宽松的环境政策能吸引更多的外商直接投资吗——基于中国工业省级面板数据的分析

利用我国1997~2009年的工业省级面板数据和动态面板GMM估计方法,考察了相对宽松的环境政策是否是吸引FDI的主要原因。研究发现,环境政策较宽松的地区能够吸引更多的外资流入,但这种影响并不大,所以,以降低环境标准、牺牲环境为代价来吸引FDI不是明智之举;与东、中部地区相比,西部在吸引FDI上处于明显劣势,这在一定程度上加剧了我国经济结构的失衡。     

经济增长与环境

在政府不参与环境控制时,经济增长率最高,但污染也最严重,社会福利要比政府采取补贴情形时低.通过建立模型推导出了在放任政策下的经济增长率是最快的,但污染比较严重。     

Implementing technology-forcing policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments and the introduction of advanced automotive emissions controls in the United States

Technology forcing is a strategy where a regulator specifies a standard that cannot be met with existing technology, or at least not at an acceptable cost. Using the 1970 U.S. Clean Air Act for controlling automobile emissions as a baseline example, we demonstrate the importance of the regulatory implementation process if regulations are to foster technological change. The 1970 legislation required steep emissions reductions for new 1975 and 1976 automobiles, which presented automakers with major technical and economic challenges. Nevertheless, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency successfully forced the adoption of two marquee control technologies—the catalytic converter in 1975 and the three-way catalyst in 1981. We focus on three factors critical to the implementation process: agency credibility to enforce standards, competitive pressures to drive industry research and development, and uncertainty about technological development.     

我国西部地区贸易对环境污染影响的分析——基于西部地区省际面板数据的检验

选取2000-2008年西部地区十一个省、直辖市和自治区的贸易与环境相关数据,利用面板数据模型对西部地区贸易对环境污染的影响进行实证分析,研究结果表明规模效应和贸易开放度的增加加剧了西部地区的环境污染,结构效应和环境政策则减少了西部地区的环境污染,而技术效应对西部地区环境污染的影响不显著。     

关于我国发展农业循环经济的思考

农业是国民经济的基础,我国农业资源总量虽然较大,但人均占有量少。传统的掠夺性的农业发展模式对我国农业的可持续发展产生了巨大的压力。发展农业循环经济是我国实现农业经济的可持续发展的必然选择。     

Air Pollution and ‘Dirty’ Industries: How and Why Does the Composition of Manufacturing Output Change with Economic Development?

This paper examines the impact on air pollution ofchanges in the composition of manufacturing output indeveloped and developing countries. Pollutionemissions from manufacturing output are estimated ina manner which holds constant the effect of technologyand regulations allowing the impact of compositional changes alone on pollution to beestimated. The paper has three main findings; (1) theinverted-U estimated between per capita income and thepollution intensity of GDP arises due to both thecomposition of manufacturing becoming cleaner and theshare of manufacturing output in GDP falling.Compositional changes alone are not responsible forthe inverted-U between per capita income and percapita emissions; (2) changes to the composition ofmanufacturing output are consistent with the pollutionhaven hypothesis, however there is clear evidence thatrising per capita incomes are associated with afalling income elasticity of demand for `dirty'products. This fact may explain the compositionalchanges that occur with development; (3) in additionto the income elasticity effect, the analysis suggeststhat land prices and to a lesser extent the prices oflabour and capital, determine the proportion of dirtyindustry within a country's manufacturing sector.     

A Model of Competing Jurisdictions with Locally Polluting Environments and Mobile Populations

In this model we consider a federation consisting oftwo geographically separated Regional states withlocal taxing authority. The residents of thefederation are identical in preferences and haveexplicit tolerance to pollution. Pollution is local innature and is a by-product of production implying amore highly populated region would generate morepollution. Local authorities in the regions can andwill (in the interest of local residents) engage ingame theoretical taxation strategies. The model isused to illustrate that Nash Equilibrium can resultwherein the two regions have different levels ofenvironmental quality. The resulting Nash conditionsimply for instance that residents of the ``cleanregion' will subsidize those in the other region tostay in the more polluted environment (in order foreach to accomplish their preferred consumption andenvironmental quality pair).     

International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty – The Case of Transboundary Acidification

The complexities of international environmental problems are only poorly understood. Hence, decision makers have to negotiate about abatement measures even though they do not know the 'true' model of the ecological system and have only a rough idea about the costs and benefits of their action. It will be analysed to what extent this kind of 'model uncertainty' – where players do not only have incomplete information about the payoff functions of the other players, but also about their own payoff function – affects the prospects of international cooperation. Using a simple game-theoretic model, it is shown how countries can use the veil of uncertainty to hide their distributional interests. The arguments are based on a deviation from the common prior assumption, which seems particularly questionable in a setting comprising various countries with different cultural and scientific backgrounds. Finally the model will prove useful to quantitatively and qualitatively illustrate the central role of model uncertainty in the negotiations of the first Sulphur Protocol signed to combat transboundary acidification.