Judo Strategy: 10 Techniques For Beating A Stronger Opponent

The idea of judo economics, building on analogies with the sport of judo, has been around for at least 20 years. But taking these ideas further to judo strategy means that a framework of strategic principles can be developed to help companies put stronger opponents on the mat.     

The Effect of Earnings–Announcement Timing on Earnings Management

This paper examines whether firms which delay earnings announcements engage in earnings management. The cross–sectional version of the modified Jones 1995 model is used to estimate 'normal' accruals. Prior research has documented that, on average, delayed earnings announcements are associated with negative earnings surprises. Our evidence suggests that the market anticipates unfavorable earnings news when it observes reporting delays. As a consequence, late reporters appear to make the most of a bad situation by employing income–decreasing accruals in big–bath–type earnings management and in contractual renegotiations. We find that the magnitude of income–reducing abnormal accruals is related to the reporting lag.     

Whistle-Blowing for Profit: An Ethical Analysis of the Federal False Claims Act

This paper focuses on the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act of 1863, which offers whistle-blowers financial rewards for disclosing fraud committed against the U.S. government. This law provides an opportunity to examine underlying assumptions about the morality of whistle-blowing and to consider the merits of increased reliance on whistle-blowing to protect the public interest. The law seems open to a number of moral objections, most notably that it exerts a morally corrupting influence on whistle-blowers. We answer these objections and argue that the law is not objectionable on these grounds. Since there are no compelling moral objections to the law, it is appropriate and acceptable to judge the law in terms of its economic costs and benefits. We assess the most salient of these and conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs. We suggest that a mechanism similar to the Act should be considered for protecting stockholders’ interests in the private sector. We conclude by making several proposals for improving the existing legislation. The authors' names are listed in alphabetical order. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Society for Business Ethics August 2004.     

THE JOINT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCESS FOR THE M/M/l QUEUE

We consider the M/M/1-queue and derive an explicit expression for the joint distribution of the number of arrivals and the number of departures in [0, t), given the number of customers initially present. The derivation is almost purely combinatorial, it avoids the use of generating functions, and immediately yields a simple probabilistic interpretation of the result.     

The Distributional Impact of Direct Payments on Irish Farm Incomes

The objective of this paper is to analyse the distributional effects of the different income components of Irish farm income with a Gini comparison method and by disaggregating the overall Gini coefficient of income inequality by income source. Using individual farm data for 1992 and 1996, the impact on farm income distribution of the MacSharry CAP reform is assessed. In addition, the change in the Gini coefficient between these years is decomposed into the changes in the within‐source distribution of each income stream and the share of each income stream. The favourable movement in the Gini coefficient is found to be due to the introduction of direct payments, which target less well‐off farmers. Market income remains the single largest influence on deciding the income ranking of a farm while contributing less to total income than before.     

Evolution of Smartn Players

To model the evolution of strategic intelligence, player types are drawn from a hierarchy of "smartness" analogous to the levels of iterated rationalizability. Nonrationalizable strategies die out, but when higher levels of smartness incur maintenance costs, being right is always as good as being smart. Moreover, if a manifest way to play emerges, then dumb players never die out, while smarter players with positive maintenance costs vanish. These results call to question the standard game-theoretic assumption of super-intelligent players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B40, C70, C72, C73.