investment ratio. Twenty potential determinants are considered using a general-to-specific model selection algorithm. Education, government consumption, geography, export growth, openness, political rights and macroeconomic instability are the most important variables. The data also suggest constant returns to capital, so investment and the determinants of productivity of investment differences matter for long-run growth.     

货币政策、企业家信心与上市公司投资效率*

企业、企业家等微观主体对货币政策的反应，在较大程度上影响货币政策的效果。货币政策可通过对企业家信心的影响，进而对公司投资效率产生作用。基于中国2007—2016年40个季度A股上市公司样本的实证研究表明：企业家信心在货币政策传导过程中有不可忽视的作用。企业家信心增强或者货币政策宽松时会加剧过度投资，减轻投资不足；企业家信心减弱或者货币政策紧缩时可以有效抑制过度投资，但会加剧投资不足。其中，国有企业对企业家信心和货币政策松紧的敏感性更强。进一步，货币政策对企业投资效率的影响，也会通过货币政策和企业家信心的交互作用而发挥作用。这种作用在国有企业和非国有企业之间无显著差异。     

国有资本经营预算能够提高地方国有企业投资效率吗？

以A股地方国有上市公司为研究对象，从投资效率的角度考察国有资本经营预算制度的实施效果，并进一步检验其对企业价值的影响。研究发现，国有资本经营预算能够显著抑制地方国有企业的非效率投资，尤其是抑制过度投资行为,并且这种影响对处于市场化程度较低地区的地方国有企业更加显著。进一步研究发现，国有资本经营预算能够通过抑制非效率投资来促进地方国有企业价值的提升。     

Coordinating China's economic growth strategy via its government-controlled association for private firms

Scholars in economics and political science argue that one major function of government is to overcome coordination failure in economic development, especially during times of rapid environmental changes. But, how and through what means does the state coordinate firms to follow the changing directions of its economic objectives? This paper focuses on the case of a government-controlled business association, namely the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), and shows that the ACFIC may be serving, at least partially, as a means of avoiding the kind of coordination failures that are often associated with policy reform programs in authoritarian regimes like China when the government deems it necessary to radically and suddenly change its policy objectives. It does so by comparing the activities of firms that are members of ACFIC with non-members before and after the world financial crisis of 2008–09 which induced a significant change in government objectives. Before that crisis when priority in government objectives was “outward” (to stave off balance of payments crises that had befallen many other developing countries), ACFIC member firms were able to engage in exports and foreign investment to a greater extent than non-member firms, and even than those whose owners are members of the Congresses or Chinese Communist Party. After viewing the crises in international markets, and government objectives had turned more “inward”, ACFIC members were more likely to focus on domestic sales and investments.