地方财政政策逆周期调节：财政分权还是债务增发*

财政政策工具实际操作偏离最初设计将会降低政策工具的调控效果，导致宏观经济波动加剧。针对地方政府财政政策的逆周期性调控目标，本文关注财政分权深化和政府债务增发的逆周期性效应。研究发现：地方政府财政政策总体呈现顺周期特征。财政分权程度的提高放大了地方财政政策的顺周期性。地方政府债务增发使地方财政政策呈现逆周期特征。地方政府财政政策及其收入面、支出面均呈现顺周期性，由“顺”转“逆”的债务平衡点分别为0137，0113，0209。当前绝大部分地区的债务规模都在债务平衡点之下。驱动地方政府债务逆周期调控的内在因素是官员晋升激励。晋升激励的程度越高，地方债务逆周期调控的力度就越大。但外部市场融资环境的波动削弱了地方政府债务逆周期调控的力度。本文的政策主张是，不宜过度财政分权，应该扩大地方债发行规模，促使地方财政政策逆周期调节。     

财政政策与货币政策的动态调控效应*——基于时变参数向量自回归模型的检验

本文廓清了财政政策与货币政策搭配动态调控宏观经济的机理，揭示了两者协调影响经济的“黑箱”机制及其在经济不同阶段的搭配方式；运用中国2004—2019年的经济季度数据，构建TVP SV VAR模型探究两类政策对宏观经济的调控效应。研究发现：财政政策与货币政策共同把控流动性“闸门”实现互动协调；财政政策搭配货币政策具有时变性，在整体上“同向发力”推动经济发展；两类政策对产出的影响并非始终如理论一致，在结构层面仍有优化靶向性操作的余地。     

When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?

This paper identifies determinants of compliance with various types of national numerical fiscal rules. Based on 51 fiscal rules in force in EU member states from 1995 to 2015, the analysis identifies determinants among specific rule characteristics and their fiscal frameworks, as well as their political, (socio-)economic and supranational environments. While the average compliance across all rules and countries is around 50%, compliance with rules constraining stock (rather than flow) variables, set out in coalitional agreements, as well as rules covering larger parts of general government finances is significantly higher. Furthermore, independent monitoring and enforcement bodies (issuing real-time alerts) turn out to be significantly associated with a higher probability of compliance. Several theories of the deficit bias of governments due to government fragmentation, decentralization and political budget cycles are also significant with regards to compliance with fiscal rules. However, neither the economic environment or business cycle, nor forecast errors (except for an unexpectedly higher primary balance) on average seem to play a significant role.     

Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it

Rules-based fiscal policy is under threat. Over the last two decades, it proved frustratingly complicated to strike the right balance between three essential properties of sound fiscal policy rules: simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Simplicity has been sacrificed to ensure that more contingent (i.e. flexible) rules remained enforceable. The resulting arrangements have failed to adequately guide fiscal policy, undermining formal compliance, and ultimately, popular and political support for rules. To mitigate the risk that countries abandon rules-based policymaking, we suggest downplaying enforceability—i.e. the role of formal sanctions through enforcement—and enhancing the reputational costs of breaching rules. At the limit, the rule could consist of a simple quantitative benchmark for a key fiscal indicator. To boost reputational effects, independent fiscal councils should focus on debunking the “fiscal alchemy,” clearing the public debate from partisan smokescreens, and fostering popular support for sound fiscal policies.     

New development: China renews reform of central–local fiscal relations and provides for basic national public services

China’s reform on central–local fiscal reform has slowed down in recent years. The appointment of a new finance minister experienced in local government affairs is expected to renew the reform affirmed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) congress in late 2017. China has unprecedentedly identified a comprehensive list of 81 national basic public services as entitlements. Eighteen of them are subject to national and local standards, and co-financed by central and local governments. A new cost-sharing method for 10 of these services classifies sub-national jurisdictions into five tiers, in which the central government’s share declines from 80% to 10%. These measures, effective in 2019, aim at creating a ‘harmonious and moderately prosperous society’.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES INTERACTION IN MONETARY UNIONS

In this paper, the literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union is surveyed. By adopting the concept of symbiosis as a starting point, the paper highlights the importance of uncertainty, policy makers' preferences and targets. Then, the role of commitment to policy rules and coordination is addressed. The analysis also focuses on the importance of the data considered for the generation of the policy mix. As a final step, the paper discusses the main results in the literature on public debt management in a monetary union. All the reported theoretical results are then adopted to retrieve policy and institutional implications for the European Monetary Union.     

新发展格局视野中的消费券发放问题与重构研究

2020年面对新冠肺炎疫情冲击,各地纷纷发放消费券刺激消费。本轮发放消费券的省市和规模远超以往。考察当前各地消费券的实践,其存在三方面的问题:短期刺激消费与构建发展新格局缺乏衔接、地方各自为政与顶层设计阙如、财政补贴与财政约束的张力。针对这些问题,本文从新发展格局视野提出将当前消费券重构为财政和金融融合的消费金融券,使之成为构建新发展格局中扩大内需的长期政策和重要的宏观调控工具。消费金融券的制度设计要与社会结构新特征和新趋势相契合。针对低收入群体的消费金融券,应以财政补贴为主、以重大生活项目消费的利息补贴与信用担保为辅。针对中等收入群体的消费金融券,应以利息补贴为主,通过消费金融的方式扩大消费。加大消费金融券的全国顶层设计,明确中央和地方财政支持产业的范围和力度。     

基于县统筹财政分权视角下的地方义务教育公平研究 ——来自山东省的实例

由于基层政府长期存在财力事权上的不均衡,我国基层地区义务教育供给存在着差距。2001年的"以县为主"的县统筹财政制度开始实行,义务教育的负责主体变成了县级政府。借助2002年到2016年的山东省县级数据,运用泰尔指数作为分析工具,结合此期间山东省出台的教育改革措施,分析其对于缩小义务教育差异的影响。研究发现,政策制度仅仅改善了中等收入县级地区之间的差距,对于高收入和低收入地区并没有太好的效果,就目标而言,由于县级各地区上经济实力和义务教育规模的固有差距,导致无法取得理想中的效果。     

Open Economy Dynamics in a Floating Exchange Rate Developing Country Context

ABSTRACT

This article develops a wavelet-based control model to simulate fiscal, monetary, and real exchange rate scenarios in an open economy developing country with an inflation-targeting regime. We use South African macro data to jointly simulate optimal fiscal and monetary policy under varying scenarios for real exchange rate stability with interest rate parity. As real exchange rate stability increases, the model simulates the effects on the trade balance under both a constant and depreciating real exchange rate. We find that short-term cycle stability problems are somewhat mitigated by allowing the real exchange rate to depreciate.     

Accounting practice,fiscal decentralization and corruption

In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting systems can inhibit monitoring incentives and thus reduce decentralization benefits in countering corruption. We argue that the effectiveness of decentralization as an anti-corruption barrier is complemented by the quality of the accounting practice in a country. Using multiple sources of data, we find that decentralization has a positive and increasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with a high-quality accounting practice. In contrast, decentralization has a negative and decreasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with weak-quality accounting practices. These findings are robust to alternative measures of accounting, decentralization and corruption and to endogeneity tests. Our findings demonstrate the crucial information role of accounting in enhancing decentralization monitoring mechanisms and in thereby reducing corruption.