Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders always displaces the followers. Instead, how a stronger threat of entry affects the equilibrium depends on the technology. With strictly convex costs it is the followers that eventually displace the leaders.     

Energy Prices and Carbon Taxes under Uncertainty about Global Warming

This paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers’ welfare for uncertainty: global warming follows an Itô -process. Stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version. The unconstrained (= reversible) case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case. Nevertheless interesting analytical properties (e.g. about when to stop emissions, implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply) are derived and complemented by a numerical example.     

Disentangling the link between stock and accounting performance in acquisitions

We study the accounting and stock performance of 4547 US acquisitions during 1989 and 2008. We categorise acquisitions into four types based on the four possible combinations of positive or negative abnormal stock performance and abnormal accounting performance. First, we compare the bidder, bid and target characteristics across the four types of acquisitions. We find significant differences. Second, with the help of existing theories we explain these differences in bidder, bid and target characteristics by differences in the acquisition motives.     

Anti-community state pesticide preemption laws prevent local governments from protecting people from harm

During the past 25 years, many state governments in the United States have adopted anti-community state preemption laws to preclude local governments from enacting ordinances regulating pesticides. In the absence of local controls, people and property are being adversely effected. The issue accompanying state preemption statutes is whether the laws constitute a reasonable resolution of the positive and negative externalities that accompany pesticide usage. Through a discussion of the tradeoffs involving pesticide preemption, we show that states having divergent agricultural, residential, commercial, and recreational activities might be better served by allowing local governments to govern selected matters involving pesticides. State pesticide preemption laws denigrate local governance and compromise public health and economic well-being. If legislators care about the health of their communities and citizens, they need to repeal preemption laws that prevent appropriate safety regulations by local governments.     

论先买权的法律规制——兼谈先买权制度在我国未来民法典中的应然定位

对于先买权的法律规制,在厘清先买权的成立与行使之间关系的基础上,主要从先买权的行使条件、行使时间和行使方式三个方面着手。在行使条件上,着重把握先买权行使的启动条件和实质性条件的认定;在行使时间和行使方式上,对常态和异态两种情形分别予以讨论。最后,对于先买权作为一项民法制度在未来的民法典中的应然定位做一大胆的设想和论证,以供未来民商事立法参考。     

Voluntary Disclosure of Good and Bad Earnings News in a Low Litigation Setting*

This study uses a historical setting in which expected litigation costs were low (i.e., Australia, from 1993 to 1996) to investigate whether companies with good news were more likely to preempt annual earnings than their counterparts with bad news. Empirical tests compare the probability of preemption conditional on having good news with the probability of preemption conditional on having bad news. The models control for other potential determinants of disclosure policy that have been documented in the literature. The results do not support the research hypothesis that companies with good news were more likely to preempt annual earnings than companies with bad news. This finding suggests that there may be other factors driving disclosure of bad news, in addition to those acknowledged in the extant literature. The evidence also indicates that in Australia during the investigation period, the probability of preemption was positively associated with firm size and analyst following and differed as a function of industry membership.     

论承租人先买权的除斥期间

承租人先买权在权利作用上属于形成权,除斥期间主要适用于形成权,例外情况下适用于请求权。法律应设定除斥期间限制承租人先买权以平衡各方利益。     

Option value and entry timing

When facing uncertainty, firms entering new markets can make initial foothold investments rather than undertake large sunk investments. Such investments are real call option purchases. They offer management flexibility, but also raise questions about whether and when to increase commitments to new markets. We present an entry timing decision criterion and discuss its application to a variety of market entry situations. Optimal timing for exercising real options depends on current dividends, possibilities for preemption, and whether the option is simple or compound, proprietary or shared. Our analysis reveals critical assumptions and new theoretical insights regarding market entry timing. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

承租人优先购买权制度的基本理论及其涉及的若干问题

由于近年来二手房交易的迅猛增长,导致涉及承租人优先购买权制度的纠纷与矛盾日益凸现。作为民法体系中一项相当重要的规则,承祖人优先购买权制度在我国多部法律法规中均有规定。本文对这一制度的基本理论进行了梳理．并在此基础上对理论与实践中争议较多的若干问题作了探讨。在文中,笔者还适时地提出了自己的观点,包括一些在法律条文上对该制度进一步规范的建议,以期在保障自愿原则的前提下,起到节约交易成本、稳定经济秩序、促进社会和谐的良好效果。