Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

Climate,diseases, and the origins of corruption

It has been commonly observed that tropical countries tend to suffer from intense corruption and underdevelopment. This study provides an explanation for this long-standing disparity across the world based on variation in the intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV-R). The central hypothesis is that UV-R is positively associated with the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases, which significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This helps shape the worldwide distribution of corruption by affecting the incumbents' window of opportunity. Using data for up to 139 countries, I consistently find empirical support for the positive relationship between UV-R and corruption. The main findings withstand accounting for numerous alternative explanations for international differences in corruption levels. Employing individual-level data from the World Values Survey, I document suggestive evidence that exposure to UV-R is linked to surveyed respondents' tolerance towards corrupt activities. Furthermore, a subnational analysis for China lends credence to the cross-country evidence.     

The major determinants of logistic performance in a global perspective: evidence from panel data analysis

The global logistics industry has grown significantly and logistics has become an important sector of the business economic system and a major global economic activity in recent years. Logistics activities accelerate economic and productivity growth. Efficient logistics is also important to a country’s competitiveness and source of employment. The purpose of this paper is to uncover and understand the major determinants of logistics performance (LP) to further lift the LP of countries. Using unbalanced panel data of 93 selected countries from 2007 to 2014, the present research attempts to critically investigate the major determinants of LP. In estimating the model, this study prefers to use static panel data approach owing to limited data. The findings of the present study reveal that (a) countries with low level of corruption and stable political environment are likely to yield a high level of LP; (b) improvement in resources supply such as infrastructure, technology, labour, and education also have a significant positive effect on LP. Therefore, institutional reforms and upgrading resources will effectively accelerate LP.     

Obesity of politicians and corruption in Ukraine in 2000–2020– Reply

We collected 469 frontal face images of Ukrainian cabinet ministers who were in office in 2000–2020. For each image, the minister's body mass index was estimated using a computer vision algorithm. The time series of median estimated body mass index of cabinet ministers co-moves over time with two existing measures of corruption – World Bank worldwide governance indicator Control of Corruption, and the discrepancy between the quantity of luxury wristwatches exported from Switzerland to Ukraine (reported by Swiss statistics) and the corresponding quantity imported by Ukraine from Switzerland (reported by Ukrainian statistics).     

Domestic institutions and export performance: Evidence for Cambodia

The paper analyzes the relevance of domestic institutions for export performance of Cambodia. Regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, and political stability are introduced in an augmented gravity model with a panel data set over 1996–2015. The research is the first application to Cambodia, until 2015 a least developed country which is generally believed to have poorly developed institutions. Due to high multicollinearity among the variables, the institutional variables are introduced in the model one by one. Estimation is by the Hausman–Taylor method, which reduces or removes the correlation between the composite error terms and the included variables. All institutional variables show a highly significant positive relationship with Cambodia's exports, with rule of law having the largest impact. It is concluded that the government should give high priority to the further improvements of the legal environment and to strong enforcement of property rights and contracts.     

Corporate stakeholders,corporate valuation and ESG

In addition to explicit contracts, corporations issue their stakeholders implicit claims, including fair treatment of employees and the promise of continuing service to customers. Corporate value is created by selling these implicit claims for more than it costs to honour them. Recently, a new class of non-investor stakeholders, related to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, has arisen. Although many ESG advocates stress their role in creating shareholder value, they do not explain how this value creation occurs. This paper shows that implicit claims provide a critical link that ties non-investor stakeholders and ESG to shareholder value, both its creation and its possible destruction.     

Political risk in private participation projects: The effects of political discretionality and corruption

This article investigates the impact of political risk on the performance of private participation infrastructure projects in emerging markets. Previous studies have shown that firms in regulated sectors are prone to employ political capabilities in their investments overseas. Our analysis of 32,257 projects in 114 emerging countries from 1997 to 2013 shows that higher political discretionality in the host country is negatively associated with project completion. In contrast, a higher level of corruption in the host country is positively associated with project completion. The study makes a contribution to the literature on political risk in foreign direct investments.     

品牌标识的隐性设计线索对消费者品牌创造性感知的影响

从品牌标识的隐性设计线索特征视角切入，基于图底反转原理和溢出效用，本文研究旨在探究品牌标识的隐性设计线索对消费者品牌创造性感知的作用机理。三个实验研究结果表明：品牌标识的隐性设计线索比显性设计线索更能够增加消费者品牌创造性感知，且此效用成立的条件为：消费者自主发现隐性设计线索。同时，消费者的感知有趣性中介了此效用。此外，产品视觉审美集中度正向强化了品牌标识的隐性设计线索对品牌创造性感知的影响作用。     

Corruption in agricultural processing firms: A comparison of cooperatives and investor-owned firms

This paper examines managerial corruption in cooperatives (co-ops) and investor-owned firms (IOFs), including its impact on prices and farmer welfare. Even when co-op managers have greater incentives to engage in corruption because of the co-op's larger production, the resulting corruption is not sufficient to offset the competitive effect that co-ops exert vis-à-vis IOFs. This conclusion holds regardless of the functional form of the production function, the farm input supply curve, and the demand curve for the processed product. In addition to showing the robustness of the competition effect, the paper provides a highly flexible modeling framework that can be used to examine other co-op behavior questions.     

Independent director compensation,corruption, and monitoring

We find that independent directors in more corrupt countries receive greater pay. This relation could reflect outside directors in corrupt countries expropriating firm value, or it could reflect higher compensation for the additional effort required to lessen the negative effects of corruption. Acquirer acquisition announcement returns are lower in more corrupt countries, and this relation is mitigated by higher director pay. Higher director pay is also associated with greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance and moderates the negative effects of country‐level corruption on firm value. This evidence is consistent with higher director pay in corrupt countries incentivizing effort.